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Summary  
 
This thesis explores drivers of female labour force participation and analyses the consequences of an increase 
in female labour force participation for income inequality at the household level. This study combines these 
two important macro indicators, namely female labour force participation and income inequality, and 
investigates their dynamics in the Swiss context from 1992 to 2014.  
 
In the first part of the thesis, particular attention is placed on the determinants of female labour force 
participation at the macro and micro level. At the macro level, contextual variables are either included in the 
background to identify the socio-political context in which women live or examined more in detail to 
determine their influence on women’s labour supply. At the micro level, wages and income of women and 
their partners are studied as main determinants of women’s labour supply. These classical determinants are 
paired with socially constructed ideologies identified through gender role attitudes towards work and family. 
The first article of this thesis examines the effects of the expansion of childcare provision at the cantonal 
level with respect to maternal and paternal labour supply, while the second article of this thesis includes 
taxes and benefits, childcare costs, and culture as contextual variables in a joint labour supply model of 
women and their partners.  
 
In the second part of the thesis, the focus shifts towards household income inequality. The third and last 
article of this thesis investigates how the increase in female labour force participation affects household 
income inequality in Switzerland. The analysis distinguishes between different income sources and 
household types, including both couples and singles.  
All articles focus not only on the extensive participation of women on the labour market, but also on the 
intensity of this participation in terms of part-time rates.  
 
The main databases used in this thesis are the Swiss Labour Force Survey (1992-2014) and the Swiss 
Household Panel (2000-2014). Each article is built on a specific methodology. The first article identifies the 
effect of family policy reforms that were introduced at the beginning of the 2000s and uses a difference-in-
differences estimation. The second article explores the impact of economic and attitudinal endowments of 
women and their partners with respect to women’s labour supply through a discrete labour supply model. 
The third article investigates the consequences of the expansion in female labour force participation for 
household income inequality through index decompositions and counterfactual analyses.  
 
Results identify a small but significant impact of the expansion of childcare provision on mothers’ high part-
time rates. No effects are found for paternal employment. Men play an important role for women’s labour 
supply as partners influence women’s decisions both through their economic and their attitudinal 
endowments. This income effect is particularly relevant for home-oriented women who feel strong moral 
pressures to stay home and perform childcare. In Switzerland, the total increase of female labour force 
participation contributed to keep household income inequality low. This effect was mainly due to the reduced 
variability in women’s wages. 
Keywords: female labour force participation, childcare, gender roles, household dynamics, income inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Résumé  
 
Cette thèse intitulée « La participation des femmes au marché du travail et les dynamiques des inégalités de 
revenus en Suisse entre 1992 et 2014 » explore les facteurs qui influencent la participation des femmes au 
marché du travail et analyse les conséquences de la croissance de cette participation en termes d’inégalités 
de revenu au niveau des ménages. Cette étude combine deux importants indicateurs au niveau macro, la 
participation des femmes au marché du travail et l’inégalité de revenu, et examine leurs dynamiques dans le 
contexte suisse entre 1992 et 2014.  
 
Dans la première partie de la thèse, l’attention est portée sur les déterminants de la participation des femmes 
au marché du travail aux niveaux macro et micro. Au niveau macro, les variables contextuelles sont soit 
inclues pour identifier le contexte socio-politique dans lequel les femmes vivent soit examinées plus en détail 
pour déterminer leur influence sur le nombre d’heures de travail effectué par les femmes. Au niveau micro, 
les revenus des femmes et de leurs partenaires sont étudiés comme déterminants pour le nombre d’heures 
de travail effectué par les femmes. Ces déterminants classiques sont appariés avec des données relatives aux 
idéologies socialement construites concernant les attitudes au travail ou à la famille. Le premier article de 
cette thèse examine les effets de l’expansion de la garde extrafamiliale au niveau cantonal sur le nombre 
d’heures travaillé par les mères et les pères. Le deuxième article de cette thèse inclut les impôts et les 
avantages fiscaux, les coûts de garde et la culture des parents comme variables de contexte dans un model 
commun d’offre de travail basé sur les femmes et leurs partenaires.    
 
Dans la deuxième partie de la thèse l’emphase se déplace sur l’inégalité de revenu au niveau des ménages. 
Le troisième et dernier article de cette thèse interroge sur l’influence éventuelle d’une augmentation de la 
participation des femmes au marché du travail sur l’inégalité de revenu en Suisse. L’analyse fait la distinction 
entre différentes sources de revenu et types de ménages, incluant les couples et les célibataires.    
Tous les articles se focalisent non seulement sur la participation extensive des femmes au marché du travail, 
mais aussi sur la proportion de contrat à temps partiel. 
  
Les principales bases de données utilisées dans cette thèse sont l’Enquête Suisse la Participation Active (ESPA 
1992-2014) et le Panel Suisse de Ménages (PSM 2000-2014). Chaque article se base sur une méthodologie 
spécifique. Le premier article identifie l’effet des reformes de la politique familiale qui ont été introduites au 
début des années 2000 en employant une estimation de la différence des différences. Le deuxième article 
explore l’impact des dotations économiques et attitudinales des femmes et de leurs partenaires sur les 
heures travaillées par les femmes à travers d’un model commun d’offre de travail. Le troisième article 
s’interroge sur les conséquences de l’expansion de la participation des femmes au marché du travail pour 
l’inégalité de revenu au niveau des ménages employant des décompositions d’indices et des analyses 
contrefactuelles.  
 
Les résultats mettent en avant un impact faible mais significatif de l’expansion de l’offre de garde formelle 
extrafamiliale sur le temps de travail partiel entre les mères. Ces réformes n’ont pas eu un effet sur le travail 
des hommes. Les hommes jouent néanmoins un rôle important pour le travail des femmes car les partenaires 
influencent les décisions des femmes avec leurs ressources économiques et leurs attitudes. L’effet du revenu 
des partenaires est particulièrement pertinent pour les femmes orientées vers les tâches ménagères qui 
ressentent des fortes pressions morales pour rester à la maison et s’occuper des enfants. En Suisse, 
l’augmentation de la participation des femmes au marché du travail a contribué à maintenir une basse 
inégalité de revenu. Cet effet a été produit par la réduction de la variabilité des salaires des femmes.   
Mots-clés : participation des femmes au marché du travail, garde extrafamiliale des enfants, rôles de genre, 
dynamique des ménages, inégalité de revenu 
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Summary 
This thesis explores drivers of female labour force participation and analyses the consequences of an increase 
in female labour force participation for income inequality at the household level. This study combines these 
two important macro indicators, namely female labour force participation and income inequality, and 
investigates their dynamics in the Swiss context from 1992 to 2014.  
 
In the first part of the thesis, particular attention is placed on the determinants of female labour force 
participation at the macro and micro level. At the macro level, contextual variables are either included in the 
background to identify the socio-political context in which women live or examined more in detail to 
determine their influence on women’s labour supply. At the micro level, wages and income of women and 
their partners are studied as main determinants of women’s labour supply. These classical determinants are 
paired with socially constructed ideologies identified through gender role attitudes towards work and family. 
The first article of this thesis examines the effects of the expansion of childcare provision at the cantonal 
level with respect to maternal and paternal labour supply, while the second article of this thesis includes 
taxes and benefits, childcare costs, and culture as contextual variables in a joint labour supply model of 
women and their partners.  
 
In the second part of the thesis, the focus shifts towards household income inequality. The third and last 
article of this thesis investigates how the increase in female labour force participation affects household 
income inequality in Switzerland. The analysis distinguishes between different income sources and 
household types, including both couples and singles.  
All articles focus not only on the extensive participation of women on the labour market, but also on the 
intensity of this participation in terms of part-time rates. 
 
The main databases used in this thesis are the Swiss Labour Force Survey (1992-2014) and the Swiss 
Household Panel (2000-2014). Each article is built on a specific methodology. The first article identifies the 
effect of family policy reforms that were introduced at the beginning of the 2000s and uses a difference-in-
differences estimation. The second article explores the impact of economic and attitudinal endowments of 
women and their partners with respect to women’s labour supply through a discrete labour supply model. 
The third article investigates the consequences of the expansion in female labour force participation for 
household income inequality through index decompositions and counterfactual analyses.  
 
Results identify a small but significant impact of the expansion of childcare provision on mothers’ high part-
time rates. No effects are found for paternal employment. Men play an important role for women’s labour 
supply as partners influence women’s decisions both through their economic and their attitudinal 
endowments. This income effect is particularly relevant for home-oriented women who feel strong moral 
pressures to stay home and perform childcare. In Switzerland, the total increase of female labour force 
participation contributed to keep household income inequality low. This effect was mainly due to the reduced 
variability in women’s wages.   
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Introduction 
Conceptual framework  
This thesis analyses the link between changes in female labour force participation and changes in 
income inequality in Switzerland. This study was supported by the related SNF project “Income and 
wealth inequality, deprivation and wellbeing in Switzerland, 1990-2013” (project 100017_143320) 
and has been inspired by a combination of its first two modules, namely “Economic inequality: 
Macro-level dynamics” (Module 1) and “Micro-level dynamics of income inequality and deprivation” 
(Module 2). The dynamics of two important macro indicators, female labour force participation and 
income inequality, are investigated within the Swiss context. Within this context, the determinants 
of female labour force participation at the macro and micro level are studied more in detail. At the 
micro level, wages and income of women and their partners are included as determinants of 
women’s labour supply, together with socially constructed ideologies, which are identified through 
moral attitudes towards work and family. At the macro level, contextual variables (e.g. taxes, 
childcare costs, culture) are either included in the background to identify where women live, or 
studied more in detail (e.g. childcare provision) to determine their influence on women’s labour 
supply.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How each component analysed in this study is linked to the other components of the conceptual 
framework is graphically represented in Figure 1. This conceptual framework is supported by recent 
literature on the different mechanisms that influence labour supply and income inequality.  
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Apart from childcare availability, the tax system, and childcare costs have been found to be strong 
institutional predictors of women’s labour supply (Attanasio, Low & Sanchez-Marcos 2008; 
Thévenon 2013; Kabatek, Van Soest & Stancanelli 2014; Cascio, Haider & Nielsen 2015). The 
implementation of these financial incentives and their response may depend also on the 
predominant culture of where people live. Mothers’ labour supply is, for instance, lowest in the 
Italian-speaking canton of Switzerland (Giudici & Schumacher 2017) and the equal division of work 
between men and women is supported in some cantons more than others (Epple et al. 2015). 
Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer & Zweimüller (2017) found also that despite similar local labor markets 
and identical institutions, Romance language speakers in Switzerland search for work almost seven 
weeks longer than their German speaking neighbours. Culture, in the form of mediatically 
influenced ideologies, shapes also the demand for social insurance between the main linguistic 
regions of Switzerland (Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer & Zweimüller 2011). The list of macro predictors 
of women’s labour supply presented in Figure 1 is not exhaustive. Other important elements are the 
flexibility and the performance of the labour market, geographical distances and other family 
policies, such as maternity leaves and after-school regulations (Jaumotte 2003). Even if not directly 
addressed by this dissertation, robustness checks are performed to test the reliability of the main 
results controlling for other important macro characteristics.  
The determinants of women’s labour supply are also at the micro level. At the micro level, these are 
mainly women’s education, fertility, marriage and divorce prospects (Goldin 1990). From an 
economic perspective, women decide to work (or to work more/less) depending on their wage 
potential, their partner’s wage level and the presence of other income sources in the household 
(Goldin 2006). In this sense, women’s labour supply depends on what might be called the economic 
endowments of the household. Research has found the presence of this income effect proving that 
women work less when their partner earns high incomes (England et al. 2012). This is not only a 
static picture, but also a dynamic adjustment that happens in proximity to fertility decisions. 
Bredemeier and Juessen (2013) have shown that women living with a high earning partner are more 
likely to reduce their hours of work and to have children than women living with a low earning 
partner. On average, women react more strongly to their partner’s wage then to their own wage 
(Devereux 2004; Bargain, Orsini & Peichl 2014). This labour supply reduction is smaller in recent 
years as research suggests that the link between partner’s wage and labour supply is weakening 
over time (Blau & Kahn 2007; Verbakel & De Graaf 2009). Compared to previous decades, women’s 
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personal motivation and lifestyle preferences have become more important for women’s labour 
supply decisions (Hakim 2000; Goldin 2006).  
Going from the drivers of female labour force participation to the consequences on income 
inequality, this dissertation tests how women’s labour supply affects household income inequality 
through different channels.  
First, female labour force participation increases the number of women with positive earnings and 
decreases the number of women with zero earnings. This makes earnings more homogeneous 
among women.  
Second, more earnings among women can also potentially affect within household inequality. Given 
the negative gender pay gap for women (which in 2014 was 15.1% in the private sector, see SFSO 
2015b and Anastasiade & Tillé 2017), this increase in earnings should reduce within household 
inequality and increase the correlation of earnings among partners. The total effect depends also 
on the composition of households and on the proportion of single households. It can be predicted 
that the household composition changes with an increase in women’s labour supply as the 
likelihood to form a single household may depend on economic independence. Higher earnings may 
be linked to an increase in the number of single households also through the possibility of divorce 
(Teachman 2010; Simonsson & Sandström 2011). However, this seems to be a mechanism that 
happened mainly in the past when many women were not employed. In more recent years, higher 
earnings increase financial stability, and, in most countries, this reduces the risk of divorce 
(Poortman 2005; Cooke & Gash 2010; Kanji & Schober 2014) and thus the likelihood of being in 
single households. In Switzerland where the probability of being a high-earning single woman has 
declined between 2000 and 2014 (Ravazzini et al. 2017, Figure 3).1  
Third, more earnings among women can also affect between household inequality. This depends on 
the correlation between partners’ earnings and on which women decide to work (more). On the one 
hand, if women in income-poor household increase their labour supply contribution, the effect of 
an increase in women’s labour supply should be equalising on total household inequality. On the 
other hand, if women in income-rich household increase their labour supply, then the effect should 
be desequalising. The second part of Figure 1 is an essential representation of a much more complex 
system of relationships that go from working hours to household income inequality. A more detailed 
figure is illustrated at the beginning of the third article of this thesis (see Figure 12). 
                                                          
1 Please note that the labels of Figure 3 in Ravazzini et al. 2017 should be Low, Intermediate and High instead of Lower 
secondary, Upper secondary and Tertiary.  
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This thesis continues by presenting more in detail the main components of the conceptual 
framework. 
 
Socio-political context 
To sustain dual-earner couples and reduce women’s career interruptions linked to childrearing, the 
welfare state has been reformed in many countries. The revolution began in the 1970s in 
Scandinavian countries, where family services were prioritised. Among all the family policies that 
were expanded in many countries, childcare has been found to minimise interruptions after 
childbirths and to reduce opportunity costs (Esping-Andersen 2009). Compared to other family 
policies, such as paid maternity leave, this policy comes without producing negative gender 
stereotypes (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011; Zoch & Schober 2018) and generates further positive 
effects on children’s cognitive abilities independently from the educational level of their parents 
(Havnes & Mogstad 2011; Crettaz & Jacot 2014; Felfe, Nollenberger & Rodriguez-Planas 2015; Felfe 
& Lalive 2018). Despite these positive effects and probably due to the high costs associated with 
these policies, huge disparities still exist in terms of implementation of childcare across countries 
(Cascio et al., 2015). Given their early start, in Europe, Scandinavian countries are the most 
performant with respect to all work-family reconciliation policies (Havnes and Mogstad 2011) and 
other countries have consistently improved their services over time (the latest reform in Spain, for 
instance, granted public places in childcare facilities for 70% of children and additional private places 
for another 20% of children, Nollenberger & Rodriguez-Planas 2015).  
Switzerland has traditionally intervened only sporadically to rule family matters and because of its 
liberalism, this country usually ranks among the lasts with respect to the generosity of its family 
policies. In this country, family reforms started mainly in the first years of the 2000s. In 2005, 
maternity leave was established, providing a federal minimum of 14 weeks at 80% of normal salary. 
This federal legislation was largely a legal confirmation of what the vast majority of employers had 
established in the early 1990s. The experiences of other countries also show that job continuity is 
not affected if leave entitlements are for up to 17-18 weeks (Baker & Milligan 2008), which is much 
longer than what has been legally established in Switzerland. 
Another reform was childcare. In 2003, some federal subsidies of 200 million Swiss francs were 
granted to early childcare and after-school facilities for a period of 8 years. This public incentive has 
been renewed twice for another 240 million francs, and around half of it (133.8 million francs) was 
claimed by early childcare facilities. Subsidies are expected to last until 2019. The allocated subsidies 
11 
 
did not alter the prices that parents had to pay to enrol their children in these facilities, but they 
covered some fixed costs that could reduce the profitability of opening or expanding childcare 
centres. These financial incentives boosted childcare and after-school places in both public and 
private facilities. 2 Over a period of 13 years, the supply increased by 28,480 places in early childcare 
facilities and by 22,121 places in after-school facilities. Despite this success, almost half of childcare 
facilities declared that they could not satisfy the demand due to inadequate time slots, which in 
most cases meant that there were fewer places than the demand for those places on certain days 
of the week (OFAS 2016). Given the high share of women working part-time in Switzerland (see 
Figure 3 in the section on Women’s labour supply), it is not surprising that women need childcare 
slots on some days more than others. Even if the reform has expanded the number of days per slot 
available, this expansion still seems far from meeting the demand. Additionally, some peripheral 
regions have not seen notable gains from this expansion (Schmid, Kriesi & Buchmann 2011). Political 
priorities, intentions to attract highly qualified migrants to the area, and the availability of 
infrastructure and of childcare providers are some of the reasons that may have led to differences 
in the implementation of childcare services. Regardless of where the facility is based, it is the 
responsibility of the (new) childcare facility to request the subsidy. This fact may therefore reduce 
the importance of cantons in determining the demand for childcare. The effect of childcare reforms 
on women’s labour supply is the first research questions of this thesis.  
In addition to these childcare reforms, some cantons reformed their constitutions to establish a 
legal enforcement of after-school care. As illustrated by Felfe et al. (2016), this legal enforcement, 
however, had an impact only in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, where after-school care 
was particularly underdeveloped. Despite these reforms, parental and paid paternity leave are still 
inexistent in this country (The Fatherhood Institute 2016) and in 2012, childcare coverage in the 
most performing cantons was only 21.5% adding both private and public institutions (Ravazzini 
2018). The decision to rely on the market for a large part of the provision of childcare services is also 
likely to be accompanied by market failures such as high prices and imperfect information. This 
appears to be the case in Switzerland, where waiting lists for subsidised places are very long (8.1 
children can be enrolled in the same waiting list for each childcare place according to Banfi et al. 
                                                          
2 Statistics about the number of places provide information regarding what the Swiss Federal Statistical Office has 
defined as “institutional care.” Independently from public funding, institutional care includes pre-school institutions, 
after-school institutions, nursery schools and associations of trained personnel specialising in day-care services for 
children.   
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2009 and Dasoki, Giudici & Le Goff 2011) and the price of childcare is a strong disincentive3 both for 
high- (Bütler & Ruesch 2009) and particularly for low-income families (Abrassart & Bonoli 2015; 
Stern & Felfe 2015).  
For female labour supply, childcare prices are clearly an important element, but they represent only 
a limited part of the story. On the one hand, some mothers, for instance low-educated mothers, are 
often the disadvantaged groups with respect to childcare accessibility when prices are high; on the 
other hand, they are also those who are less strongly motivated to take part in the labour market. 
Investments on this type of policy can be successful in terms of female employment only when there 
is an intention to become active on the labour market. This depends also on culture and on attitudes 
towards paid employment and gender roles. These cultural dimensions might prevail on decisions 
or be more silent in some parts of the life-course of individuals. Studies have found that attitudes 
become more important when economic incentives created by public policies lose their effect and 
this is usually when children become older (Hummelsheim & Hirschle 2010; Liechti 2017). Attitudes 
have also evolved over time and, in parallel to increasing female labour force participation, social 
norms towards women’s work have generally changed towards more egalitarian values (Zuo & Tang 
2000).  
What has not changed are fertility intentions, which appear to have remained stable at two children 
per family (Esping-Andersen 2009). In Switzerland, fertility has been lower than the two-child norm 
since 1972. In 2014, fertility in this country was 1.54. The theory on fertility decisions highlights at 
least two main decisional factors: the earning capacity of the main breadwinner and the opportunity 
cost of motherhood in terms of potential lifetime earnings (Hotz et al. 1997). A woman who 
interrupts her main activity for a period of five years to take care of her children earns 40% less on 
a lifetime basis than what she would have earned if she did not interrupt her activity (Esping-
Andersen 2009). This estimate is calculated without looking at pension entitlements or wealth 
accumulation. Childcare has been again proposed as a possible family policy to avoid career 
interruptions and increase fertility.  Among the different tools used by the public policy, many 
countries propose a mix of tax deductions and subsidised care. In Switzerland, many cantons allow 
for tax deductions for childcare (Ravazzini, Guillet & Suter 2016) in addition to family allowances 
and new-born supplements (Ravazzini & Chesters 2018). Whether these policies are effective in 
                                                          
3 According to the OECD Family Database (2014), childcare fees are 67.3% of the average wage. This is the highest 
proportion among 34 OECD countries. For middle-class two-income families, this corresponds to 23.6% of net household 
income. Switzerland can be ranked together with other liberal countries with a proportional fee for childcare 2.4 times 
higher than in Germany or France and almost 9 times higher than in Austria. 
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changing women’s realised fertility might however depend on the returns that women foresee in 
the short-run. Tax deductions might have a considerable time lag to be considered for this type of 
decisions, whereas childcare subsidies might have a more sudden impact on household finances.  
Even if some family policies could affect the entire household, previous research conducted on the 
Swiss context and other contexts found that only the employment behaviour of mothers has 
changed over time.  Fathers appear inelastic to changes in policies (Asai 2015; Felfe et al. 2016) and 
their behaviour towards full-time employment is stable over time. To reach more equality on the 
labour market, some commentators are suggesting that men should be granted the same rights to 
childcare that women have (Esping-Andersen 2009). This would imply a more radical reform and 
the institutionalisation of paternal and parental leave at the national level. Until that time, 
motherhood penalty reflected in lower salaries for working mothers and other gendered 
inequalities on the labour market are likely to persist.  
 
Economic and attitudinal endowments  
In many European countries, the last years have witnessed an expansion of some household types, 
namely of single adult households and of recomposed families (Goldschneider, Bernhard & 
Lappegard 2015). In Switzerland, household types have remained rather stable over time, but new 
family arrangements in terms of the division of work have altered the “traditional male breadwinner 
model” (i.e. women do not work, men work full-time) changing it into a “modified male breadwinner 
model” (i.e. women work part-time, men work full-time) (Blossfeld & Drobnič 2001; Bühler, Brun, 
Steinmann & Brulhardt 2002). In this country, 75% of couples had a unique male breadwinner in 
1970 (Levy Bühlmann & Widmer 2007) and this proportion decreased to only 32% in 2000 and 19% 
in 2014 (Kuhn & Ravazzini 2017a).  
This evolution of dual-earner couples challenges Becker’s theory of division of labour based on 
household production or paid work (Becker 1965, 1991). According to this theory, and to pooled-
income approach to household decision-making, the partner with the highest economic potential 
maximises the time spent in employment, while the other partner maximises the time spent in 
unpaid activities that could be beneficial for the household (e.g. housework, childcare and other 
forms of care). With educational expansion, however, economic potentials are becoming more 
similar between partners and this theory is losing part of its foundations. In addition, instead of a 
single utility function for the household, other contributors have illustrated how partners could have 
two different utility functions that are maximized through bargaining (Manser & Brown 1980; 
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McElroy & Horney 1981). The role of the welfare state is here crucial as the result of bargaining will 
depend on whether taxes and benefits are placed on the entire household or on one of the two 
partners (Lundberg & Pollak 1993). 
More recently, other theories have been introduced to explain how partners influence women’s 
labour supply. These theories rely less on economic reasons and more on sociological explanations. 
According to these theories, partners have an influence on women’s labour supply also through 
their social capital and their attitudes towards work and family (Fortin 2005; Kangas & Rostgaard 
2007; Steiber & Haas 2009, 2012; van Gameren 2013; Stam, Verbakel & de Graaf 2014).  Highly 
educated men might transfer their positive attitude towards the labour market to their partners. 
They may also provide resources for their partners to find a suitable job activating their network. 
On the contrary, men with traditional attitudes toward the gender roles at work and within the 
family might discourage women from an active participation in the labour market. Women’s and 
their partners’ attitudes towards work and family, which could be called the attitudinal endowments 
of the household, are therefore important elements to consider for labour supply decisions. 
Economic resources are only one aspect that explains the division of work within households. 
Gender role attitudes might be able to explain more.  
Considering contextual and economic factors in Switzerland, the mechanisms through which 
attitudes influence labour supply of women and their partners is the second research questions of 
this thesis.  
 
Women’s labour supply 
In Switzerland, female labour force participation has been steadily increasing since the early 1990s 
reaching 79% of women active on the labour market in 2014 (Figure 2). In a cross-national 
perspective, Switzerland has one of the top scores in terms of female labour force participation 
among all European countries (close to Scandinavian countries like Iceland and Sweden) (Hermann 
& Murier 2016). The rise in female labour force participation has been associated with higher 
educational levels, less traditional gender ideologies, more economic freedom and higher 
contributions to public finances. Due to this last aspect, a high female labour force participation is 
usually considered a good target for public policies.  
In Switzerland, the most rapid increase in employment (25 percentage points) has been registered 
for mothers of young children, namely for mothers of children below 15 years old (Figure 2). Despite 
this important increase, Switzerland loses many positions if maternal employment is studied 
compared to total female labour force participation. For maternal employment, Switzerland 
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occupies the 11th place among 28 European countries (Hermann & Murier 2016). According to the 
Europe 2020 targets (European Commission 2018), employment rates should be at least 75% for 
persons aged 20-64. Switzerland met this target for women in the 2000s, but in 2014 the target was 
not yet met for mothers of young children. Female labour force participation has always been lower 
for mothers than for all women, whereas it has always been higher for fathers than for all men. 
Fathers’ employment appears rather stable at 95% and does not show important signs of 
adjustment to women’s employment (Figure 2). Employment remains at high levels also for all men, 
but it has slightly declined over time (from 92% in 1992 to 87% in 2014). Therefore, the gender 
employment gap, defined as the difference in employment between men and women, has halved 
between 1992 and 2014 (going from 40% to 21% for parents and from 20% to 8% for the entire 
population).  
 
Figure 2: Labour force participation rates for women and men, and mothers and fathers of young children, 
1992-2014 
 
Sources: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: The sample includes individuals between 20 and 50 
years old. Young children are defined as children below 15 years old.  
 
The particularity of female employment in this country is the high share of women, and particularly 
of mothers working part-time (Figure 3). The national definition of part-time includes all work 
percentages up to 90%. According to this definition, Switzerland is the European country where 
part-time is the most common form of employment. Alternatively, the European definition of part-
time work means working for less than 30 hours per week or working at 75% for a week of 40 hours 
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(van Bastelaer, Lemaître & Marianna 1997). If this definition is applied, then Switzerland becomes 
the second country for part-time work after the Netherlands (Hermann & Murier 2016).4 Figure 3 
shows that very few men work part-time (less than 15%), whereas many women (45%) and most 
mothers (81%) who are active on the labour market have a part-time employment. The high increase 
of part-time work among active women is usually an adjustment to lower percentage rates that 
happens after the birth of the first child (Levy & Ernst 2002; Le Goff & Levy 2016). This adjustment 
depends on many factors. Individual characteristics such as women’s educational level, the 
educational level of their partners (Krone-German & de Chambrier 2011; Giudici & Schumacher 
2016) and marital status (Hiekel et al. 2014) are particularly important for this labour supply 
adjustment.  Cultural and structural factors are also relevant elements that should be taken into 
account to understand women’s employment decisions (Wood, Kil & Marynissen 2018). 
Even if the decision to decrease labour supply after childbirth varies according to women’s 
characteristics and to where they live (Felfe, Lechner & Thiemann 2016), many general factors 
including the lack of a paid paternity leave (Valarino & Gauthier 2016) and the fact that women earn 
less than men (Bonjour & Gerfin 2001) lead more women than men to reduce their working hours. 
This division of labour inside the couple might be what both partners want, but in some cases, and 
more often in liberal countries such as Switzerland, this division creates psychological tensions and 
long-lasting gender inequality (Bühlmann 2009).  
In the short-term, it is in most cases financially convenient for couples where both partners work to 
reduce the number of working hours when they have dependent children (Bütler & Ruesch 2009). 
In the long-term, economic gains from interrupted careers during childrearing might however 
become inexistent. This is because women become unable to earn according to their initial earning 
potential due to experience losses and in-job training. Despite high educational and wage 
homogamy, this inequality between men and women is attested by the decrease in similarity 
between partners’ wages over the partnership (Ravazzini, Kuhn & Suter 2017). 
The economic losses due to interrupted careers are difficult to estimate and require specific data 
that include observations over the entire life-course or pension entitlements and retrospective data. 
This estimation is still an open question that the literature needs to address in the future, but 
                                                          
4 It is interesting to notice that in countries where part-time work is common, the percentage of part-time work is 
defined up to a high work percentage (90% in Switzerland and 87.5% in the Netherlands). Another peculiarity in cross-
country comparability is that since the standard hours of work per week are 40, but they can arrive also to 42, in 
Switzerland, a 90% in this country corresponds to more than a full-time in other countries where the standard hours of 
work per week are only 35.  
17 
 
preliminary research shows that women cumulate substantially less wealth than men generating a 
consistent gender wealth gap (Ravazzini & Chesters 2018) and an important gender pension gap 
(Kucera 2015).   
Even if gendered imbalances in earnings are an element tightly linked to women’s labour supply, 
this thesis focuses more on the overall level of income inequality in society. 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of active parents of young children and of active childless individuals working part-time, 
by gender, 2014 
 
Sources: Swiss Labour Force Survey 2014. Notes: The sample includes individuals between 20 and 50 years 
old. Young children are defined as children below 15 years old.  
 
Income inequality  
Unlike an increase in female labour force participation, a rise in income inequality is generally 
regarded as a negative socio-economic change. A high level of inequality is usually associated with 
a higher level of debt, high crime rates, social instability, low levels of subjective well-being5 and low 
social trust (Wilkinson & Pikett 2009). The literature has identified many drivers of income inequality 
both at the macro and at the micro level. In the US, capital gains and the rise of top income shares 
have been identified as the main drivers of the recent increase of income inequality (Piketty & Saez 
2014). In Europe, inequality has remained at comparatively low levels with respect to the US. Still, 
also in several European countries, inequality has been rising since the 1990s (OECD 2008).  
                                                          
5 More than an association between countries with high inequality and low subjective well-being, it is an association 
between the growth in inequality and the decrease in subjective well-being. This means that living in a country with 
higher inequality than another country does not make people more dissatisfied, but if inequality grows in the same 
country, then people become more dissatisfied (Schmidt-Catran 2014; Ravazzini & Chávez-Juárez 2017).  
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Even if in most countries inequality has been rising, the situation is different in Switzerland where 
household income inequality has remained rather stable and only inequality linked to top incomes 
has increased (Suter, Kuhn, Gazareth, Crettaz & Ravazzini 2016). Household income inequality in 
Switzerland is neither high, nor low. Depending on the data source, in a scale from 0 to 1, inequality 
in disposable or net household income ranged between 0.29 and 0.48 in 2014 (Figure 4).  The main 
difference in estimates is between tax statistics, which give high values, and estimates of survey 
data, which suggest a value around 0.30. With this value, income inequality in this country is similar 
to the income inequality of many other European countries. Based on all countries of the Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions 2014, income inequality in Europe is estimated at a value of 0.31, with 
Norway having the lowest value (0.23) and Turkey the highest (0.41) (Eurostat 2015). As previously 
mentioned, contrarily to many countries where inequality increased due to high earners (e.g. the 
US, the UK) or to transition from a closed to an open economy (e.g. Russia and other post-
communist countries), in Switzerland, inequality in household disposable income remained rather 
stable over time (SFSO 2015a). Only inequality in market income (Grabka & Kuhn 2012) and tax data 
suggest a slight increase (Dell et al. 2007). As illustrated by Suter et al. (2016) with the Swiss Earning 
Structure Survey and by Foellmi & Martinez (2017) with social security data, this increase is probably 
due to the rise of top incomes. Even if income shares at the very top of the income distribution (top 
0.01%) have more than doubled in the last coupes of decades (Foellmi & Martinez 2017), this rise 
has been moderated compared to other countries and almost invisible when measured with survey 
data. As these different examples show, income inequality can be measured both with tax registers 
and with survey data. The two measures give a different picture due to the low representability of 
the extremes of the distribution (i.e. both people with very low and very high incomes) in survey 
data. Even if tax registers do not suffer heavily from this under-representation, these data have also 
some drawbacks such as the distance between tax units and household members and 
underreporting of income from self-employment. Although estimates of income inequality 
constructed with tax registers might be considered more representative, the presence of survey 
data containing income has made possible the analysis through the correlation with many socio-
demographic characteristics. The analyses of this dissertation are mainly based on survey data. 
More details about the data are reported in the section about the data and the methodology.  
In terms of labour market changes, the causes of this increase or stability in income inequality have 
been linked to the technological progress and to the regulations of atypical short-term contracts for 
young people (OECD 2011). Demographic changes and changes in family formation have also been 
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studied in some countries (Karoly & Burtless, 1995; Chevan & Stokes 2000; McLanahan & Percheski 
2008), but female labour force participation is rarely regarded as a factor that could affect income 
inequality. Despite the rapid increase in both income inequality and female labour force 
participation in many countries, the way female labour force participation is linked to household 
income inequality is an underexplored mechanism in the literature.  
The consequences of the modified division of work within households on household income 
inequality is the last research question of this thesis. 
 
Figure 4: Gini coefficient of household equivalent disposable or net income  
 
Sources: Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) 1992-2014, Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2000-2014, Statistics of 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) 2007-2015; Household Budget Survey (HBS) 1998, 2000-2011, Federal 
Tax Administration statistics (FTA) 1992-2014 (series including zero-payers 1996-2014), Swiss Poverty Survey 
(SPS) 1992. Notes: in the SLFS 2008 missing values are imputed and for this reason the series has been broken 
in the graph; income in SILC refers to the previous year; more details about these surveys can be found in 
Suter et al. (2016).  
 
Changes in income inequality following crises and particularly the last financial crisis have fuelled 
analyses that link socio-demographic characteristics to income inequality leading to new 
international reports (OECD 2008, 2011, 2015), overarching volumes based on in depth country-
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specific studies on inequalities and their societal impacts (Nolan et al. 2014; Salverda et al. 2014; 
Ravazzini 2015) and internationally comparable databases focused on the income distribution (e.g. 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), see Gornick & Jännti 2013). All these outcomes are possible 
only because of the pioneering studies on income inequality conducted by A.B. Atkinson (1970, 
1971, 1975, 1997). Its contributions highlighted the possibility to distinguish measures of inequality 
according to different income sources and to the importance we give to different parts of the 
distribution, and therefore to different population groups. An index named after him, the Atkinson 
index (Atkinson 1970), represents only a small part of the legacy left by this author. 
To measure income inequality, the Atkinson index is one of the alternatives to the mostly used Gini 
index, but there are many more. As all the aggregated measures, income inequality indices reduce 
information to provide a straightforward number, which is usually comparable across countries and 
over time. The choice of this number depends on the focus of the analysis (e.g. the top, the middle 
or the bottom of the distribution) and on the properties of the inequality index.6 The Gini index is 
for instance easy to interpret: 0 corresponds to perfect equality and 1 corresponds to perfect 
inequality. This index measures the distance of the current distribution of incomes compared to the 
perfectly equal distribution of incomes. Even if the Gini index has been often criticized for not 
measuring changes at the extremes of the distribution and this is even more likely if the Gini is 
measured with survey data, no alternative has so far replaced the Gini index and this index continues 
to be used at the international level.  
To account for changes at the extremes of the distribution, inter-quartiles or inter-decile ratios are 
however increasingly proposed. One of these ratios is the Palma ratio, which divides the top 10 
percent of the distribution by the bottom 40 percent (Palma 2011; Cobham et al. 2016). Following 
the same line, Eurostat provides the income quintile share ratio as a measure of inequality, which 
is the top 20 percent divided by the bottom 20 percent. Even if these ratios are easy to construct 
and simple to use, they maximise the information loss by dividing only a precise position in the 
distribution over another and if the Gini index can be criticized about the fact that it does not take 
into account the extremes, these ratios can be criticised about the fact that they do not consider 
the centre of the distribution.  
                                                          
6 The most desirable properties are population size independence and scale independence (inequality does not change 
if income is multiplied by a positive constant), symmetry (inequality does not change if observed individuals are 
observed in a reversed order) and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (inequality should not increase if income is 
transferred from the rich to the poor). On top of these properties, decomposability by population group is another 
desirable property of these indices. More on these technical aspects about the decomposability of the inequality indices 
are explained in the methodology section. 
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The debate on how inequality is measured does not stop at which index to be used but interests 
also the degree to which inequality measures poverty. This ambiguity between income inequality 
and poverty is present already in the Atkinson index, which implicitly includes normative values 
about the supremacy of the bottom of the distribution.  Through a parameter that measures 
inequality aversion, the Atkinson index can be interpreted as the proportion of total income needed 
to achieve the same level of social welfare as under an unequal income distribution (De Maio 2007; 
Suter et al. 2016).  
In developed countries, the reduction of inequality is interesting from a policy point of view to 
produce fair and stable societies in which all individuals could live trusting each other without any 
fear of crime. The reduction of poverty is of even more importance from a moral and a legal point 
of view as each country is legally engaged to guarantee the right to an adequate standard of living, 
at least at the minimum subsistence levels. The superiority of poverty reduction is established in the 
order of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), which mention poverty reduction in the first place of the agenda and the 
reduction of inequalities in the 10th position. In addition, the first target of the SDG on income 
inequality is very close to a poverty reduction and calls for income growth of the bottom 40 per cent 
of the population at a rate higher than the national average. According to their definition, the SDGs 
are targeted to developing countries and this might explain their order, but, in their current form, 
they have the same goals also for developed countries. Not only in the SDGs, but also in the Europe 
2020 targets, poverty is one of the most important strategic point. Inequality is in this case not 
explicitly targeted, but it is implicitly included in the same strategic point. The Europe 2020 target 
on poverty suggests that the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion should be 
reduced by 20 million. The risk of poverty is measured by Eurostat as having an income below the 
60% of median household income. Poverty is currently measured in a relative way and this implies 
a high correspondence with inequality (Suter, Beycan & Ravazzini 2017). Eurostat indeed found this 
measure to have a correlation of 0.7 with the Gini index (Bogliacino 2014). According to the current 
measure of risk of poverty, if median income augments due to an increase in the income of the 
middle class, then more people are likely to fall into poverty independently of their absolute living 
standards. In 2011, in Switzerland, the average absolute poverty threshold of 2,224 CHF of 
disposable equivalised income per month for single person households was only around CHF 200 
lower than the relative poverty threshold. However, for couples with children this difference was 
CHF 1,350 per month (absolute poverty threshold: average of CHF 4,477 per month; relative poverty 
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threshold: CHF 5,828 per month) (SFSO 2013). Even though the Europe 2020 target on poverty could 
be technically achieved, the way in which it is measured makes it impossible to eradicate poverty as 
long as there is inequality. Elevated by the poverty measure, inequality seems therefore of high 
importance for the European vision of sustainable and inclusive future societies.  
The reason why inequality is not expressively mentioned in the Europe 2020 targets might be linked 
to the fact that poverty reduction has more public consent than inequality reduction. The debate is 
whether it makes sense to talk about differences in earnings or income as something negative. 
Differences in income might indeed reflect differences in effort and should not be penalised by the 
welfare state. For this reason, it seems reasonable to disentangle the part of inequality that 
individuals are able to determine with their own choices from the part of inequality that goes 
beyond their control. There are different ways to tackle this issue.  
One way is to distinguish the sources of inequality and not only the final outcome. With a measure 
of inequality of opportunity, Roemer (1998) proposes to distinguish the part of total inequality due 
to effort from the part due to predetermined circumstances such as gender, ethnicity and parental 
socio-demographic characteristics. Inequality of opportunity is statistically different from income 
inequality: the two measures have a correlation of only 0.3 in Europe (Ravazzini & Chavez-Juarez 
2017). Inequality of opportunity is also often lower than income inequality in developed country 
and in Switzerland this measure was 0.20 in 2014 and ranged from 0.18 to 0.27 between 2002 and 
2014 (Ravazzini & Chavez-Juarez 2017). The concept of inequality of opportunity is closely linked to 
social mobility because high levels of inequality of opportunity are generally associated with low 
levels of social mobility. Previous research found that when there is a perceived probability of 
positive social mobility, the demand for redistribution decreases (Alesina & La Ferrara 2005; 
Ravallion & Lokshin 2000, Guillaud 2013, Cojocaru 2014). At the same time, when inequality is high, 
the demand for redistribution increases (Finseraas 2009).7  
Social mobility and income inequality are therefore linked (OECD, 2008, Figure 8.1) and have a joint 
effect on people attitudes. The effect might be different according to the socio-economic status of 
individuals. With high income inequality individuals at the top might suffer from status anxiety 
                                                          
7 In 2016, in Switzerland, 65% of people expressed their agreement about the fact that the government should intervene 
to decrease income inequality (ESS, own computations). Currently, income taxes are progressive (expect for foreign 
nationals subjected to a lump-sum taxation and in two cantons where income taxes are flat), based on marital status 
and the number of children and levied at the federal, cantonal and municipal level. No federal tax is levied on individuals 
with a yearly taxable income below CHF 14,500 and on couples with a yearly taxable income below CHF 28,300. The 
OECD Taxing Wages 2017 report places the average income tax level for an average Swiss resident earning an annual 
income of 85,536 francs at 10.7%. This average tax rate is lower than the average tax rate of many other European 
countries. 
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(Wilkinson & Pickett 2009; Delhey & Dragolov 2014; Walasek & Brown 2015) and fear to lose 
considerable amounts if they fall down the social ladder. Conversely, poor people that hope to 
improve their relative position might consider a certain degree of income inequality as beneficial 
(Grosfeld & Senik 2010; Kelley & Evans 2017a, b) because potential future gains might be larger 
(Bénabou & Ok 2001). Contrarily to this expectation, research has found that all people, both the 
rich and the poor, are negatively affected by an increase in income inequality (Ravazzini & Chavez-
Juarez 2017). Apart from normative egalitarian arguments and pure aversion to inequality (Alesina, 
Di Tella & MacCulloch 2004; Dawes et al 2007; Carlsson et al 2005;  Senik 2005; Thurow 1971), the 
reason why all people might be negatively touched by inequality could be linked exactly to this loss 
in the capacity to aspire for a better future (Appadurai 2004; Bogliacino 2014). Even if income 
inequality is a limited measure and could be complemented with other indicators (e.g. inequality of 
opportunity), its connections with other important social phenomena, such as social mobility and 
attitudes towards the future, make this indicator fundamental for social policies.  
Despite the possible consent about the importance of this indicator, the discussion remains about 
the degree up to which inequality measures a fair or an unfair society. According to the index 
inequality of opportunity, the only unfair part should correspond to the outcome that people are 
not able to control. In line with this approach, some researchers have proposed to measure natural 
inequality as the part of inequality due to life-cycles profiles of income accumulation and therefore 
to ageing (Atkinson 1971; Paglin 1975). Natural inequality can be measured through an index 
decomposition (Mookherjee & Shorrocks 1982) and has been recently quantified by Harvey, Mierau 
& Rockey (2017) with a Gini index of natural inequality that ranges between 0.2 and 0.35 depending 
on the country. The analysis of Harvey et al. (2017) does not include Switzerland but shows a large 
variability across countries in the share of natural inequality over total income inequality measured 
by classical Gini index. This suggests that inequality levels as they are currently constructed are not 
perfectly comparable measures of unfair inequality.   
Another approach is again proposed in line with the Palma ratio as a measure of distance with the 
elites. Krozer (2015) suggests using the top 5 percent over the bottom 40 percent (the Palma V.2 
index) as a measure of unfair inequality that should be targeted by social policies more than the 
reduction in inequality among the middle class measured by the Gini index. The measure to be 
chosen to quantify unfair inequality is still being debated, but there is consent on the fact that an 
increase in inequality, however it is measured, is a bad sign for social cohesion and for society.  
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This thesis links inequality with other indicators that are sustained by public policies. Results indicate 
whether there is a trade-off to accept between an increase in desirable indicators and an increase 
in income inequality.  
Contribution 
This introductory section identifies the topic of each article and their contribution to the literature 
on women’s labour supply and/or income inequality.  
The first part of this dissertation investigates the determinants of women’s labour supply. With 
women’s labour supply it is intended the decision to participate in the labour market (the extensive 
margin of labour supply) and the number of hours women decide to work (the intensive margin of 
labour supply). Even though this distinction is a classical approach in labour economics, this is 
something rarely investigated in the literature regarding the effects of childcare policies on women’s 
labour supply. Studies on this topic have generally researched the impact of family policies only on 
the engagement in active labour force participation (see Cascio et al. (2015) for a review). So far, 
the focus has been placed on the possible activation effects that changes in family policies could 
produce on inactive women. The focus on the intensive margin of labour supply and the number of 
hours worked by women is however something extremely relevant for countries that have reached 
high female labour force participation and a high share of women working part-time. Only a few 
studies so far have investigated whether a change in policy affected the number of hours worked 
by already working women. These studies have emerged only recently in countries like Switzerland 
(Felfe et al. 2016) and the Netherlands (Bettendorf, Jongen & Muller 2015), which are indeed 
countries where the labour market is flexible enough to allow women to work at different part-time 
rates. Applying an innovative focus on part-time work, the first article of this dissertation aims at 
replicating the study of Felfe et al. (2016) based on after-school care in the German-speaking part 
of Switzerland with a new study of childcare in the entire country. The first article of this thesis is 
based on newly collected administrative data at the cantonal level about childcare provision. More 
details about these data are exposed in the methodological section.   
With more than 2000 municipalities and 26 cantons, the welfare system in Switzerland is one of the 
most decentralised among modern welfare states. This creates different implementations of the 
same broader framework set at the federal level. In addition to this important geographical 
component for childcare provisions, the operationalisation of financial incentives (e.g. taxes, costs 
and benefits) varies depending on whether individuals are in a formal union. In this case, financial 
incentives are tailored at the household level. Partners play a more important role for women’s 
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labour supply in this country than in countries where the welfare system is individualised also for 
married couples (Bennett 2013). Given this economic interdependence between partners 
reinforced by the institutional level, the second article of this dissertation uses a household 
dimension where both partners can contribute in terms of labour supply. Most studies so far have 
considered partners as exogeneous for women’s labour supply (Henz & Sundstrom 2001; Verbakel 
& de Graaf 2009; Verbakel 2010). In this sense, these studies explain how women adjust to men’s 
socio-demographic characteristics and income without considering that labour supply decisions 
take place at the household level and not between two separate decision makers. Men have usually 
a constant labour market contribution and for this reason it might make sense to consider their 
labour supply as given. In the literature, this choice was dictated also by the fact that men were 
more educated and had higher earning potentials. In more recent years, however, women have 
acquired high educational degrees (Becker 2014; Breen et al. 2009, 2010; Zangger & Becker 2016) 
and might have more bargaining power about their labour supply. In addition to this, in Switzerland, 
the importance of endogenous decision-making of couples concerning working time8 is visible 
through the fact that educational assortative mating does not affect income inequality (Wise & 
Zangger 2017; Kuhn & Ravazzini 2017b). The interdependence between couples in labour supply 
decisions has already been modelled by Gerfin & Leu (2007), but the sample comprised only income-
poor couples in 1998.  
One of the innovations of the second article of this thesis is to consider partners decisions as 
endogenous within all types of heterosexual couples. This is done including not only economic 
variables of the two partners, but also attitudes.  
Although rarely included in the literature that studies reactions to increases in income and wages, 
moral behaviours are important because financial incentives targeted to increase labour supply 
might be ineffective if people are not willing to benefit from them. For example, tax incentives and 
subsidies targeted on second earners might be ineffective if parents think that staying at home is 
important for their children’s well-being. The literature has shown that gender role attitudes have 
a strong impact on women’s working hours (van Gameren 2013; Stam et al. 2014) and this impact 
is not only produced by own attitudes, but also by partner’s attitudes (Fortin 2005; Kangas & 
Rostgaard 2007; Steiber & Haas 2009, 2012). The interaction between partners is therefore 
fundamental for both economic and attitudinal variables. The interdependence of these two 
                                                          
8 By endogenous decision-making of couples concerning working time it is intended the adjustment that each partner 
makes to adapt to the employment and earning situation of the other partner. 
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elements is something innovative for the literature on gender role attitudes and for the literature 
on economic wage elasticities.  
The contribution of the second article of this thesis is twofold. First, it specifically models the 
interdependence of partners in terms of labour supply and updates older studies on Switzerland 
targeted on specific population groups. Second, it includes also attitudinal variables and investigate 
how they interact with the economic endowments of women and their partners. More details about 
how this is done in empirical terms is described in the methodology. 
The third article of this thesis adds to the literature on the drivers on income inequality by 
investigating how women’s labour supply affect household income inequality in Switzerland. 
Although many studies have tested the equalizing effect of an increase in female labour force 
participation (Del Boca & Pasqua 2003; Daly & Valletta 2006; Pencavel 2006; Breen & Salazar 2010, 
Larrimore 2014), only a few studies have theoretically considered the intensity of women’s labour 
supply as a driver of household income inequality (Esping-Andersen 2009; OECD 2013) and no study 
has investigated this aspect in detail in a country where part-time is a widespread form of female 
employment. All the articles of this thesis share the innovative aspect of focussing on not only on 
female labour force participation, but also on women’s intensity of paid work and particularly on 
women’s part-time work.  
The drivers of female labour force participation are studied with the first two articles of this 
dissertation and the impacts on income inequality with the last article. The data and the 
methodology used in each article of this thesis are presented in the following section.  
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Data and methodology 
Data 
This dissertation is based mainly on two databases. The first database used for the first article of 
this thesis is the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS). This survey started in 1991 and since then it 
collects cross-sectional information9 about work-related aspects of the 15+ population living in 
Switzerland. The SLFS includes new samples of considerable size every year and since 2009 it allows 
for a representative analysis at the cantonal level.10 Since 2010, the survey design is no longer 
annual, but it consists in four interviews over a period of 18 months. Questions are principally 
objective, related to the labour market and focussed particularly on employment and 
unemployment. Additional themes are education, retirement and gender equality.  
A special module on childcare is included every year from 2001 to 2010, as well as in 2013. However, 
the wording of the question changed in 2010, which makes it possible to compare only the answers 
between 2001 and 2009. Questions ask about the use of institutional forms of childcare and other 
forms of external childcare. As women prefer to use different types of care when they have enough 
resources, it is difficult to estimate the full-time usage rate of a childcare places. The SLFS asks about 
the regular use of external care and the number of days in each type of external care for each child. 
Official statistics provide some figures regarding the use of childcare from the 2013 SILC (SFSO 
2016). From these figures, it appears that 73.8% of children up to 3 years of age are taken care of 
by an external carer. Of these, 17.6% are exclusively cared for by a non-institutional entity such as 
grandparents, nannies and daily mothers, and 56.3% by an institutional entity. Thus, by 2013, the 
majority of young children were at least partly cared for in a childcare facility. Moreover, according 
to the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO, 2016), only 12% of all children using childcare services 
use childcare facilities 5 days per week (35% of children, for instance, use the service 2 days per 
week, and 20% use it only 1 day per week). Of all children using childcare at least one day per week, 
68% use a daily service, 30% use the service only for the first or the second half of the day, and 2% 
of children use an hourly service. Even if the majority of children use childcare at a daily basis, 32% 
of all children use it regularly not a daily basis, but for only some parts of the day. This is an important 
information to consider in the analysis of childcare use.  
                                                          
9 Data collection is through computer aided telephone interviews (CATI). Until 2010, the design included also a 5-year 
rotating panel for employees.  
10 Data at the cantonal level were also available in 1995. A new sample of foreigners has been included in 2003. 
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The SLFS contains information at the micro level and data at the micro level have to be included 
from other sources. Administrative data at the cantonal level about the availability of childcare 
places from 1991 to 2012 have been collected through a separate questionnaire and subsequently 
paired with the SLFS through the information about the canton of residence of individuals. This 
separate online questionnaire has been sent to cantonal bureaux in charge of childcare 
administration. Data have been complemented with information from the website 
www.berufundfamilie.admin.ch11 and with three studies: INFRAS’s report on childcare and equality 
(Stern et al. 2013), the SFSO reports on families in Switzerland (SFSO 2004/2008) and COFF’s report 
on external childcare and after-school care (COFF 2008). In terms of data quality, information about 
childcare availability in the 1990s is extremely scarce because very few cantons had electronic 
archives. Information about childcare places become more accurate only in the 2000s. Overall, 24 
out of 26 cantons have information about the number of childcare places in their public and private 
facilities for at least two years around 2002 and 2012.12 If data for these exact two years are not 
available, information can be retrieved from the years closest to those dates, making the reliable 
assumption that childcare places do not change radically from one year to the next, but rather over 
subsequent decades.13 One of the limitations of the data is the lack of detail at the municipal level, 
which is important in the Swiss context because municipalities are sometimes more competent than 
cantons in regulating childcare activities.14 Another limitation of the data is the lack of information 
about the price of external childcare. In spite of these limitations, to the best of my knowledge, 
these data are the only source currently available about the number of childcare places in 24 Swiss 
cantons between 1991 and 2012. More information about these data can be found in Ravazzini et 
al. (2016). Data on Vaud, Bern and Neuchâtel have been revised with cantonal statistics before the 
publication of the first article of this thesis. 
Even if the SLFS does not contain information at the macro level, there are other questions at the 
micro level that this dissertation could exploit. In addition to work-related aspects and childcare 
use, information about individual earnings collected by the SLFS is very precise and asked with 
                                                          
11 This website has been deactivated on the first of January 2017 and replaced by the publication “Familienfreundliche 
Arbeitsbedingungen: Was Machen die Kantone/Gemeinden?” (Ecoplan, 2016).   
12 The only two cantons missing are Uri and Obwalden. 
13 Half of the cantons have information about one or two years before or after 2002, whereas six cantons have 
information on childcare places in 2010, but not in 2012.  
14 A collection of data on preschool and after-school care at the municipal level was performed by Stern at al. (2013) in 
2009-2010. No such previous collection was performed, and this prevents the use of these data in an application with a 
quasi-experimental design using the number of childcare places. Felfe et al. (2016) employed these data in a two-stage-
least-square estimator instrumenting the variation in the cantonal reforms of after-school care. Cantonal reforms were 
also used in a difference-in-differences framework that did not look at the after-school supply.  
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several questions where people can indicate their net and/or gross earnings at an hourly, monthly 
or yearly basis including indications about the 13th and 14th salary. Information about household 
characteristics and household income is much less precise. This survey asks only one global question 
about net and/or gross household income and the proportion of missing values is rather high (from 
23 to 45%). Except in 2008, missing values are not imputed. The SLFS is a survey based mainly on 
individuals and not on households. For this reason, the SLFS lacks information on partner’s income.  
Due to the richness in information about household and partners’ characteristics, the main database 
used for the last two articles of this thesis is the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). This database uses 
representative samples of the Swiss population 14+ since 1999 (SHP I). Refreshment samples were 
introduced in 2004 (SHP II) and 2013 (SHP III). Migrants that arrived in Switzerland between 2004 
and 2013 are not well represented in this survey because the sample was not refreshed in this 
period.  
Compared to the SLFS, the SHP covers a shorter time span. In this sense, the SLFS can be used to 
evaluate changes at the macro level between two centuries, whereas the SHP can better identify 
the within-household dynamics since the onset of the major family policies reforms of the beginning 
of the 2000s. For this dissertation, the fact that the SHP collects15 information about incomes and 
labour supply for all household members in every year is extremely important. This information is 
collected through several questions both at the individual and at the household level. The SHP asks 
also several subjective questions on attitudes. Gender role attitudes are asked in 2002-2011 and 
2014.  
Even if not fully exploited in this study, the most distinctive feature of this database is its longitudinal 
nature. The SHP follows individuals and households over time. Missing values for income are 
imputed using also the longitudinal information available in the panel. Even though this design 
opens new research possibilities, a panel design is linked to attrition and this is likely to decrease 
inequality over time. Part of the effect of attrition, however, can be corrected through weighting. 
Data of the SHP is particularly useful for the analysis on hourly wages because these data include 
income and labour supply for all household members over time. This survey design allows for good 
data imputation on hourly wages (see also Kuhn 2008) and this is particularly important for the 
imputation of wage potentials in the second article of this thesis. In the second and the third article 
of this dissertation, hourly wages have been computed for both partners at the basis of monthly 
                                                          
15 Like for the SLFS, up to know the survey mode has been computer aided telephone interviews. The SHP allows for 
alternative survey modes for difficult cases.    
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wages and weekly working hours. The SHP does not apply any top-code for economic variables, but 
to restrain the influence of outliers, the second and third article of this thesis top-code hourly wages 
at 10 times the median wage and the highest 0.2(5) percent of total household income.  
Sample and working time definitions 
Even if the comparability has been searched, the sample selection differs in the three articles of this 
thesis due to methodological reasons.  
The first article focuses on the effect of childcare for women’s labour supply. The sample used in 
this study is therefore more linked to fertility and employability and includes mothers between 20 
and 50 years old who have at least one child between 0 and 3 years old. Some tests are performed 
also on fathers within the same age range.  
The second article focuses on intra-household labour supply decisions. As joint decisions become 
relevant when there is more than one person in the household, the sample of the second article is 
restricted to cohabiting couples. No sample restriction is placed on marital status or on parenting 
as these characteristics are interesting to study labour supply behaviours within couples. Given the 
importance of women and their labour supply, only heterosexual couples within a working-age 
range (25-64 years old) are taken into account for the analysis.  
The same working-age range is applied also to the third article of this thesis. The sample of the third 
article is however different to the second article because single households are important for the 
analysis of the impact of women’s labour supply on household income inequality.  Therefore, the 
third article of this thesis includes both singles and couples.  
Even if the focus is placed on women’s labour supply in all three articles of this thesis, men are 
always present, and the analyses are tailored so that their contribution can always be discussed. In 
addition, in all the three articles, the samples are not restricted to inactive women, but include 
selected women independently from their working hours. Working hours are used to create 
interesting categories for the analysis. 
The definition of part-time and women’s working hours is particularly important for this 
dissertation. In the third article, in line with an old definition of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(SFSO), individuals working at six one hour per week are considered as active,16 and individuals 
working at least 36 hours a week as full-time workers. A distinction between low part-time work (6–
                                                          
16 The new definition of economically active individuals of the SFSO has adapted to the ILO definition of one hour of 
work. Currently, in Switzerland, a job of less than six hours per week is called minimal professional activity (translated 
from the French activité professionnelle minimale). 
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19 hours) and high part-time work (20–35 hours) is made for some analyses. A similar distinction of 
high part-time work is also used for the first article. In this case, high part-time corresponds to work 
percentages higher than 50% and lower than 90%. In a normal week of 40 hours, this range 
corresponds to 20-36 working hours. The second article uses the most elaborated definition of 
working hours. Under the assumption that working hours have a continuous distribution (Aaberge, 
Dagsvik & Strøm 1995; van Soest 1995), and this seems to be the case for Switzerland (see Figure 
9), women are set to choose between six working alternatives, and namely 0-4, 5-12, 13-20, 21-28, 
29-36 and 37+ hours of work. The third and second last alternatives can correspond to a definition 
of high part-time work. In this thesis, the only article that allows for the same work categories for 
men and women is the first article, where the focus is on mothers and fathers. Otherwise, men are 
modelled differently as their hours of work do not depend heavily on part-time. In the second paper 
of this dissertation, men can choose between inactivity (0-12), part-time (hours range 13-36) and 
full-time work (at least 37 hours per week). The definition of inactivity for men includes more hours 
of work than for women and this is due to the very low proportion of men working at low percentage 
rates. We did not include the possibility for men to work at different part-time percentages within 
part-time work in the third article of this thesis.  
 
Methodological choices and limitations 
Investigating different research questions, each article of this thesis relies on a different 
methodology.  
The first article is based on a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation (see Imbens & Wooldridge 
2009). This empirical strategy is particularly suited to evaluate the effects of reforms targeted to 
specific population groups. The empirical model compares the labour market outcomes of a specific 
group targeted (treated) by a political reform with the outcome of a similar group that is untouched 
by the reform. The methodology consists of a comparison of the years before and the years after 
the reform, under the testable assumption that the groups would have reacted in the same way 
without a reform. The identification strategy used in the first article of this thesis is based on the 
canton of residence. This article tests the effects of the 2003 introduction of subsidies for childcare 
facilities on parental, and especially maternal, employment. Mothers (or fathers) living in cantons 
that have expanded their childcare places more than the national average are considered as treated, 
whereas parents living in cantons with a relatively small expansion of childcare places are the control 
group. Figure 5 shows the evolution of childcare coverage among the treated and the control group. 
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The net increase was of 10 percentage points over 10 years and the increase is, by definition, higher 
in the treated versus the control group. This empirical strategy has been used by similar studies on 
other countries, such as Norway and Germany (Havnes & Mogstad 2011b; Bauernschuster, Hener 
& Rainer 2015).  
Apart from the test about parallel trend assumption before the introduction of the reform, other 
tests must be performed to assure the reliability of the results. In this article, these tests include 
changes in fertility decisions, inter-cantonal mobility and the use of institutional childcare. Two tests 
are also performed to estimate possible confounding effects due to the almost simultaneous 
policies introduced in this period, such as the introduction of paid maternity leave and the legal 
enforcement of after-school care. Other two alternative specifications provide additional reliability 
proofs to the results. The first specification excludes years that are too close to the introduction of 
subsidies. This is done because the expansion of childcare places may have produced nonlinear 
effects in the years before and after the first introduction of childcare subsidies.  
 
Figure 5: Evolution of childcare coverage, comparison between treated and control groups. 
 
Sources: Administrative data on cantonal childcare places (Ravazzini et al. (2016), 2012 cantonal statistics for 
Bern, Neuchâtel and Vaud). The dotted line highlights the expected behaviour of the treated group in absence 
of treatment. A linear trend is assumed to interpolate the missing years. 
 
The second specification is inspired by the method applied by Felfe et al. (2016). This method 
controls for endogeneity of demand-induced supply through the construction of local labour 
markets. According to this innovative methodology, only some municipalities are retained in the 
analysis to gain a comparable set of treated and control cantons. These municipalities are situated 
inside a spatial mobility area composed of at least two neighbouring cantons and have similar voting 
preferences regarding family policies. As in Felfe et al. (2016), data regarding spatial mobility regions 
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and votes for the 2006 referendum on family benefits are retrieved from the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office. 
The geographical dimension is highly important in the first article of this thesis and it remains an 
important background characteristic also in the second article of this thesis. This second article 
applies a discrete labour supply model where both partners can adjust their labour supply 
depending on the other partner and the place where they live. Discrete labour supply models are 
increasingly used because they take into account the dependency between partners and the 
dependency between the decision to become active on the labour market and the decision on the 
number of hours people work (Steiber & Haas 2012; Bargain et al. 2014; Pestel 2017; Muizon 2018). 
In these models, people can choose between different options that give them a certain level of 
consumption, if they decide to work, or a certain amount of time to spend on unpaid activities, if 
they decide not to work. Consumption corresponds to the disposable income that households could 
have depending on the labour supply of both partners. In mathematical terms, this could be written 
as:  
𝐶 = 𝐷𝐼 = 𝑓(𝑤, ℎ, 𝑜|𝑋, 𝑇, 𝜖) = 𝑤ℎ + 𝑜 − 𝑇(𝑤ℎ, 𝑜, 𝜖|𝑋) − 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑤ℎ, 𝑜, 𝜖|𝑋) − 𝜖 (ℎ, 𝑋)   (1) 
Where consumption (C) or disposable income (DI) is a function of hourly wages w, hours of work h 
and other incomes o, given observable socio-demographic characteristics X, simulated taxes and 
benefits T, simulated childcare costs (which depend on income) and semi-observable working costs 
𝜖 (e.g. all working women have a unitary weekly cost given by transportation).  
This model is rather computationally intense because data must be expanded to have all the 
different options for individuals and their partners. Moreover, given the decentralised Swiss 
administrative system, taxes and benefits and childcare costs must be simulated given household 
characteristics and the municipality of residence of individuals. In addition, hourly wages for inactive 
individuals must also be imputed. The procedure for this imputation is described more in detail in 
the methodological section of the second article.  
Individuals do not have to make a binary decision between work and unpaid activities but can decide 
on a combination of the two. Given a rather flexible labour market, these decisions might depend 
on personal preferences, which might depend in their turn on personal characteristics (age, 
education, marital status, nationality, the number of children and their age), the place of residence 
(urbanization, linguistic region) and attitudes towards work and family. The inclusion of attitudes in 
these discrete labour supply models is an innovation of the second article of this thesis. These 
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attitudes are measured in the SHP with the agreement with these statements: “To have a job is the 
best guarantee for a woman as for a man to be independent” and “A pre-school child suffers if his 
or her mother works for pay”. Responses are collected on an 11-point scale, which ranges from 0 to 
10. In addition, attitudes might be influenced by the examples observed during adolescence. The 
literature shows that women whose mothers worked are found to have a strong attachment to the 
labour market and men whose mothers worked are found to be more tolerant towards the active 
labour force participation of their wives (Fernández et al. 2004). To measure this intergenerational 
transmission of attitudes, the SHP provides information on whether the respondent’s mother 
worked when the respondent was 15.  
Given the attention placed on attitudes, these models can be run first excluding and then including 
attitudes as taste shifters. These models can also be performed on different samples depending on 
the level of attitudes that individuals express with respect to gender roles applied to work and 
family. Even if rather demanding in terms of data preparation and settings, these discrete labour 
supply models give flexible estimations that allow to compare the influence of both partners 
simultaneously depending not only on objective, but also on subjective characteristics. Compared 
to other models, such as panel fixed effects, these models do not require long panel data. However, 
among their disadvantages, they need a large number of observations per year and good data for 
the simulations. Compared to longitudinal regressions, they also suffer from the limitation of not 
being able to identify the selection into partnership.  
The third article of this thesis is also based on a form of simulation. In this case, inequality is 
simulated with counterfactual distributions.  Before performing counterfactual distributions, the 
first part of this article decomposes household income inequality in three factors: female labour 
income (f), male labour income (m) and other income sources (ot). The inequality index chosen for 
this decomposition is (half) the (squared) Coefficient of Variation (CV). The CV belongs to the family 
of generalised entropy measures. Like the Atkinson index, the generalised entropy measures have 
a sensitivity parameter (alpha) that weights the distance between incomes at different parts of the 
income distribution. This can be mathematically written as:  
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In the formula, the higher the alpha, the higher the importance at the top of the distribution. Alpha 
usually takes the values of 0, 1 and 2. In case of the CV, alpha is equal to two and this gives high 
importance to the top of the distribution. The CV can be decomposed into three elements 
(Shorrocks 1982): the inequality of each factor, the correlation between income components, and 
the share of each component for total household income. Increased female labour force 
participation might influence income inequality in three different ways: decreasing inequality in 
female earnings, increasing the importance of women’s share of total household income, therefore 
increasing the importance of women’s earnings inequality and changing the correlation of women’s 
earnings with men’s earnings and with other income components, therefore changing within and 
between household income inequality. The impact of each change can be estimated with a shift-
share decomposition over time. Using two points over time, inequality can be computed under the 
assumption that only some elements of the CV have changed and that the other elements have 
remained at their original levels. 
Even if this shift-share decomposition can tell us which factor contributed the most to total 
inequality if the factors are correlated, a limitation of this approach is that inequality within and 
between households cannot be identified. If not disentangled, the correlation between men’s and 
women’s earnings include both the correlation within and between couples and singles. Moreover, 
singles and households with a non-working partner are treated in the same way. An alternative 
approach is to compare inequality using different household types. These types are arbitrary but 
can identify meaningful mating patters and changes in the division of labour within couples. 
Typically, the literature based on couples distinguishes between dual-earner couples, male- and 
female-breadwinner couples, and non-working couples (Pasqua 2008; Harkness 2013). This article 
adds to the literature by including singles and a further distinction of household types by part-time 
and full-time work. To do so, it uses the Theil index, an alternative entropy measure with alpha equal 
to 1. Like the Gini, this index is therefore more sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution. 
One drawback of the Theil index and of all inequality measures based on the logarithm is that zeros 
lead to the index being undefined. Households with no income are, therefore, excluded. Including 
all income sources and not only labour income, however, this exclusion does not concern many 
households and is not problematic for the analysis.  
Unlike the Gini, both the CV and the Theil are unbounded at the top. This means that these indices 
can go beyond the value of 1 or any value and their comparability over time can only be studied in 
relative terms compared to previous periods. Despite this unboundedness, the magnitude of 
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changes in both indices can be studied with respect to the magnitude of the index. In addition, both 
indices are able to give indications about whether inequality increases or decreases. This is most 
important information that the indices must convey for this analysis.   
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Empirical contributions 
Article 1: Childcare and Maternal Part-Time Employment: A Natural 
Experiment using Swiss Cantons 
Abstract 
Fuelled by federal stimuli of 440 million Swiss francs, the staggered expansion of childcare in 
many cantons allows the evaluation of this family policy on female labour supply. With new 
cantonal data, this study analyses both the decision to participate in the labour market and 
the intensity of participation. Empirical results of difference-in-differences regressions show 
that mothers work at higher percentage rates if they live in cantons that have expanded their 
childcare services more than the national average. The reform stimulated part-time 
employment of between 20 and 36 hours per week by 2 percentage points.  The expansion 
of childcare particularly affected women with two children and upper-secondary education, 
who are married or cohabit with their partner.    
 
Keywords: childcare places, maternal employment, policy evaluation, quasi-natural experiment, part-time 
JEL codes: J13, J22, H40  
The published version of this article can be found in the Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics: 
https://sjes.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41937-017-0003-x. This article is single authored.  
Introduction 
Many modern welfare states have prioritised assisting women in their work-family life. One of the 
tools used by policy makers to stimulate the labour supply of mothers is through the expansion of 
childcare. In countries in which female labour force participation is already high, the effects 
produced by childcare are usually minimal (Bettendorf et al. 2015). Recent studies in many 
Scandinavian countries indeed show that subsidised childcare has had no significant impact on 
female labour supply (Lundin, Mörk & Öckert 2008; Havnes & Mogstad 2011b).17 As these studies 
suggest, this is probably because the services provided in these countries meet the demand for 
childcare among all social classes almost perfectly. This does not appear to be the case in 
Switzerland, where, as in Germany (Wrohlich 2008; Bauernschuster & Schlotter 2015), the demand 
for childcare is much higher than the supply (Banfi, Farsi & Filippini 2009). As illustrated in the 
introduction of this thesis, in Switzerland, female labour force participation is very high, but the 
participation of women with children is much lower. As in the Netherlands, the majority of this high 
rate of work force participation is part-time work. This finding suggests that childcare could 
                                                          
17 This trend cannot be entirely generalised for Scandinavian countries, because Danish childcare prices and availability, 
for instance, are highly relevant for female employment (Simonsen, 2010). 
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potentially influence working hours rather than labour market entry itself. However, there is also 
room for improvement also for maternal labour force participation.  
The extensive margin of female labour force participation linked to the availability of childcare has 
been studied in many countries, and results appear to differ depending on the national context (see 
Cascio et al. 2015 and Del Boca 2015 for a review of recent studies). Evidence of the effects on the 
intensive margin is something that has been studied only recently. This paper contributes in this 
respect by examining a natural experiment of childcare expansion in Switzerland.  
This paper analyses the effects of the increase in the number of childcare places driven by public 
subsidies, applying a quasi-experimental design in 24 Swiss cantons. The Swiss federal system is 
peculiar in its characteristics because each canton can legislate over many aspects that affect the 
socio-economic life of its population. This wide variety of legislation creates variability in the data, 
which becomes useful for evaluating policies. In addition to this political diversity, the Swiss context 
is interesting because many aspects of its welfare state have led it to be classified among liberal 
countries. Unlike modern Anglo-Saxon countries that have promoted women’s independence since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the values and gender roles of this country have been 
traditionally anchored in the classical male breadwinner model. This means that the government 
intervenes only sporadically to regulate family matters and that social norms do not create strong 
work attachment among women.  
In addition to this, many factors intervene in women’s decisions to participate in the labour market. 
These factors include the preferences of the individual and of the partner, culture and discrimination 
(Milligan 2014). Recent studies show that a gender egalitarian culture is still not widespread in 
Switzerland (Epple et al. 2015) and that decisions regarding paid employment for mothers are 
strongly influenced by their partner’s income (Gerfin & Leu 2007; Ernst Stähli et al., 2009). As 
highlighted by Asai (2015), in Japan, the participation of fathers in childrearing could substantially 
reduce mothers’ hardships in reconciling work and family life. In Switzerland, the influence of 
partner’s income on female labour force participation declines four years after childbirth, but not 
before (Liechti 2017). 
In this context, the evaluation of the effect of childcare policies is not a trivial exercise. This is true 
for several reasons. First, when formal childcare places are rationed, the creation of new slots or 
the introduction of subsidies might simply substitute other non-institutional childcare arrangements 
among mothers who are already working (Del Boca & Vuri 2007; Givord & Marbot 2015). If this 
occurs, the political effort put into the expansion of childcare may appear unsuccessful (Havnes & 
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Mogstad 2011b). Second, when most women prefer part-time work arrangements,18 it is difficult to 
measure full-time equivalents because women may use childcare at different rates. Analyses of the 
effects of an expansion of childcare places should therefore take into account these preferences 
and select a variable that can detect subtle changes in working hours. In addition to this, when most 
women work, changes are expected to be found more on the intensive margin than on the extensive 
margin. The expansion of childcare places in a country with high labour force participation and 
widespread part-time work translates into an expansion in the number of days per slot available. 
Third, prices can be a deterrent for the use of childcare among certain types of households. In this 
case, when prices are not directly available, it is important to test the assumptions on a broad 
spectrum of household types in order to have a reliable picture of the overall effects. Fourth, 
childcare services may be steered by parental demand for this type of service and by political 
interests based on the specific characteristics of local labour markets. If the supply is driven by 
demand, then estimates are likely to be biased. It is therefore important to correct for this possible 
endogeneity.  
This study uses data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) and a newly established database 
with cantonal data on the number of childcare places in recognised private and public childcare 
facilities for early childcare. The identification strategy consists of a quasi-experiment created by 
different degrees of expansion of childcare places among 24 Swiss cantons between 2002 and 2012. 
The target population comprises mothers with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. A 
difference-in-differences analysis is used to evaluate the effect of the expansion of childcare places 
on the labour market outcomes of these mothers.  
The results demonstrate that an expansion in childcare places stimulates part-time employment of 
between 20 and 36 hours per week by 2 percentage points for mothers of 3-year-olds. The reform 
has not triggered any change in female labour force participation but has allowed working mothers 
to work longer hours. The effects appear greater for married or cohabitating mothers with upper-
secondary education. Significant effects are registered for mothers of two children. No effects are 
found for fathers.    
The paper is organised as follows. The next two sections introduce the data and the empirical 
strategy applied for the identification of the link between childcare expansion and maternal labour 
                                                          
18 In Switzerland in 2012, only 7.6% of part-time working mothers would have preferred a full-time contract, whereas 
41.6% of full-time working mothers would have preferred a part-time contract. Similar figures were produced with the 
ISSP in 1997 (Stier & Lewin-Epstein 2003). This indicates that preferences have not changed over time.  
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supply. The following two sections present the results of this study and compare them with those 
of similar quasi-experimental analyses. The last section concludes with some final remarks.  
 
Data  
This analysis uses data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
This is an annual survey that focuses on the employment situation of the permanent resident 
population aged 15 and older. The survey includes labour supply indicators (participation, income, 
part-time rates), socio-demographic characteristics (marital status, age, education, nationality) and 
some limited information about other household members (total household income, age and 
education of each household member). Repeated cross-sections begin in 1991, and this allows for 
the study of the pre-reform period for both the targeted group and the control group.19 A special 
module on childcare is included every year from 2001 to 2010, as well as in 2013. However, the 
wording of the question changed in 2010, which made it possible only to compare the answers 
between 2001 and 2009.  
Data on the number of childcare places come from a newly established questionnaire sent to each 
cantonal administration to collect relevant information about the evolution of childcare services 
from 1991 to 2012. More information about these data can be found in Ravazzini et al. (2016). Data 
from the 1990s is extremely scarce, because very few cantons had electronic archives. Only in the 
2000s did information about childcare places become more accurate. Overall, 24 out of 26 cantons 
have information about the number of childcare places in their public and private facilities for at 
least two years around 2002 and 2012. If data for these exact two years are not available, 
information is taken from the years closest to those dates, making the reliable assumption that 
childcare places do not change radically from one year to the next, but rather over subsequent 
decades. One of the limitations of the data is the lack of detail at the municipal level, which is 
important in the Swiss context, because municipalities are sometimes more competent than 
cantons in regulating childcare activities. Another limitation of the data is the lack of information 
about the price of external childcare. To overcome this problem, the analysis is run for several 
household types. Moreover, even if it is clear that the federal government authorises and subsidises 
only those childcare facilities that meet certain standards, there is no particular specification 
                                                          
19 The stratification of the survey is based on cantons only in 1995 and since 2009 onwards. In all other years, the 
stratification is limited to macro regions (Nuts II). Nuts II include the following seven macro-regions: Vaud, Valais and 
Genève; Bern, Fribourg, Solothurn, Neuchâtel and Jura; Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft and Aargau; Glarus, Schaffhausen, 
Appenzell A.Rh., Appenzell I. Rh., St. Gallen, Graubünden and Thurgau; Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden and 
Zug; Zürich; and Ticino.  
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regarding the quality of childcare. This paper assumes that the quality of service in authorised 
childcare facilities is the same everywhere across the territory and that parents could substitute 
other forms of care with this one if they were able to do so. This assumption of uniform quality may 
not hold in countries such as Germany, where there is a large divide between the East and the West 
(Schober & Spiess 2015), but it should be a reliable assumption for a small country such as 
Switzerland.  
Methodology and sample 
The relationship between childcare provision and female labour supply is identified using a 
difference-in-differences model (DiD) (see Imbens & Wooldridge 2009). This model compares the 
labour market outcomes of a specific group (treated) targeted by a political reform with the 
outcome of a similar group (untreated) that is untouched by the reform. The methodology consists 
of a comparison before and after the reform, under the assumption that the groups would have 
reacted in the same way without a reform. To rely on this assumption, the common trend is tested 
in the years preceding the reform. The groups treated in this paper consist of working-age mothers 
(between the ages of 20 and 50) who have at least one child up to 3 years of age. These mothers 
could particularly benefit from the expansion of childcare services if they lived in those cantons in 
which the expansion was higher than the national average.20 Since the allocated subsidies targeted 
mothers of children of different ages through both childcare and after-school services, it was not 
possible to exclude mothers of older children who might have benefitted from the reform. The 
administrative data collected by Ravazzini et al. (2016) do not include information about the number 
of after-school places. Mothers who use childcare services for more than one child can also benefit 
from special prices. The targeted group in the majority of the analyses in this paper is therefore 
composed of mothers who have at least one child up to 3 years of age and the possibility to have 
also older children (up to 15 years old, as indicated by the policy). The control group consists of the 
same type of mothers who reside in cantons in which the expansion was lower than the national 
average. This definition of treated and control group is the same one used by Havnes & Mogstad 
(2011b) for Norway and similar to the one used by Felfe & Lalive (2018) and Bauernschuster et al. 
(2015) for Germany. It is important to remember that, in this empirical setting, all cantons were 
touched by the reform, but some cantons were more active than others in expanding their childcare 
                                                          
20 The treated group comprises the cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Schaffhausen, Appenzell A.Rh., St. Gallen, 
Graubünden, Ticino, Vaud, Valais and Jura. The control group comprises the cantons of Zürich, Bern, Glaris, Zug, 
Fribourg, Solothurn, Appenzell I. Rh., Thurgau, Neuchâtel, Genève, Luzern, Schwyz, Nidwalden and Aargau. More details 
are provided in Table A1. 
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places (see Table A1 in the annexes). The evolution of childcare coverage between the treated and 
the control groups is represented in Figure 5.  
From Figure 5, it appears that the net increase in coverage consists of 10 percentage points over 10 
years, a small increase compared to those produced by other similar reforms carried out in Europe 
(in Spain, for instance, the net increase was 25 percentage points over 6 years).  
The econometric model for the difference-in-differences used in the analysis could be written as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑃𝑡 +  𝛾𝑇𝑖 +  𝛿 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑖 +  𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑐 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑐                                   (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome variable. Given the importance of analysing the extensive and the intensive 
margins separately, this paper uses three different outcome variables: active participation in the 
labour market at any participation rate, participation at high part-time rates (>50%), or participation 
only at full-time rates (90-100%).21 The reference group changes according to the three outcome 
variables; it is composed of inactive mothers in the first case, by inactive mothers and mothers who 
work at low part-time rates in the second case, and by inactive mothers and mothers who work 
part-time in the third case. This definition of the dependent variable allows the creation of 
progressive employment statuses without restrictions on participation, which, in this case, could be 
endogenously determined. In Equation (3), P indicates the years prior and post the reform, which 
are 1992-2002 vs. 2003-2014, and T the affiliation to the treatment or to the control group. The 
intention to treat effect is estimated by the coefficient 𝛿. Canton (𝑍𝑐) and year (𝑌𝑡) fixed effects are 
also added, and standard errors are clustered accordingly in order to correct for the specificities of 
each canton. Personal characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) are included in the model to control for possible time 
varying influences on the outcome variable. These personal characteristics consist of education, 
income of other family members, age, nationality and number of children.  
A further disaggregation of the results is performed according to the educational level of the 
mother. Table 1 shows that labour force participation is strongly dependent on the educational level 
of individuals, among other socio-demographic characteristics.  
Low-educated fathers have a labour market participation rate that is almost 10 percentage points 
lower than high-educated fathers. The difference between low- and high-educated mothers is even 
more dramatic, at more than 34 percentage points. In an analysis based on the effects of childcare, 
                                                          
21 These thresholds (i.e. 50% and 90%) correspond to national distinction between low and high part-time rates and 
between high part-time rates and full-time work. In a standard week of 40 working hours, high part-time corresponds 
to between 20 and 36 hours of work. The continuous variable for the number of hours worked is not used because of 
the strong differences encountered between the number of hours and the plausibilised variables about the part-time 
and full-time employment rates constructed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.  
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Stadelmann-Steffen (2007) confirms the importance of this distinction by educational levels, 
demonstrating that the heterogeneous effects of regional childcare policy in Switzerland mainly 
affect the behaviour of women with an intermediate education level. Because her analysis used the 
number of childcare facilities in 2001, which differs from the number of childcare places, her results 
are not necessarily expected to match those estimated in this analysis. After the introduction of 
childcare subsidies in 2003, many existing institutions expanded their offerings. For this reason, we 
see more of an increase in the number of places in each childcare institution than in the number of 
institutions.  
 
Table 1: Participation in the labour market according to individual and household characteristics.  
Characteristics Maternal labour 
force participation Share 
Paternal labour 
force participation Share 
Educational level     
Lower secondary 41.34 9.69 87.96 11.04 
Upper secondary 68.97 46.90 94.52 38.36 
Tertiary 75.97 43.41 97.47 50.60 
Marital status     
Single parent 74.87 17.03 90.98 15.02 
Married or cohabitating 67.78 82.97 96.05 84.98 
Number of children     
Small family (1-2 children) 70.16 84.79 94.94 83.01 
Large family (3+ children) 62.45 15.21 96.96 16.99 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey, 2014. Note: The sample is restricted to mothers and fathers between 20 
and 50 years of age with at least one child up to age 3.  
 
The possible effects of expansion of childcare places on fathers are also tested. Robustness checks 
of Equation (3) include changes in fertility decisions, inter-cantonal mobility and the use of 
institutional childcare. Two tests are also performed to estimate possible confounding effects due 
to the almost simultaneous policies introduced in this period, such as the introduction of paid 
maternity leave and the legal enforcement of after-school care. The main DiD is further tested with 
three alternative specifications. The first specification excludes years that are too close to the 
introduction of subsidies. This is done because the expansion of childcare places may have produced 
nonlinear effects in the years before and after the first introduction of childcare subsidies. To 
exclude nonlinearities, the years are restricted to seven years (1992-1998) for the period before the 
subsidies and to another seven years (2006-2012) for the period after the subsidies. The years after 
the last data collection on childcare places are intentionally excluded (2013 and 2014). The second 
specification restricts the analysis the years to close to introduction of the subsidies (1999-2002 vs. 
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2003-2005) to test whether the expansion in childcare places in treated cantons was demand driven. 
The third specification is inspired by the method applied by Felfe et al. (2016). This method controls 
for endogeneity of demand-induced supply through the construction of local labour markets. 
According to this innovative methodology, only some municipalities are retained in the analysis in 
order to gain a comparable set of treated and control cantons. These municipalities are situated 
inside a spatial mobility area composed of at least two neighbouring cantons and have similar voting 
preferences with regard to family policies.22 This procedure assures that the restricted sets of 
municipalities constituting the cantons are comparable in terms of labour market opportunities and 
of attitudes towards family policies. Cantons that have the majority of the population in the selected 
municipalities are omitted from the analysis, and this further excludes eight small cantons. As in 
Felfe et al. (2016), data regarding spatial mobility regions and votes for the 2006 referendum on 
family benefits are retrieved from the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics.  
 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive results on maternal employment 
Treated and control cantons do not differ greatly in terms of the socio-demographic characteristics 
of mothers. Table 2 shows how the sample differs between these two groups before and after the 
expansion of childcare places. Significant differences between control and treated cantons prior to 
the reform can be found in educational level and in Swiss nationality. The treated group has a slightly 
less educated composition of mothers than the control group, whose mothers are more likely to be 
Swiss and to be more educated. This socio-demographic composition is unlikely to explain the 
expansion of childcare places in either of the two groups of cantons. As a general trend that can be 
observed in all cantons, the table shows a clear expansion in those with tertiary education, signalled 
by the twofold increase in mothers with a tertiary education before and after the introduction of 
childcare subsidies. Mothers have also become older. This comes as no surprise, as official statistics 
report that the average age of women at birth of first child has increased from approximately 29.1 
in 1992 to 31.7 in 2014. About half of the sample has at least one child between 4 and 15 years of 
age in addition to at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. In terms of other socio-
demographic characteristics, the number of married women declined by approximately 6 
percentage points, but marriage remains the preferred choice among mothers (more than 85% are 
married in the post-reform period). Mothers with Swiss nationality represent the majority of the 
                                                          
22 Similar voting preferences refer to intended votes that do not differ by more than 5 percentage points. 
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sample, even if the percentage is slightly decreasing due to recent immigration and different fertility 
rates between the native and foreign-born populations. The share of single mothers among the 
sample also slightly increased over time. Differences in the socio-demographic composition of 
cantons and fertility rates after the reform are the object of two robustness checks that are 
performed later in the results.  
 
Table 2: Sample description of mothers with children between 0 and 3 years of age before and after the 
reform.  
 Total Treated canton Control canton 
Year  before after before after 
Maternal age     
20-30 36.70 41.07 30.67 43.48 31.05 
31-40 58.27 55.87 62.40 53.78 61.68 
41-50 5.03 3.06 6.93 2.74 7.27 
Maternal education     
Lower secondary 15.30 18.26† 14.89† 16.06† 13.23† 
Upper secondary 61.80 66.87† 55.23 69.60† 55.10 
Tertiary 22.90 14.87 29.88† 14.34 31.67† 
Number of children under 4 years old    
1 80.09 80.72 79.65 80.16 79.93 
2 19.08 18.34 19.44 19.07 19.31 
3 or more 0.83 0.94 0.91 0.76 0.77 
Number of children aged 4 to 15    
0 54.19 51.47 55.91 53.58 55.34 
1 31.98 32.70 30.77 32.05 32.15 
2 11.21 13.22 10.73 11.59 10.05 
3 or more 2.62 2.60 2.59 2.78 2.47 
Married 89.35 92.35 86.66 92.91 85.79 
Swiss 69.14 71.03† 62.26† 75.07† 66.03† 
Single mothers 2.60 1.95 3.34 1.85 3.29 
Income of other family 
members  74,319 64,508 72,044 72,456 82,384 
N (unweighted) 43,519 4,567 11,283 7,062 20,607 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. 
Note: All figures are weighted percentages of the corresponding subsample except for income of other family 
members and the number of cases. Income of other family members is represented in Swiss francs. The 
sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 years of age. † indicates significant differences at 1% level 
between treated and control cantons.  
 
In terms of labour market outcomes, the two groups again show very similar trends (Figure 6). 
Maternal labour force participation has increased enormously over the last 20 years. While less than 
half of mothers worked in 1992, almost three quarters did so in 2014. In absolute terms, this was 
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mainly due to an increase in maternal labour force participation. In relative terms, the amount of 
mothers working at high part-time rates, which means more than a part-time rate of 50% or more 
than 20 working hours per week, also increased by a large extent. This Swiss distinction regarding 
part-time rates differs from the standard OECD definition that sets the threshold for full-time 
employment at 30 usual weekly working hours in the main job (which corresponds to 75% of a 
standard working week of 40 hours). Therefore, a significant share of mothers who are defined as 
part-time workers in Switzerland would be included among full-time workers using a European 
definition. In this paper, national definitions are used in order to highlight the importance of part-
time work among women in this country. Although this figure is purely descriptive and does not 
allow us to spot significant differences, mothers in treated cantons appear to work in high part-time 
jobs more than mothers in control cantons.  
 
Figure 6: Change of several dependent variables on maternal employment over time depending on the 
canton of residence.  
 
Sources: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992–2014. The dotted lines indicate control cantons and full lines 
treated cantons 
 
These figures illustrate trends, but do not provide robust tests on whether the parallel trend 
assumption was satisfied before the introduction of subsidies. To observe whether the treated and 
control groups had parallel trends, a regression similar to the main DiD equation (Equation (1)) is 
performed substituting the post-reform period with the pre-reform period (1992-2002). The results 
for the equivalent of the coefficient 𝛿 for the pre-reform period are illustrated in Figure 7. As none 
of the coefficients are significantly different from zero, the parallel trend assumption should not be 
rejected. A test on the pre-reform period year by year yields significant coefficients for participation 
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and full-time employment only in 2001. This confirms that the common time trend holds for all years 
for high part-time employment and for all years except for 2001 for labour force participation and 
full-time employment.   
 
Figure 7: Estimates for the parallel trend assumption test.  
 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992–2014. Coefficients are represented with their 95% confidence 
intervals. Insignificant coefficients validate the parallel trend assumption. 
 
Main results on maternal employment 
Descriptive statistics alone do not provide a clear interpretation of the impact of the reform of 
female employment. The results of the estimates of the DiD model are required, and they are 
illustrated in Table 3, which is constructed illustrating yearly estimates first and then average effects 
over the post-reform period. The results of the first three columns are dedicated to mothers who 
have only children between 0 and 3 years of age, and the following three other columns focus on 
mothers who have at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. The columns on active labour 
force participation and high part-time rate demonstrate that the effects are centred on the years 
2009-2011. Before and after this period, the effects are not particularly significant, and the effects 
on active labour force participation often change in sign. The reform has therefore taken some years 
to produce significant effects on the labour supply of mothers, and these effects dwindled after the 
last years in which data on childcare expansion were collected.23 Overall, it appears that the reform 
has not increased female labour force participation for inactive mothers. For women who already 
worked, however, the reform increased the probability of working at high part-time participation 
rates. The average effect of two percentage points is significant only for mothers who may also have 
                                                          
23 Data on childcare expansion are available up to 2012, and after this year, other cantons in the control group may have 
expanded their childcare supply. The exclusion of 2013 and 2014 does not change the magnitude of the coefficients or 
the significance level of the coefficients. A test without these two years is also shown in Table 7. 
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older children. This increase did not affect full-time participation. This significant change is therefore 
attributable to women who increased their working hours.24 The impact of the reform explains 19% 
of the overall increase in high part-time work registered between 2002 and 2014.  
 
Table 3: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the reform on maternal employment.   
 Only 0-3 Also 4-15 
 Active High part-time Full-time Active High part-time Full-time 
2003 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
2004 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
2005 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.00 
2006 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
2007 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.00 
2008 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
2009 0.03 0.05** -0.01 0.03 0.07** 0.00 
2010 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
2011 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04* 0.02 
2012 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.04* 0.00 0.01 
2013 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
2014 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
Average effect -0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.02* 0.00 
t-statistic (-0.28) (1.11) (-0.14) (-1.00) (1.72) (0.13) 
N 23,357 23,357 23,357 43,519 43,519 43,519 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: the sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 
years of age who have at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. Controls include age, education, 
marital status, nationality, number of children and income of other family members. In all specifications, 
clustered standard error at the cantonal level and cantons and years fixed effects are used. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses above the number of observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
Table 4 shows average effects of the impact of the reform according to the same socio-demographic 
characteristics illustrated in Table 1. The results are found to change according to the educational 
level of mothers.  
Similar to what was found by Stadelmann-Steffen (2007), childcare places are found to stimulate 
labour force participation among mothers with an upper-secondary educational level. In addition to 
this, the effects of the reform are registered only for women who are married or cohabitating, rather 
than for single mothers. As seen in Table 3, the effect is significant only for mothers with more than 
one child. The increase in the number of working hours, however, does not affect mothers with 
                                                          
24 If mothers who work at high part-time rates are isolated and compared only to mothers who work at low part-time 
rates, then the effect becomes larger (5 percentage points) and highly significant. This specification (not displayed in 
Table 3) may however suffer from endogeneity.   
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large families. To summarise, the increase in high part-time work concerns women with the most 
common socio-demographic characteristics, namely, those who have completed upper-secondary 
education, are married or cohabitating and have two children. 
 
Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the reform on maternal employment by 
different individual and household characteristics.  
 Active 
High part-
time Full-time 
Disaggregation by educational levels  
Lower-secondary 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.17) (0.27) (-0.20) 
 6,687 6,687 6,687 
Upper-secondary -0.01 0.05** 0.02 
 (-0.35) (2.62) (1.52) 
 24,446 24,446 24,446 
Tertiary -0.05 -0.02 -0.03** 
 (-1.32) (-0.53) (-2.31) 
 12,386 12,386 12,386 
Disaggregation by marital status  
Married or cohabitating -0.02 0.02* 0.00 
 (-1.04) (1.80) (0.13) 
 41,869 41,869 41,869 
Single mothers -0.08 -0.02* -0.04 
 (-0.89) (-1.96) (-0.52) 
 1,650 1,650 1,650 
Disaggregation by number of children  
1 child -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (-0.31) (0.89) (-0.21) 
 16,845 16,845 16,845 
2 children -0.02 0.02* 0.00 
 (-0.65) (1.72) (0.20) 
 18,937 18,937 18,937 
3 or more children -0.03 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.62) (0.06) (0.21) 
 7,737 7,737 7,737 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: the sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 
years of age with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. Depending on the disaggregation, controls 
include age, education, marital status, nationality, number of children and income of other family members. 
The difference-in-differences corresponds to a model with controls, cantons and years fixed-effects and 
clustered standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis above the number of observations. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Robustness checks and paternal employment  
In this section, the stability of the results is checked by several robustness checks. These checks 
include a test on the socio-demographic characteristics of mothers in treated and control groups, 
an analysis of fertility rates, a test on the displacement of other forms of care, an analysis of paternal 
employment, two analyses over a restricted number of years, and an analysis over a restricted 
number of municipalities. 
The first check tests whether there were changes in the socio-demographic characteristics between 
the two groups of cantons after the introduction of the reform. Some municipalities tried to attract 
highly qualified foreign workers through an expansion of childcare services, and if they succeeded, 
a change in the socio-demographic characteristics of mothers should at least partly signal this effect. 
Descriptive evidence is provided in Table 2, where many socio-demographic characteristics seem to 
differ over time between the control and the treated group. A formal test is needed, however, to 
see whether these differences are significant. This test is performed through a DiD similar to 
Equation (3), where the dependent variable, instead of being 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is one of the 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . Table 5 shows 
that all the coefficients linked with the socio-demographic characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are not significant. It 
can thus be concluded that the composition of mothers residing in the two groups of cantons was 
not influenced by the reform. As a cautionary note, however, it is important to stress that although 
the composition of the treatment and control groups has not changed in a systematic way with 
respect to these observed socio-demographic characteristics, there may be unobserved 
heterogeneity that could bias the results.  
 
Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the reform on the socio-demographic 
characteristics of mothers.  
Lower 
secondary 
educ. 
Upper 
secondary 
educ. 
Tertiary  
educ. 
Married 
or 
cohabiting 
No. of 
children 
0-3 
No. of 
children 
4-15 
Swiss 
nationality Age 
Income of 
other 
family 
members 
-0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.19 -1.19 
(-0.35) (0.77) (-0.99) (0.95) (0.26) (-0.88) (0.23) (-0.80) (-0.19) 
43,519 43,519 43,519 43,519 43,519 43,519 43,519 43,519 43,519 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: the sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 
years of age with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. Depending on the disaggregation, controls 
include age, education, marital status, nationality, number of children and income of other family members 
in 1,000 CHF. The difference-in-differences corresponds to a model with controls, cantons and years fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis above the number of 
observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Overall, this robustness check highlights that the results from Table 3 are robust to international 
and inter-cantonal mobility with respect to observed characteristics. At least at a cantonal level, the 
efforts of some municipalities to attract highly qualified workers through childcare services seem to 
have been unsuccessful. 
However, it is important to note that cantonal aggregation might hide the effects of some successful 
municipalities in big cantons.  
If fertility increased with the activity rate of women, then it would be difficult to compare the same 
set of women over time. The effects of the reform would then reflect changes in employment and 
in fertility, as illustrated by Nollenberger & Rodriguez-Planas (2015). The normal hypothesis under 
this particular reform is that women in treated cantons decided to have more children because they 
could rely on external childcare and did not have to choose between a family and a career. To test 
this, the same DiD model is employed in a second robustness check. The main dependent variable 
here is the likelihood of having a child less than one year old. Table 6 shows that women in treated 
cantons do not have a significantly higher or lower fertility rate than women in control cantons. 
When performing these regressions with yearly estimates, significant increases in fertility were, 
however, reported in three years: 2006, 2007 and 2012.  
 
Table 6: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the reform on fertility rates, use of institutional 
childcare and paternal employment. 
 Institutional Paternal Paternal Paternal 
Fertility  childcare use participation  High part-time full-time 
-0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(-0.12) (0.77) (0.52)         (0.29)   (0.54) 
43,519 19,017 39,416       39,416  39,416 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: the sample is restricted to mothers or fathers between 
20 and 50 years of age with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. Controls include age, education, 
marital status, nationality, number of children and income of other family members. The difference-
indifferences corresponds to a model with controls, cantons and years fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors at the cantonal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis above the number of observations. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
A legitimate claim could also be made that users of other forms of childcare switched to institutional 
childcare25 once childcare subsidies became effective (Bassok, Fitzpatrick & Loeb 2014). To test 
whether or not this was the case for the third robustness check, the use of other childcare services 
                                                          
25 After-school care is not treated in order to provide better comparability with Figure 1. Even if at different levels, time 
trends in the use of institutional and other types of care are also representative for after-school services.  
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is compared with the use of formal childcare. Figure 8 shows that the use of other forms of care 
declined in treated cantons until 2004. The hypothesis that institutional care substituted for other 
types of care therefore appears more likely prior to the introduction of subsidies. It is also evident 
that, in both groups of cantons, the expansion in childcare use between 2001 and 2009 concerned 
mainly institutional childcare. This similar childcare use between treated and control cantons is 
confirmed by a DiD model on the use of institutional childcare over other forms of childcare, which 
did not yield a significant coefficient (Table 6). Even if comparable data ended in 2009, what can be 
drawn from this short analysis is that, until 2009, institutional care was unlikely to have displaced 
other complementary forms of care. Another quick conclusion that Figure 8 may suggest is that the 
large expansion in childcare places in treated cantons has been ineffective, because mothers in 
those cantons have not increased their use. Even if it is true that the use of institutional care has 
not increased more in treated cantons compared to control cantons, Figure 8 may hide an intensive 
margin effect on the amount of hours of care used. This interpretation supports the main results 
regarding maternal employment. Childcare use is not reported at full-time rates in the SLFS, and this 
means that Figure 8 represents only the number of mothers (weighted by number of children) who 
regularly use an external service for childcare. As ‘regularly’ may refer to once a week or once a 
month, and not every hour of every day of the week, this figure does not take into account frequency 
of use.  
 
Figure 8: Evolution of childcare use by type of care in treated and control cantons.  
 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 2001–2009. The sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 years 
of age with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age.   
 
53 
 
When exploited at part-time rates, a single childcare place could be used by more than one mother 
during the same week. For this reason, Figure 5 and Figure 8 are not perfectly comparable. Similar 
to the insignificant effect on female labour force participation, the increase in the number of 
mothers that use institutional childcare in treated cantons has not been larger than the increase in 
control cantons. In this sense, the greater expansion in childcare services in treated cantons has not 
boosted the number of women who are active on the labour market. Nevertheless, it has allowed 
more women to work longer hours or more days per week.  If there was an increasing engagement 
of men in childrearing, it would be also possible that an expansion of childcare places changed 
employment patterns among men. The labour force participation rate among fathers is stable at 
approximately 95%, and has not changed over time. Unlike for mothers, there is no remarkable 
difference in male participation between cantons or between fathers of children of different ages. 
Any DiDs regression applied to fathers with yearly estimates yielded insignificant results. It can thus 
be concluded that the expansion of childcare places affected only female employment.  
To control for the stability of the results, two tests are performed based on the introduction of 
almost simultaneous policies (i.e., maternity leave and legal enforcement of after-school care), and 
two tests based on the expansion of childcare. The test on maternal employment and the 
enforcement of paid maternity leave is based on DiDs that isolate cantons that introduced the policy 
in a specific year from those that implemented it previously (for maternity leave) or those that never 
implemented it (for the enforcement of after-school care). For maternity leave, the cut-off year is 
2005,26 whereas the cut-off is 2009 for the legal enforcement of after-school care.27 The results 
displayed in Table 7 show that those cantons that introduced paid maternity leave in 2005 do not 
register significantly different behaviour in terms of maternal employment. This is likely due to both 
the late introduction of the reform – which happened when all, but four cantons had already 
established paid maternity leave – and the small number of weeks of paid maternity leave (Baker & 
Milligan 2008). The second test shows that the enforcement of after-school care did not produce 
significant effects on mothers with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. These mothers 
                                                          
26 According to Guillet et al. (2016), the cantons that introduced maternity leave in 2005 are Bern, Graubünden, 
Scaffausen and Uri. We exclude from the comparison those cantons that gradually introduced paid maternity leave 
between the early 1990s and 2005. This DiDs therefore compares Bern, Graubünden, Scaffausen and Uri to cantons that 
already granted paid maternity in the early 1990s (Appenzell A.Rh., Basel-Stadt, Jura, Neuchâtel, Schwyz, Ticino, 
Thurgau, Valais and Vaud).   
27 According to Felfe, Lechner & Thiemann (2016), the cantons that introduced enforced after-school care by 2009 are 
Bern, Solothurn and Zurich. Geneva already introduced it in the 1990s, and is excluded from the comparison. Basel City, 
Graubünden, Luzern, Neuchâtel, and Schaffhausen introduced it between 2010 and 2015, and hence they are also 
excluded from the comparison. This DiD compares Bern, Solothurn and Zurich with all cantons that never introduced 
the enforcement of after-school care before 2015.  
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may be jointly affected by after-school care, because they possibly also have older children. With 
the most appropriate sample, Felfe et al. (2016) found that the effect was indeed significant for 
those mothers with at least one child between the ages of 4 and 12. With a sample of mothers of 
younger children, this test shows only that there are no confounding effects of the legal 
enforcement of after-school care on the main effect found for the expansion of childcare.  
 
Table 7: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the enforcement of maternity leave on maternal 
employment. 
Test       Active High part-time Full-time 
Paid maternity leave -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
 (-0.50) (-1.64) (-0.12) 
 19,744 19,744 19,744 
Enforcement of after- 0.00 0.02 0.01 
school care (0.07) (0.91) (0.74) 
 34,431 34,431 34,431 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: the sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 
years of age with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. Controls include age, education, marital 
status, nationality, the number of children and income of other family members. The difference-in-
differences corresponds to a model with controls, cantons and years fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors at the cantonal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis above the number of observations. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
Table 8: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the reform on maternal employment using 
alternative controls. 
Test       Active High part-time Full-time 
1992-1998, 2006-2012 -0.01 0.03* 0.00 
 (-0.45) (1.97) (0.23) 
 25,371 25,371 25,371 
1999-2002, 2003-2005 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.09) (-0.35) (-0.26) 
 11,601 11,601 11,601 
Local labour markets -0.03 0.03 0.01 
 (-1.45) (1.63) (0.78) 
 33,788 33,788 33,788 
Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey 1992-2014. Notes: the sample is restricted to mothers between 20 and 50 
years of age with at least one child between 0 and 3 years of age. Controls include age, education, marital 
status, nationality, number of children and income of other family members. The difference-in-differences 
corresponds to a model with controls, cantons and years fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the 
cantonal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis above the number of observations. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Other tests with restrictions on the expansion of childcare services are reported in Table 8. The first 
two tests of the table restrict the years of the analysis, and the third test addresses endogeneity, 
limiting the analysis to mothers who live in areas with similar labour markets and similar preferences 
for family policies.  
The results are quite robust to alternative specifications. The restriction to years that are not close 
to the introduction of the subsidies causes the coefficient to increase by one percentage point but 
does not change its significance level. It is notable, however, that the T-statistic of the coefficient 
increased. The restriction to the years close to the reform suggests that the variation in the 
expansion of childcare is plausibly exogenous. Therefore, some spikes in women’s labour supply 
observable in Figure 6 for treated cantons, like the one in 2001, are probably due to normal 
fluctuations in labour supply. The fact that most socio-demographics (Table 2 and 5) and the balance 
between informal and formal childcare use (Figure 8) do not differ between fast- and slow-
expansion cantons is consistent with this claim. The third test yields also insignificant results. 
Although it does not reach the minimum significance level of 0.10, the coefficient for high part-time 
rates does not change dramatically in magnitude from the basic specification, and equals the 
coefficient found in the first alternative specification of Table 7. This indicates that previous 
coefficients were not severely biased due to endogeneity.  
Results in perspective: effects, subsidies and policies 
Many studies have addressed the issue of the effects of an expansion in childcare services on female 
labour supply in different countries. To my knowledge, however, the results of these studies are 
dependent on the sample selected, years analysed, country studied and methodology chosen (see 
Bettendorf et al. 2015 for a review). Unlike the studies on Scandinavian countries presented in the 
introduction, studies on countries in which childcare services are not extremely well developed find 
a strong increase in female labour supply associated with the creation of childcare places. This is the 
case in Argentina, for instance, where with every 100 new places created in childcare facilities, 13 
mothers began working (Berlinski & Galiani 2007; Berlinski, Galiani & Mc Ewan 2011), in Hungary, 
where subsidized childcare increases maternal labor supply by 11.7 percentage points or 24% 
(Lovász & Szabó-Morvai 2018), and in Spain, where reforms granted public places in childcare 
facilities for 70% of children and additional private places for another 20% of children (Nollenberger 
& Rodriguez-Planas 2015).  
Switzerland is particular in this respect, because childcare coverage is underdeveloped from an 
international perspective, and coverage remained quite limited even after the reform. Even though 
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childcare provision is not homogeneous across cantons, those cantons that expanded childcare 
more rapidly between 2002 and 2012 managed to cover only 17.4% of children on average in both 
private and public childcare facilities. This expansion has only modestly affected the labour market, 
even considering that female labour force participation is relatively high. In Switzerland, between 
1992 and 2014, there was no significant change in active female labour force participation as a result 
of the expansion of childcare places. However, a significant change was found in high part-time 
employment, defined as at least a part-time rate of more than 50%. The increase was indeed small 
and accounted for two percentage points. Estimates increased to three percentage points in a 
robustness check that excludes the years close to the reform. These effects are in accordance with 
those found by Felfe et al. (2016) for after-school care in German-speaking cantons. The results in 
this major linguistic region of Switzerland pointed to an expansion of full-time employment, defined 
as more than 36 working hours per week. This evidence suggests that the results can also be 
extended to pre-school care and to non-German-speaking cantons. Following the definition of part-
time work adopted by the Swiss Labour Force Survey, this paper suggests that changes in 
employment concern mainly high part-time rates.  
Regarding socio-demographic groups, this paper supports the results on education found by 
Stadelmann-Steffen (2007). In Switzerland, the effects of childcare are found to be stronger for 
mothers with upper-secondary education, but contrary to results from other countries (Blau & Tekin 
2007; Goux & Maurin 2010; Fitzpatrick 2010, 2012), married or cohabitating mothers benefit more 
from childcare than single mothers. This result could be due to the fact that this study takes into 
account both private and public childcare places. The expansion of private childcare places often 
does not interest single mothers, because prices are too high. The same argument regarding prices 
could also be used for large families. Moreover, in Switzerland, single mothers are given priority for 
subsidised places and are thus less likely to remain on the waiting lists.  
As found by Nollenberger & Rodríguez-Planas (2015) in Spain, the reform was more effective for 
mothers with two children, who may decide to resume work more easily than mothers who desire 
to have more than one child. This two-children effect is present also in Germany, where childcare 
availability for under 3-year-olds has been found to reduce mothers’ employment interruptions, 
particularly after a second childbirth, and to increase the probability of returning to part-time or 
full-time employment as opposed to marginal employment (Zoch & Hondralis 2017).   
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These results of this study are found to affect only female employment, because male employment 
was not altered by the availability of childcare. This is similar to the determination made by Felfe et 
al. (2016). 
Regarding the amount of spending for the reform, the results for working mothers in Switzerland 
are lower than what was found in the Netherlands by Bettendorf et al. (2015). An additional subsidy 
of 2 billion euros in the Netherlands increased female labour force participation by 2.3 percentage 
points and hours worked by mothers by 6.2%. This translates into 90,000 euros per additional full-
time equivalent position created by the reform (Bettendorf et al., 2015). In Switzerland, total 
investment between 2003 and 2019 is estimated at 440 million Swiss francs for both pre-school and 
after-school care between 2003 and 2019. The resources allocated to early childcare in Switzerland 
are therefore considerably lower than those granted by the Dutch government; thus, it should not 
be surprising that the effects on maternal employment are not remarkable. The generosity of the 
subsidy may play a role, yet this remains an interesting comparison because these two countries 
have similar rates of female labour force participation.  
Childcare reforms were accompanied by another family policy, namely, the legal recognition of 
maternity leave and the enforcement of after-school care in some cantons. A similar joint reform of 
childcare and maternity leave occurred in Germany in 2007 (see Geyer, Haan & Wrohlich 2015). 
Despite this similarity, the effects of these policies in Switzerland, mainly on childcare expansion, 
are minimal compared to the extensive increase in maternal employment found in Germany (7 
percentage points, both in part-time and in full-time employment). A similar policy setting is also 
present in Canada. Confirming results from other countries, childcare subsidies there had a greater 
impact on the gender employment gap than parental leave (Milligan, 2014).  
 
Conclusions 
Childcare expansion is a family policy that many researchers consider non-distortive in terms of 
gender-oriented discrimination (Hegewisch & Gornick 2011). Childcare has often been proven to 
produce other desirable effects, such as a fairer distribution of household duties between couples 
(Epple et al., 2014), and sometimes even higher fertility rates (Del Boca 2002; Bonoli 2008; Haan & 
Wrohlich 2011). The effects of childcare speak not only to the issue of female labour supply but also 
to the wellbeing of children. It is indeed found that children who use institutional childcare services 
benefit from a higher quality of childcare (Haeck et al. 2015) and are better able to develop their 
cognitive abilities independently of the educational level of their parents (Havnes & Mogstad 2011a; 
Crettaz & Jacot 2014; Felfe et al. 2015; Felfe & Lalive 2018). The drawback of this powerful policy, 
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however, is the high cost to governments for such an intervention. Given the significant share of 
resources at stake, this important issue is relevant to those making decisions at the highest levels. 
The Swiss federal system offers a very good experimental setting in which to test these policy 
outcomes, as each of the 26 cantons has broad freedom of action in terms of policy implementation. 
In this context, the institutionalisation of maternity leave and the expansion of childcare caused a 
small but significant increase in female high part-time employment. Compared to other European 
countries, this increase was indeed small, although in line with the small expansion of childcare 
places (compared to Spain), the amount of subsidies allocated (compared to the Netherlands) and 
the short duration of parental leave (compared to Germany).  
It is important to state that this expansion in childcare did not particularly benefit vulnerable groups, 
such as low-educated mothers, single mothers or large families. This is likely due to the high cost of 
institutional childcare in Switzerland. To better test this assumption, a cost-benefit approach should 
be performed through a labour supply model (as in Müller & Wrohlich 2015), and further research 
is needed in this regard.  
As of the present, it is interesting to note that neither governmental support nor social norms have 
increased paternal involvement in childcare roles.  
Finally, it is important to point out that these results rely on a new collection of data at the cantonal 
level. Despite being a new source of information, the data can be considered limited, given that it is 
based on the averaging of childcare among all municipalities within a canton. Although the evidence 
retrieved from a set of German-speaking municipalities supports the results found in this study 
(Felfe et al. 2016), whenever possible, new data collections on childcare should focus on the 
municipal level in order to truly capture the socio-economic diversity of Switzerland.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Childcare coverage across cantons, 2002 and 2012. 
Canton 2002 2012 Expansion in %  Treated or control  
Zürich 11.71 19.42 65.83 Control 
Bern 12.13 16.64 37.17 Control 
Luzern 5.98 7.36 23.05 Control 
Schwyz 4.15 5.52 33.14 Control 
Nidwalden 2.68 4.70 75.24 Control 
Glaris 5.33 10.26 92.34 Control 
Zug 10.11 14.61 44.58 Control 
Fribourg 6.60 10.24 55.14 Control 
Solothurn 6.12 10.84 77.25 Control 
Basel-Stadt 18.43 48.56 163.53 Treated 
Basel-Landschaft  4.80 17.77 269.95 Treated 
Schaffhausen 7.45 19.06 156.04 Treated 
Appenzell A. Rh. 2.61 9.80 274.75 Treated 
Appenzell I. Rh. 0.87 0.90 3.59 Control 
St. Gallen 2.57 6.16 139.73 Treated 
Graubünden 2.00 8.42 321.57 Treated 
Aargau 7.48 8.98 20.01 Control 
Thurgau 4.54 8.39 84.89 Control 
Ticino 2.88 11.53 300.87 Treated 
Vaud 16.37 29.47 80.04 Treated 
Valais 7.45 15.59 109.32 Treated 
Neuchâtel 19.50 27.90 43.10 Control 
Genève 15.41 23.52 52.66 Control 
Jura 3.22 7.32 127.07 Treated 
Sources: Ravazzini et al. (2016), 2012 cantonal statistics for Bern, Neuchâtel and Vaud. 
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Article 2: Moral Pressures for Women to Stay Home: Incorporating Gender 
Role Attitudes into a Categorical Labour Supply Model of Couples 
Abstract 
This study investigates the importance of gender role attitudes for the labour supply 
decisions of couples. To account for the interdependence between partners, categorical 
labour supply models are applied to 2004 and 2014 data of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). 
In addition to the standard specification constructed with wages and incomes of the two 
partners, taxes, childcare costs, and socio-demographic characteristics, we include also 
gender role attitudes to the model. Results show that labour supply elasticities are close to 
zero. The only exception is women’s negative cross-wage elasticity, which demonstrates that 
women react more strongly to their partner’s wage than to their own wage. Most 
importantly, this study shows that gender role attitudes influence labour supply decisions in 
two ways. First, women’s and their partner’s attitudes are taste shifters that influence 
women’s preference to stay home. Second, gender role attitudes alter the reaction to 
financial incentives. In this sense, we find that labour supply elasticities are more negative 
for women with home-oriented attitudes. Women’s utility of staying home is also higher for 
married women in the Italian-speaking part of the country. This suggests that culture matters 
for women’s labour supply decisions.  
Keywords: labour supply, working mothers, couples, division of labour, attitudes  
JEL: J20, H31, C35 
This article in under review in the Journal of Family and Economic Issues. This article is coauthored with Ursina 
Kuhn.  
Introduction 
From a macro-economic perspective, high labour force participation has many desirable 
consequences. An increase in the activity rate can partially offset the negative effects of population 
aging on pension systems, better exploit the capacities of the national labour force in case of high 
demand, decrease vulnerability to poverty, and lower social spending. Because the activity rate is 
lower for women than for men, almost all governments in Western societies provide incentives to 
stimulate female labour supply and to reconcile work and family life. Besides all the desirable 
consequences of an increase in female labour supply at the macroeconomic level, fundamental 
changes in gender roles and childcare accompany this social transformation.  
An extensive literature addresses the determinants of female labour supply. To study couples’ 
labour supply, a strand of the literature of labour economics estimates categorical (or structural) 
labour supply models because they capture the interdependence of partners’ labour supply 
decisions and the selection into the labour market (Blundell & McCardy 1999). So far, these 
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structural labour supply models have not integrated attitudes, values and cultural aspects,28 even if 
a growing number of studies document the importance of these aspects. This paper fills this gap by 
including cultural aspects and individual gender-related attitudes into a categorical labour supply 
model. This approach has two main advantages. First, it compares the relevance of income and 
wages with the relevance of cultural aspects and individual attitudes. Second, it tests whether 
reactions to financial aspects are conditional on attitudes. To the best of our knowledge, this aspect 
has never been assessed before. It is however of great importance to understand the interaction 
between monetary aspects and attitudes because financial incentives targeted to increase labour 
supply might be effective only if people are willing to benefit from them. For example, tax incentives 
and subsidies targeted on second earners might be ineffective if parents think that staying at home 
is important for their children’s well-being.  
We analyse labour supply of couples in Switzerland. This country has several particular 
characteristics that make it well suited to study couple’s labour supply. First, women’s activity rate 
is very high (79% in 2014) and part-time work is more common than in any other country.29 Among 
part-time workers, work percentages vary strongly, and this creates one of the most uniform 
distributions of women’s working hours in Europe (see Figure 9).  
Second, the Swiss federalism constitutes a unique opportunity to estimate the impact of financial 
incentives on labour supply because taxes, availability of childcare services, and costs of childcare 
vary between more than 2,000 political municipalities. The different linguistic regions add a layer of 
diversity to this already diversified system. In comparison with cross-national studies, our analysis 
has the advantage to exploit differences between linguistic regions within the same data source 
holding potential macro confounders, such as national policies, constant. Third, the Swiss Household 
Panel (SHP) has good longitudinal data that involves the socio-economic situation of couples, 
include gender-specific attitudes and can be linked to municipal variables. 
Our contribution to the literature on labour supply is threefold. First, we incorporate subjective 
attitudes into a categorical labour supply model. This allows us to compare the impact of financial 
aspects and attitudes within the same model and to better explain differences in preferences. 
Second, we investigate the interaction between attitudes and wage elasticities, which has remained 
insofar unexplored in the literature. Third, we add evidence from a country with strong cultural 
                                                          
28 In this paper, wages and incomes are called economic factors, but it is not excluded that they could be socially or 
culturally constructed, for instance through discriminatory practices. 
29 According to national definitions, part-time work is defined in this country as work at a lower percentage than 90%.  
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diversity, fiscal federalism and high female labour supply to the study of the mechanisms of female 
labour supply. 
 
Figure 9: Women’s contractual working hours in Europe. 
 
Sources: SILC 2014 (own calculations). Notes: the sample consists of women between 25 and 64 years old. 
The number of observations range from 2,245 in Iceland to 13,031 in Italy. Working hours are top-coded at 
45 hours per week.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the literature on the mechanisms that 
sustain labour supply among women and among couples. We then present the hypotheses and 
explain the data and the methodology. The last two sections illustrate the results of the discrete 
choice model on labour supply and conclude the discussion with policy recommendations.  
Literature review 
Previous studies have identified many determinants of female labour supply (Thévenon 2013). At 
the individual level, these are mainly women’s education, fertility, marriage and divorce prospects 
(Goldin 1990). At the macro level, the tax system, the expansion of the service sector, childcare costs 
and childcare availability are strong predictors of female labour supply (Attanasio et al. 2008; 
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Kabatek et al. 2014; Cascio et al. 2015). Partner’s characteristics, such as education and income, 
have also revealed to be important. There is broad evidence that women’s labour supply depends 
negatively on their partner’s wage level (Goldin 2006), while men hardly react to their partner’s 
earnings (Aaberge et al. 1999; Blau & Kahn 2007).  
In this literature review, we concentrate on studies that focus on couples’ labour supply, the 
influence between partners or the effect of attitudes on labour supply.30 When comparing results 
of different studies, it is important to consider the method of analysis because labour supply is 
selective and many variables of interest, such as partner’s labour supply or attitudes, are 
endogenous to working hours. 
In this literature, a recent comparative study by Bargain et al. (2014) estimates wage-elasticities for 
18 countries using categorical labour supply models. In all these countries (Switzerland is not 
included), the authors report negative cross-wage elasticities for women. The strongest effects are 
in Ireland with an elasticity of -0.22% for a 1% change in partner’s hourly wage. At least in Europe, 
it seems that women react more strongly to their partner’s wage then to their own wage (Devereux 
2004; Bargain et al. 2014). Bredemeier & Juessen (2013) have also shown that women living with 
high earning partners are more likely to reduce their hours of work and to have children than women 
living with low earning partners. This labour supply reduction is smaller in recent years as there is 
evidence that the link between partners’ wage and labour supply is weakening over time (Blau & 
Kahn 2007; Verbakel & De Graaf 2008).  
Some studies have also shown differences between regions of the same country. Giudici & 
Schumacher (2017) found that mothers’ labour supply is lowest in the Italian-speaking canton and 
Epple et al. (2015) showed that the equal division of work between men and women is supported 
in some cantons more than others. Language is important as Romance language speakers in 
Switzerland have been found to search for work almost seven weeks longer and to have stronger 
ideologies about social insurance than their German speaking neighbours living in similar labour 
markets (Eugster et al. 2011, 2017). Regional differences are also important in Germany. Pestel 
(2017) attests that labour supply, both in terms of participation rate and hours worked, is larger in 
the East than in the West. Steiner & Wrohlich (2008) propose several explanations for the different 
labour supply and wage elasticities of the two regions. Apart from the institutional diversity, which 
is tested in their analysis, the authors suggest that previous work experience under socialism (see 
                                                          
30 A review on the theories linked to couples’ labour supply is presented in the Introduction of this thesis, please refer 
to the section Economic and attitudinal endowments.  
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also Hummelsheim & Hirschle 2010) and the greater importance of demand–side restrictions on 
labour supply in the East might contribute to this difference in labour supply behaviours.  
In more recent literature, attitudes and values have come more into focus as determinants of female 
labour supply (Giuliano 2014). Both gender role values and work ethic have been found to make a 
strong impact on mothers’ working hours (van Gameren 2013; Stam et al. 2014). Women are also 
influenced by the gender role attitudes of their partner (Fortin 2005; Kangas and Rostgaard 2007; 
Steiber & Haas 2009, 2012). Moreover, positive attitudes towards women’s work and egalitarian 
values have been shown to depend on previous levels of female labour force participation (Zuo & 
Tang 2000; Fernandez 2013) and childcare (Zoch & Schober 2018) of the country. Fernandez & Fogli 
(2009) added to this literature by demonstrating that female labour supply of second-generation 
immigrants in the USA is strongly correlated with female labour force participation in the country of 
origin. At the macro-level, cross-national evidence suggests that gender role attitudes explain one-
fourth of the total variability in female labour supply across countries and that gender role attitudes 
are more important than institutional factors (Uunk 2015). Boekmann et al. (2015) showed also that 
gender role attitudes explain the difference in labour supply of mother and childless women. 
The causal influence between attitudes and labour supply goes however in both directions. Studies 
with individual longitudinal data have shown that attitudes adapt to match employment behaviours 
(Himmelweit & Sigala 2004; Corrigall & Konrad 2007; Kan 2007; Berrington et al. 2008). Moreover, 
gender role attitudes (Fortin 2005) and patriarchal values (Alesina, Giuliano & Nunn 2013) are not 
stable over time, but change depending on the macroeconomic situation of the country. Changes 
are however very slow because attitudes and values are transmitted through generations. Women 
whose mothers worked are indeed found to have a strong attachment to work and men whose 
mothers worked are found to be more tolerant towards the active labour force participation of their 
wives (Fernández et al. 2004). Bühlmann et al. (2009) demonstrated that egalitarian values and 
practices of couples tend to be coherent in their pre-parental phase, but that there is tension 
between egalitarian values and gendered practices after the births of their first child. This tension 
endures in Liberal welfare states like Switzerland, whereas it disappears in socio-democratic 
regimes. 
There has been little research on couples’ labour supply in Switzerland. To the best of our 
knowledge, and despite the unique setting of this country, the most recent study on the joint labour 
supply of couples in Switzerland is the one written by Gerfin & Leu (2007). For married women, the 
wage elasticity has been estimated to amount to 0.56, the cross-wage elasticity to -0.43 and the 
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income elasticity to -0.06. For men, all elasticities are very close to zero.31 This study is however 
hardly generalizable to present days because it focuses on data from 1998, when female activity 
rate was well below the current value, and on households whose income was below the national 
average. Other studies have found that the correlation of partner’s earnings in Switzerland is 
particularly weak in an international comparison (Cancian & Schoeni 1998; Kuhn & Ravazzini 2017b). 
This might be the result of a high impact of partner’s income on women’s labour supply, which 
implies a strongly negative cross-wage elasticity. Wise & Zangger (2017) have indeed found that 
there is an endogenous decision-making of couples concerning working time. Financial incentives 
present the most prominent explanation for the weak correlation of partners’ earnings. Due to the 
progressivity of the tax system and childcare costs, the marginal costs of working more hours is 
sometimes above 100% (Bütler & Ruesch 2009; Schwegler et al. 2012). Applying a longitudinal 
perspective, Liechti (2017) found that partner’s income is important for mothers of children younger 
than three years old, but this impact declines when children become older. Ernst Stähli et al. (2009) 
confirmed the importance of partner’s income, and documented the impact of childcare, the 
urbanisation of the place of residence and lifestyle preferences on women’s labour supply. Lifestyle 
preferences were coded as work centred, adaptive or home centred at the basis of the combination 
of two questions about career priorities and the ideal role distribution between mothers and 
fathers. These preferences had however only little impact on mother’s labour supply.32 It is to 
remark that, like the study of Gerfin & Leu (2007), the analysis of Ernst Stähli et al. (2009) is based 
on 1998 data.  
 
Hypotheses  
At the basis of this literature review, we formulate three hypotheses. The first hypothesis postulates 
that attitudes and cultural aspects are important for female labour supply. This general hypothesis 
can be broken into three specific aspects. Given the broad evidence on cultural differences between 
countries, we expect to find differences in women’s labour supply across linguistic regions because 
they reflect cultural differences that go beyond gender role attitudes and institutional differences 
(Hypothesis 1a). Several studies have also shown that not only women’s attitudes matter, but also 
                                                          
31 An earlier study by Gerfin (1993) report wage-elasticities from 0.1 to 0.5 for married women but did not report cross-
wage elasticities. 
32 The model is a multinomial logistic regression based on answers about the current and the past activity rate of 
mothers: never reduced or interrupted (working career), reduced at some moment (combined career), stopped for 
children but currently active (interrupted career), or completely stopped and currently at home or never worked before 
(homemaker). 
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attitudes of partners and of other family members. We therefore expect that both women’s and 
partner’s gender role attitudes influence women’s working hours (Hypothesis 1b). As cultural norms 
and values are passed through generations, we also suppose that women who grew up with a 
working mother work more hours for pay than women whose mother was not working (Hypothesis 
1c). Similarly, women might work more hours for pay if their partner has grown up with a working 
mother. In addition to the direct impact of gender role attitudes on labour supply, women’s reaction 
to economic conditions might be conditional on these attitudes. We expect labour supply elasticities 
(own wage level, the wage level of the partner, non-labour income) in labour supply models that 
condition on gender role attitudes to differ from labour supply elasticities in labour supply model 
that do not condition on these attitudes (Hypothesis 2). One of the underlying mechanisms might 
be that the income effect of a pay rise is particularly important for home-oriented women relative 
to the substitution effect. Because these women are, by definition, less motivated to engage in paid 
work than market-oriented women, they might work only as much as it is needed to reach a certain 
living standard. If this was the case, an income increase (of the hourly wage of women or of their 
partner, or of other income) is likely to reduce of women’s working hours. We therefore expect that 
wage elasticities of home-oriented women are more strongly negative than wage elasticities of 
work-oriented women (Hypothesis 3). 
  
Data and methodology 
We use data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). Beginning in 1999, the SHP is a representative 
household survey of all household members that contains information on income, employment, 
socio-demographic characteristics and gender-related attitudes. The design of the Swiss Household 
Panel (SHP) allows us to treat labour supply as a joint decision of the household.  
Our sample is composed of cohabitating heterosexual couples, who are not necessarily married. 
People with disabilities and people outside the working age range 25-64 are excluded from the 
sample. Information on family-related attitudes has been collected in the years 2002-2011 and 
2014. We analyse the years 2004 and 2014. These two years represent two relatively recent time 
points and are years close to when new refreshment samples have been added.33 These 
refreshments allow for a higher sample size than in other years and reduce the bias that originates 
from attrition. The full sample in 2004 and 2014 is composed by respectively 2,854 and 3,402 
couples with complete information. Attitudes on paid work are available only for a subsample of 
                                                          
33 No refreshment sample was added in 2014, but the refreshment was in 2013.  
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these couples (reduced sample). This is due to several reasons: first, to item non-response with 
respect to questions on attitudes, second, to partial unit non-response when one partner did not 
respond to the individual questionnaire, and third, to the refreshment sample (SHP III) of 2013 that 
did not include questions on gender attitudes.34 The sample size of the reduced sample with valid 
answers on attitudes for both partners amounts to 1,370 couples in 2004 and to 1,158 couples in 
2014. We estimate models both for the full sample and for the reduced sample.  
The estimation of the correct labour supply of individuals is complex because of many interactions 
between policies, societal and economic factors and their behavioural responses. Discrete labour 
supply models are increasingly used because they take the dependency between partners and the 
dependency between the decision to participate and the intensity of participation into account (for 
recent applications see e.g. Steiber & Haas 2012; Bargain et al. 2014; Pestel 2017; Muizon 2018). 
Discrete labour supply models have the important advantage to estimate choices of couples jointly, 
without relying too much on assumptions about wage imputations, budget constraints or 
instrumental variables (Bargain et al. 2014; Löffler et al. 2014).  The main disadvantage of this 
models is the impossible estimation of the selection into partnership. These models can however 
monitor the adaptation between partners if performed over more than one year. 
Discrete labour supply models are constructed considering decisions on a continuous distribution 
of hours (Aaberge et al. 1995; van Soest 1995). In our implementation, the model maximises 
household utility given women’s and men’s weekly wages in a set of 18 choices of hours 
combinations. Women can choose between six working hours points H= {0, 8, 16, 24, 32 and 40} 
that correspond to the hour ranges 0-4, 5-12, 13-20, 21-28, 29-36, and 37+ respectively. Men can 
choose between inactivity (H=0 for hours range 0-12), part-time (H=24 for hours range 13-36) and 
full-time work (H=40 for at least 37 hours per week).  The details of the estimation of the utility 
function are explained in the Appendix. The results of the first baseline model estimated can be 
compared to the results of previous studies.  
In a second model, we add attitudes towards gender roles as taste-shifters. The first variable is the 
agreement with the statement: “To have a job is the best guarantee for a woman as for a man to be 
independent”. The second variable is the agreement with a rather home-oriented statement: “A 
pre-school child suffers if his or her mother works for pay”. Responses are collected on an 11-point 
                                                          
34 The part of the questionnaire on gender attitudes was not asked to the new sample because the questionnaire was 
judged too long during fieldwork. This strategic decision was taken to avoid excessive attrition within the new 
refreshment sample. Questions on gender attitudes have been asked to the full sample, including the 2013 refreshment 
sample, in 2017.   
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scale, which ranges from 0 to 10. In addition, we add a binary variable indicating whether the 
respondent’s mother worked when the respondent was 15.  
The complex part of this model is the measurement of disposable income, which is defined as in 
Equation 1. 
The computation of disposable income involved the following steps. First, we estimate gross hourly 
wages for all individuals. For employed and self-employed individuals, gross hourly wages are 
computed at the basis of monthly earnings and weekly working hours. If one of these elements is 
missing, hourly wage is imputed. The (unobserved) wage potential of inactive women is also 
imputed.35 The second step to estimate disposable income is the computation of labour income at 
the basis of working hours and hourly wages for all 18 alternatives of working hours per couple. The 
third step is to sum labour income, asset income, imputed rents and private transfers to obtain total 
gross household income. To restrain the influence of outliers, we top-code the highest 0.2 percent 
of the total household income. The fourth step is the simulation of taxes for each income alternative. 
This step is complex due to the federal structure, which includes not only 27 different tax systems 
(26 cantons and the federal taxes), but also different tax levels for the over 2000 municipalities.36 
Therefore, disposable household income cannot be estimated by a single regression as in other 
countries. The SHP has developed a procedure to simulate taxes, which can be applied in our labour 
supply model (see Kuhn & Schmid 2009).  
The fifth step is the inclusion of public transfers by defining a minimum disposable household 
income (Y) according to the thresholds defined by the SKOS (the Schweizerische Konferenz für 
Sozialhilfe).37 Social assistance complements household income in a way that all households should 
reach the defined thresholds. Because dependency on social assistance is likely to weaken the 
attractiveness of some work-hours alternatives, an indicator of welfare dependence is included in 
                                                          
35 Thanks to the richness of the questionnaire and the panel structure, the SHP offers a good basis to estimate the wage 
potentials of all individuals. First, the hourly wage in a previous year is available for many individuals. Assuming that 
hourly wages remain relatively stable over time and that the potential wage is close to the wage earned in the past, we 
impute hourly wages from previous waves. This was possible for 51% of individuals with missing hourly wage and for 
29% of inactive individuals. If no such information is available, we use information from the next wave (11% of 
individuals with missing hourly wage, 4% of inactive). Second, still missing values are then imputed using iterative 
algorithms for men and women separately. The procedure is performed through multiple imputation (MI impute in 
Stata). As explanatory variable we use education (5 dummies), age, gender, marital status, sector of employment (4 
dummies), self-employment status, hierarchical position, ISCO-code (7 dummies), and partner’s wage. Information on 
previous employment is known for inactive individuals because they have been asked about their last job. The R-squared 
for the imputation of hourly wage is 0.35 for men and 0.28 for women. To exclude implausible values and to limit the 
impact of outliers, we top-code hourly wages to ten times their median value. 
36 For example, depending on the municipality, the tax burden varies between 3.5% and 13.4 % for the same single 
household with a gross income of 50’000 CHF. 
37 In line with the study by Gerfin & Leu (2007), we add mean housing costs to the threshold. 
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the model. The final step to obtain disposable household income for each labour supply option is to 
estimate childcare costs. This step needs some detailed explanation. Although the SHP collects 
childcare costs, we cannot include this information as such in the model because costs for formal 
childcare are income-dependent and therefore vary between the different work alternatives of each 
couple. We simulate costs for childcare at the basis of observed childcare costs in the SHP. The 
childcare costs are predicted at the basis of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression on household 
income, the number of children and various interactions. In 2014, the OLS model explains 47% of 
the household’s childcare cost. The estimated monthly costs of childcare per household amount to 
251 CHF for a gross household income of 4,000 CHF, 552 CHF for 8,000 CHF, 852 CHF for 12,000 CHF 
and 1,153 for 16,000 CHF.  
Descriptive statistics for the most important variables are provided in Table 9. We briefly address 
the changes between 2004 and 2014 by commenting the mean values in these two years. The 
evolution over time documents the increase in female labour force participation (from 18.3 hours 
of work in 2004 to 21.8 in 2014). Another important change involves a small rise in real disposable 
household income, which is in line with more working hours and a higher gross hourly wage among 
women. We also see the signs of educational expansion, as the share of tertiary educated women 
went from 25% in 2004 to 37% in 2014, and from 42% to 51% for men. Among demographic changes, 
we also remark that marriage rates have declined from 90% to 82%. We also observe a shift in 
gender role attitudes over time. This is highlighted by the stronger agreement with the role of jobs 
in providing independence and by a weaker moral accusation on working mothers. These attitudes 
have declined to a similar extent for women and men. 
After the estimation of disposable income for each of the working hour alternatives, we can 
estimate the categorical labour supply model. We use a trans-log utility function. The regression 
output cannot be directly interpreted because the coefficients refer to the utility function (rather 
than to working hours) and involve many interaction terms. Moreover, the coefficients for 2004 and 
2014 cannot be directly compared because the regression model is non-linear. Therefore, results 
are usually reported in terms of elasticities (percentage change in working hours assuming a 
percentage change in hourly wages or income, often displayed for a 1% change). Elasticities cannot 
be computed directly from the utility function. We need to simulate the working hours assuming an 
exogenous change in hourly wages or income. We present results both as elasticities and in terms 
of marginal effects (i.e. in absolute change in working hours). 
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Results 
Figure 10 shows the categories of working hours for women and men in 2004 and 2014. This Figure 
delivers two main messages. First, the comparison of observed working hours in 2004 with 2014 
reveals that women’s labour force participation has increased both due to entry into the labour 
market and to higher work percentage of working women. In 2014, more women tend to work at 
high rates (100%, 80% or 60%), while lower work percentages have declined over time. Second, the 
Figure shows the performance of the model by comparing observed labour supply and predicted 
labour supply for the full sample. We observe that the categorical labour supply model predicts 
women’s hours of work relatively well. The most important difference is the slight underestimation 
of women who work at around 60% (24 hours) and the overestimation of women who work at 
around 40% (16 hours) in 2014. Estimating the categorical labour supply model with the reduced 
sample (only couples with work-attitudes), the fit is somewhat less accurate, but still rather close to 
observed working hours (see Table A2).  
To interpret the discrete labour supply model, simulated changes in working hours are presented in 
Table 10 (for variations in wage or income levels) and 11 (for variations in socio-demographic 
variables). Eight different models are estimated to test the hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 show the 
baseline models without attitudes for 2004 and 2014. These first two models are run on the full 
sample and their effects can be compared with findings from the literature on joint labour supply 
decisions. These models are well suited to gauge the labour supply elasticity in Switzerland and to 
estimate the effect of socio-demographic characteristics. We test Hypothesis 1a on these models. 
Models 5 and 6 include gender role attitudes and the indication for working mothers. These models 
are used to test Hypothesis 1b and 1c. Because these models refer to different samples, we cannot 
directly test Hypothesis 2 according to which labour supply elasticities differ when attitudes are 
included in the model. To compare the model with attitudes to the model without attitudes, we re-
estimate the baseline model (without gender role attitudes as taste-shifters) on the reduced sample 
(only couples with measured attitudes) in Models 3 and 4. In this way, we can compare Models 3 
and 5 for 2004, and Models 4 and 6 for 2014 as they refer to the same subsample of couples. In the 
last regression that tests Hypothesis 3, we separate couples in 2014 into two groups according to 
gender role attitudes. We divide the sample according to women’s agreement with the statement: 
“A pre-school child suffers if his or her mother works for pay”. We choose this variable because it 
measures gender roles in a very direct way and has the strongest variation of all attitude variables 
in the model (see Table 10). To have equally sized groups, women who answer between zero and 
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four are coded as paid-work-oriented (47% of all women in 2014) (Model 7), whereas the women 
who answer between five and ten are coded as home-oriented (53% of all women in 2014) (Model 
8).  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the sample. 
   2004  2014  
 Min Max Mean se Mean se 
Financial variables       
Hours of work, women  0 40 18.32 (14.73) 21.77 (14.08) 
Hours of work, men  0 40 36.64 (10.02) 35.49 (11.28) 
Real gross hourly wage, women 9.02 360.69 33.96 (18.59) 36.09 (20.34) 
Real gross hourly wage, men 9.04 260.87 45.41 (22.28) 45.65 (20.63) 
Weekly disposable hh. income/100 6.61 113.61 19.85 (9.19) 21.04 (9.00) 
Socio-demographic variables       
Age, women 25 64 43.12 (9.38) 45.63 (9.93) 
Age, men 25 64 45.71 (9.54) 48.16 (10.22) 
Education: Lower secondary, women   0 1 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.27) 
Education: Upper secondary, women 0 1 0.65 (0.48) 0.55 (0.50) 
Education: Tertiary, women 0 1 0.25 (0.43) 0.37 (0.48) 
Education: Lower secondary, men   0 1 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.16) 
Education: Upper secondary, men 0 1 0.51 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 
Education: Tertiary, men 0 1 0.46 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 
Swiss nationality, women 0 1 0.88 (0.32) 0.90 (0.30) 
Swiss nationality, men 0 1 0.87 (0.33) 0.89 (0.31) 
Mother employed at age 15, women 0 1 0.52 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 
Mother employed at age 15, men 0 1 0.43 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 
Children 0-6 years 0 3 0.39 (0.71) 0.30 (0.65) 
Children 7-12 years 0 3 0.39 (0.71) 0.28 (0.62) 
Children 13-18 years 0 3 0.36 (0.69) 0.36 (0.69) 
Married couple 0 1 0.90 (0.30) 0.82 (0.39) 
Urban municipality 0 1 0.23 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 
Attitudinal variables       
Child suffers with working mother, women 0 10 5.08 (3.60) 4.37 (2.96) 
Child suffers with working mother, men 0 10 6.36 (3.34) 5.36 (2.91) 
Job preservers independence, women 0 10 7.85 (2.90) 8.60 (1.73) 
Job preservers independence, men 0 10 7.67 (2.89) 8.38 (1.73) 
n (couples)     1,370   1,158   
Source: SHP 2004, 2014, own calculations. Only couples where both partners report gender role attitudes 
(reduced sample). Notes: Standard errors (se) are in parentheses.  
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Figure 10: Predicted and observed hours of work in 2004 and 2014.   
 
Source: SHP 2004, 2014. Note: The predicted hours refer to the baseline model (without attitudes, full 
sample). 
 
Table 10: Predicted change in women’s working hours according to financial aspects  
Baseline 
models 
Baseline models Attitude models Models by 
attitudes  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
year 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2014 2014 
sample full full red. red. red. red. paid-
work  
home  
N (couples) 2854 3402 1370 1158 1370 1158 559 599 
Elasticities (% change in women’s working hours for a 10% change in income or wages 
Own wage: hours  -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 
Own wage: hours of working 
women 
-0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 
Own wage: participation 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Cross wage: hours -1.5 -0.9 -1.7 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7 -1.0 -2.3 
Cross wage: hours of working 
women  
-0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 
Cross wage: participation  -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 
Other income: hours -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Source: SHP 2004, 2014. Number of couples: n=1370 in 2004, n=1158 in 2014. Note: Working hours refer to 
the average over the 8 categories (0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40 hours). Predicted change in working hours have been 
computed by weighting each of the alternatives by its probability.  
 
Before addressing the hypotheses, we discuss the main results of the baseline model with respect 
to women’s working hours (Models 1 and 2). Table 11 shows the predicted changes in working hours 
(elasticities) when simulating a 10% increase in wages or income. Overall, the models show that 
women’s labour supply is rather independent from their wages and non-labour incomes. The effect 
of a 10% increase in hourly wages is very close to zero in terms of working hours (-0.1 in 2004, 0.2 
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in 2014). The effect on participation (extensive margin) is always positive, showing that women with 
higher wages are more likely to work. In contrast, working women with higher wages tend to work 
slightly less than working women with lower wages in 2004 (intensive margin). This finding is in line 
with Schmid (2016) and Oesch, Lipps & McDonald (2017), who found that women working part-time 
in Switzerland have a higher hourly wage than women working full-time. In 2014, the work 
percentage of working women (intensive margin) does not seem to depend on their wage level. In 
a cross-national perspective, these elasticities appear very weak for both years. The weakest own-
wage elasticity documented by Bargain et al. (2014) was found for Estonia in 2005 and amounted 
to 0.8 (for a 10% wage increase). Nevertheless, the inelastic labour supply in Switzerland is plausible 
considering that a wage increase is only partly reflected in disposable income due to progressive 
taxes, health insurance subsidies and income-dependent childcare costs. Cross-wage elasticities are 
more in line with other European countries. As for example in France and Austria (see Bargain et al. 
2014), the cross-wage elasticity in Switzerland is stronger than the own-wage elasticity. While 
women’s labour supply is inelastic with respect to their own wage, cross-wage elasticities are slightly 
negative. If partner’s hourly wage increases by 10%, we estimate that women decrease their 
working hours by 1.5% in 2004. These results are not far from what was found for Germany in 2001 
(1.7) and Austria in 1998 (1.3) (Bargain et al. 2014). Cross-wage elasticities are also declining over 
time to 0.9 in 2014 confirming that the influence of partner’s wages or incomes is becoming less 
important for women’s labour supply.  
We now discuss the influence of socio-demographic characteristics on labour supply (Table 11). 
Predicted changes are marked as significant when the interaction term between the variable of 
interest and the utility of staying home in the regression model is significant (see Table A3 and A4 
in the appendix). The model shows that utility of staying home increases with the number of 
children, education, age, marital status and is particularly low in the Italian speaking part of the 
country. The Swiss nationality and living in an urban municipality do not affect labour supply in a 
significant way.38 Socio-demographic characteristics linked to the family are the most important 
taste-shifters. This underlines that many women do not face a trade-off between leisure and 
consumption as assumed in the classical economic theory, but rather a trade-off between care-work 
                                                          
38 Giudici & Schumacher (2017) found at the basis of the structural survey 2010-2014 (95.000 couples) that women 
holding a Swiss citizenship have a slightly higher labour supply than women without a Swiss citizenship. The difference 
is higher for participation rates than for working 50% or more. This study, however, did not control for wages and did 
not consider labour supply as a joint decision of the partners. Another reason for this different result could be that 
foreigners who have recently immigrated in Switzerland are underrepresented in the SHP. 
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and paid work. As for children, a small child up to six years old decreases working hours on average 
by 8.2 hours in 2004 and by 5.9 hours in 2014. Each child between 7 and 12 years lowers working 
hours by about 3.7 hours per week, whereas each child between 13 and 18 lowers it by 1.8 hours. 
This large effect of children on women’s working hours can be explained by different factors, namely 
by the tradition to consider childcare as part of the private sphere, high childcare costs, limited 
availability of childcare places and inexistent paternity leave (Giudici & Schumacher 2017). The 
evolution over time shows that in 2014 small children do not induce women to reduce their working 
hours as much as they did in 2004. This suggests that mothers of young children have become more 
attached to the labour market in 2014 and that the reconciliation of work and family has improved. 
Confirming the predominant gender role model, men with older children (13-18 in 2004, 7-18 in 
2014) have a lower utility of staying home than men with no children.  
Like children, marriage has a very strong effect on female labour force participation. All else being 
equal, in 2004 and 2014, married women work about seven hours per week less than unmarried 
women. This effect is surprisingly high, as it means that marriage affects labour supply to the same 
extent as a small child. There are different possible explanations for this effect. The joint taxation of 
married couples may discourage married women to work. This is however unlikely because only a 
few couples, those where both partners have high earnings, are concerned by a marriage penalty. 
The share of couples that benefit financially from marriage is indeed higher than the share of 
couples who lose from marriage (Peters 2014; SFTA 2016). The fact that labour supply is inelastic to 
a pay rise also speaks against an economic interpretation of the marriage coefficient.39 Rather than 
being a causal effect, we suppose that the large effect of marriage reflects different preferences of 
married and unmarried couples. If mostly couples favouring a male breadwinner model choose to 
marry, this selection into marriage would explain the fewer working hours of married women. 
Following this line, Hiekel et al. (2014) have shown that the desire for independency is the most 
important reason for partners not to marry in Western Europe. Finally, the large coefficient for 
marriage in the regression model could also be partly due to multicollinearity between marriage 
and having children.40  
 
                                                          
39 When we exclude marriage as a taste shifter from the categorical labour supply model, labour supply elasticities do 
not change. 
40 In 2014, 90% of married couples had children versus only 22 % of unmarried couples.  
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Table 11: Predicted change in women’s working hours according to socio-demographic and attitudinal 
aspects  
 
Baseline 
models 
Baseline 
models 
Attitudinal 
models 
Models by 
attitudes  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
year 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2014 2014 
 sample full full red. red. red. red. paid-
work 
home  
N of couples 2854 3402 1370 1158 1370 1158 559 599 
Change in women's working hours: socio-demographic aspects 
0 child (ref.)         
 Child 0-6 years  -8.2* -5.9* -7.5* -6.3* -7.6* -6.6* -6.1* -7.5* 
   Child 7-12 years  -3.7* -3.8* -3.6* -3.5* -3.5* -3.7*  -3.2* -4.3* 
   Child 13-18 years  -1.8* -1.8* -1.9* -2.5* -1.6* -2.7* -2.1* -3.2* 
Age 25-39 (ref)         
   Age 40-49 -3.8* -1.2 -4.4* -1.2 -4.4* -1.1 -1.1 -2.1 
   Age 50-64 -6.8* -5.6* -7.6* -5.9* -7.1* -5.9* -5.3* -7.6* 
Lower secondary education (ref.)         
   Upper secondary education  1.6* 2.2* -0.1 0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -0.8 0.2 
   Tertiary education  7.0* 7.2* 6.6* 5.5* 4.7* 3.3* 3.7 2.3 
Unmarried couple (ref.)         
   Married couples  -6.9* -7.1* -7.6* -7.5* -7.4* -7.2* -5.0* -8.5* 
German speaking region (ref.)         
   French speaking region  1.4* 1.2* 1.8* 1.3 2.3* 2.0* 2.2 1.9 
   Italian speaking region  -2.0 -3.5* -4.7* -8.7* -3.6* -7.6* -6.1 -8.1* 
Change in women's working hours: attitudes 
Child suffers with working mother  
    
-0.4* -0.6* -0.1 -0.5 
Work important for independence  
    
0.1 0.4* 0.8* 0.3 
Working mother at age 15     0.8 -0.3 0.5 -0.7 
Partner: Child suffers with working 
mother  
    
-0.3* -0.4* -0.4* 0.4 
Partner: Work important for 
independence 
    0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 
Partner: working mother at age 15     0.9 1.0 -0.2 2.2* 
Source: SHP 2004, 2014.Note: Working hours refer to the average over the 8 categories (0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40 
hours). Predicted change in working hours have been computed by weighting each of the alternatives by its 
probability. Significance levels refer to the interaction with women’s utility to stay home. * Significant at 95% 
level.  
 
The next paragraph addresses the hypothesis on linguistic regions (Hypothesis 1a). Controlling for 
basic socio-demographic and economic characteristics, cultural differences between linguistic 
regions remain visible. In line with Giudici & Schumacher (2017), women in the Italian speaking part 
of Switzerland are more likely to stay home than women in the other linguistic regions. In terms of 
77 
 
predicted working hours, the difference with women in the German speaking part of Switzerland 
amounts to 2 hours in 2004 and to 3.5 hours in 2014.  
The reason for this growing difference is that women in the Italian part of Switzerland increased 
their working hours only to a small extent between 2004 and 2014 (0.7 hours), whereas women in 
the other linguistic regions of Switzerland increased their hours more intensively (3.4 hours in the 
French part and 3.8 hours in the German part). Therefore, we find clear support for Hypothesis 1a 
according to which cultural differences affect labour supply. Cultural differences remain or are even 
amplified when gender role attitudes are controlled in the model (Models 5 and 6). 
Turning to the impact of attitudes, Models 5 and 6 show that attitudes are important for women’s 
labour supply and support thus Hypothesis 1b. Women who think that a job is important for 
independence tend to work more for pay: A shift of one point within the 11-point scale, predicts a 
shift of 0.4 working hours in 2014. Attitudes towards working mothers play an even more important 
role. Women who think that pre-school children suffer with a working mother have a considerably 
higher utility of staying home. For this variable, a shift of one point within the 11-point scale, predicts 
a shift of 0.6 working hours. In addition, partners’ opinion on working mothers plays a role, whereas 
partners’ opinions on the importance of a job for independence do not have a significant impact on 
female labour supply. This evidence shows that many women feel a moral pressure to stay home. It 
is also interesting to look at attitudes and men’s labour supply. In 2004, men who thought that a job 
was important to keep independence tended to work less. Probably, these men do not favour a 
single breadwinner model, but a division of paid labour between both partners. Moreover, men 
tend to comply to the main breadwinner model if their partner thought that a child suffered with a 
working mother. In 2014, we do not find any significant influence of attitudes on men’s labour 
supply. Our finding of strong effects of attitudes contradicts relatively old evidence on Switzerland 
(Ernst Stähli et al. 2009) and is in line with findings on other countries (Giuliano 2014). In both years, 
having been raised by a working mother has no significant impact on women’s labour supply. 
Neither do women work more hours if the partner has grown up with a working mother. We 
therefore find no support for Hypothesis 1c. Overall, we can conclude that attitudes play a much 
stronger role for labour supply than financial aspects. 
We now discuss Hypothesis 2 on the interrelation of attitudes and wages or incomes. For this 
Hypothesis, we compare Model 3 and 5 for 2004 and Model 4 and 6 for 2014 in Table 11, which 
have been estimated using the same sample. We remark that the inclusion of attitudes makes 
almost all elasticities become (more) negative. As postulated in Hypothesis 2, the reaction to a pay 
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rise seems to be conditional on attitudes. When attitudes are controlled for in the model, an 
increase in wages or incomes brings a stronger reduction on women’s working hours. Stated 
differently, models that ignore gender role attitudes underestimate the negative impact of wage 
increases on the hours worked by economically active women (intensive margin).  
To dig deeper on how attitudes affect elasticities, we test Hypothesis 3 that expects a pay rise to 
have a different influence on home-oriented and paid-work-oriented women. The results in Table 
11 indicate that home- and paid-work-oriented women do not react in the same way in terms of 
participation. While a pay rise lowers the labour supply of home-oriented women (intensive 
elasticity of -0.4 for a 10% wage increase), labour supply of paid-work-oriented women is inelastic 
(intensive elasticity of -0.1 for a 10% wage increase). Home-oriented women react also more 
strongly to a wage increase of their partner (intensive cross-wage elasticities amount to -0.8 
compared to -0.4 for paid-work-oriented women). Nevertheless, a pay rise of their partner also 
affect paid-work-oriented women negatively. The stronger negative reaction of home-oriented 
women to an increase in wages or incomes supports Hypothesis 3 and suggests that the income 
effect is very important for home-oriented women. Home-oriented women seem to work only as 
much as necessary to cover their household expenses. If the household budget is produced by other 
sources (e.g. higher own wages or income, higher partner’s wages or income, or other household 
income), these sources substitute women’s working hours. The story is different for paid-work-
oriented women, whose labour supply is more inelastic to a change in their own wage in particular 
and in other income more in general.  
 
Conclusion and discussion 
Encompassing all dual-earner couples, this paper provides evidence on decisions to labour supply in 
a multicultural and politically diverse country like Switzerland. This contribution adds to the 
literature on families’ labour supply by analysing gender role attitudes and financial incentives 
jointly in a categorical labour supply model. In this common framework, it is not only possible to 
compare the relative influence of determinants of labour supply, but also to analyse the 
interrelation between attitudes and wages or incomes. 
The analysis revealed that gender role attitudes influence women’s labour supply considerably. Not 
only women’s gender role attitudes, but also their partners’ play an important role in the choice of 
working hours. Attitudes affect both the utility of staying home and the reaction to financial 
incentives. Own-wage elasticities of working women and cross-wage elasticities become more 
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strongly negative if the regression model conditions on gender role attitudes. Women with home-
oriented attitudes reduce their working hours more strongly following a pay rise than women with 
work-oriented attitudes. The same holds for a wage increase of the partner. This means that for 
home-oriented women, the income effect is stronger than the substitution effect. Moral pressures 
to stay home have a considerable influence on these women.  
Besides gender-attitudes, some additional results on couples’ labour supply deserve our attention. 
Overall, women’s labour supply has revealed to be relatively inelastic to the wage level and very 
similar to men’s elasticities. 41 The only exception is the negative cross-wage elasticity of women, 
which shows an important negative influence of partner’s wages on female labour supply. This is in 
line with Wise & Zangger (2017)’s findings about the endogenous decision-making of couples 
concerning working time. For socio-demographic characteristics, the analysis confirmed the large 
impact of the number of children, marital status, and education on labour supply previously found 
in the literature. Differences are also found between linguistic regions. The most important result 
with respect to these coefficients is that women in the Italian speaking part of the country have the 
highest utility of staying home. This evidence reflects cultural differences that could be addressed 
more in detail in future research also on other countries.  
It is important to note that our model focused on couples in general and not on specific groups. 
Labour-supply elasticities might be stronger for specific groups such as mothers of small children or 
parents with no access to informal childcare by grand-parents. As most labour supply models, our 
analysis is static. The interaction between wage level and gender role attitude in the future will 
depend on several factors. If attitudes continue to shift away from traditional gender roles, we 
expect negative cross-wage elasticities to become weaker. At the same time, we expect a self-
reinforcing mechanism between rising female labour supply and egalitarian gender role attitudes. 
This process could be studied with panel data.  
Overall, the addition of subjective indicators to classical labour supply models has revealed to be a 
fruitful approach that brings interesting policy implication. If women have moral pressure to stay 
home, policies that aim to stimulate labour supply via financial incentives might have little effect or 
                                                          
41 Preliminary research has also showed that earnings are not highly influential for women’s SWB. Even if women 
compare their income more than men independently from the gender composition of the sector of employment, 
women’s SWB is not affected by an income increase of their reference group. There might be two explanations for this. 
On the one hand, women’s SWB could benefit from a possible tunnel effect with future prospects of upwards mobility 
when the average income of their reference group increases. On the other hand, even though they found income 
comparisons to be important, women might not weight economic and job-related factors as crucial for their general life 
satisfaction (Ravazzini & Piekałkiewicz, 2018). 
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even unintended opposite effects. In a context with a high share of home-oriented women and an 
inelastic female labour supply, a focus on other factors might be more promising to increase women 
paid working hours. Alternative policy approaches, such as work-friendly school schedules, flexibility 
in the workplace, high quality childcare, and more social and financial incentives for fathers to work 
part-time or to take parental leaves, might be more promising than classical monetary incentives. 
Our research has contributed in this respect by showing that gender role attitudes are an important 
non-economic factor that should be taken into account by labour supply models.   
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Appendix 
Estimation of the utility function 
The utility function is maximised in a trade-off between consumption (C) and leisure (L), which can 
be mathematically written as: 
max
ℎ∈𝐻
𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿|𝑋, 𝜖, 𝜀)                                                             (EQA1) 
we refer to L as the “utility of staying home”. In addition to C and L, X refers to individual 
characteristics, which are also called taste shifters. In line with previous literature, we include age 
(three age groups), education (three levels), an indicator for urban municipalities, an indicator for 
marital status, the number of children in three age ranges (0-6 years, 7-12 years, 13-18 years), 
nationality (Swiss, other nationalities) and the linguistic region (German, French, or Italian, 
measured by the language of interview) as taste-shifter. All the individual characteristics listed 
above are interacted with the utility of staying home. For all women and both models, we also 
control for part-time work. In addition to X, 𝜖 indicates job availability, which can be approximated 
by semi-observable working costs (e.g. all working women have a unitary weekly cost given by 
transportation; other costs could be search costs for part-time jobs or rigidities regarding working 
hours). In addition, ε is the unobserved taste variation assumed to be i.i.d.  
The probability for a couple of choosing a combination of hours i can be expressed by: 
𝑃(𝑈𝑖 > 𝑈ℎ,, ∀ℎ ≠ 𝑖) =
exp(𝑈{𝐶𝑖,𝐿𝑖|𝑋,𝜖})
∑ exp(𝑈{𝐶ℎ,𝐿ℎ|𝑋,𝜖})ℎ∈𝐻
                                   (EQA2) 
According to this probability, for each family with characteristics X, the likelihood function can be 
written as: 
𝐿 = ∬
exp(𝑈{𝐶𝑖, 𝐿𝑖|?̂?𝑖, 𝜖})
∑ exp(𝑈{𝐶ℎ, 𝐿ℎ|?̂?ℎ, 𝜖})ℎ∈𝐻
+∞
−∞
𝑓(𝜖)𝑓(?̂?)𝑑(𝜖)𝑑(?̂?)   (EQA3) 
Where ?̂? are wage predictors. EQA3 is solved using maximum simulated likelihood with random 
draws from the distribution of 𝜖 and ?̂?. 
Our model is estimated with the user written command lslogit developed by Max Löffler in Stata 13 
(see Löffler et al. 2014).  
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Table A2: Distribution of observed and predicted weekly working hours. 
Hours category observed  predicted predicted predicted 
  baseline baseline attitudinal 
  full sample reduced sample reduced sample 
Year: 2004     
 0-3 28.0 28.0 26.4 27.1 
 4-12 10.4 9.2 13.4 13.5 
 13-21 13.1 16.4 15.9 15.9 
 22-29 20.5 17.7 15.3 15.1 
 30-37 8.3 9.2 10.9 10.7 
 38+ 19.5 19.5 18.2 17.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N (couples) 2,854 2,854 1,370 1,370 
Year: 2014     
 0-3 21.8 21.8 18.7 18.3 
 4-12 9.3 8.2 10.5 10.5 
 13-21 13.6 16.5 16.3 16.3 
 22-29 22.9 20.4 19.1 19.2 
 30-37 11.3 12.0 15.0 15.1 
 38+ 21.1 21.1 20.3 20.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N (couples) 3,402 3,402 1,158 1,158 
Source: Swiss Household Panel 2004 and 2014. 
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Table A3: Categorical Labour supply model. Baseline model and attitudinal model. 
  Baseline model Baseline model Attitudinal model 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
  2004  2014  2004  2014  value2004  value2014  
EQUATION VARIABLES Coef. tstat Coef. tstat Coef. tstat Coef. tstat Coef. tstat Coef. tstat 
Cx Constant -1.054 (-0.3) -1.843 (-0.5) -0.846 (-0.1) 8.896 (1.3) -2.233 (-0.4) 4.770 (0.7) 
CxC Constant -0.636** (-3.3) -0.505** (-2.7) -0.743* (-2.5) -1.078*** (-3.3) -0.759** (-2.6) -1.014** (-3.0) 
CxL1 Constant 0.304 (0.8) -0.080 (-0.2) 0.334 (0.6) -0.430 (-0.7) 0.686 (1.2) 0.389 (0.6) 
CxL2 Constant 0.982* (2.2) 1.450*** (3.4) 1.078 (1.6) -0.009 (-0.0) 1.061 (1.6) 0.048 (0.1) 
L1x Nb children 0-6 years 2.885*** (14.9) 2.113*** (12.9) 2.783*** (10.2) 2.482*** (8.3) 2.925*** (10.4) 2.739*** (8.8) 
 Nb children 7-12 years 1.264*** (8.9) 1.360*** (9.3) 1.302*** (6.4) 1.373*** (5.3) 1.318*** (6.4) 1.509*** (5.6) 
 Nb children 13-18 years 0.641*** (4.7) 0.665*** (5.2) 0.684*** (3.3) 0.974*** (4.2) 0.622** (2.9) 1.104*** (4.6) 
 Education: Upper secondary, women -0.551* (-2.2) -0.793** (-3.1) 0.035 (0.1) -0.266 (-0.5) 0.246 (0.6) 0.035 (0.1) 
 Education: Tertiary, women -2.338*** (-7.7) -2.524*** (-8.9) -2.259*** (-4.8) -2.120*** (-3.7) -1.682*** (-3.5) -1.324* (-2.2) 
 40-50 years, women 1.277*** (5.3) 0.431 (1.8) 1.545*** (4.2) 0.472 (1.0) 1.597*** (4.3) 0.441 (0.9) 
 51-64 years, women 2.362*** (8.7) 1.986*** (7.7) 2.754*** (6.7) 2.308*** (4.9) 2.668*** (6.4) 2.437*** (5.0) 
 Married couple 2.264*** (8.1) 2.427*** (10.7) 2.574*** (5.7) 2.871*** (6.8) 2.589*** (5.6) 2.886*** (6.6) 
 Urban municipality -0.308 (-1.6) 0.000 (0.0) -0.376 (-1.3) 0.076 (0.2) -0.249 (-0.8) 0.302 (0.9) 
 Swiss nationality, women 0.471 (1.9) -0.279 (-1.3) -0.096 (-0.2) 0.345 (0.7) -0.179 (-0.4) 0.318 (0.7) 
 French speaking -0.489* (-2.6) -0.425* (-2.3) -0.641* (-2.3) -0.518 (-1.7) -0.848** (-2.9) -0.799* (-2.4) 
 Italian speaking 0.693 (1.7) 1.260** (3.2) 1.849** (2.6) 3.674*** (4.4) 1.451* (2.0) 3.313*** (3.9) 
 Mother employed at age 15, women         -0.299 (-1.2) 0.112 (0.4) 
 Mother employed at age 15, men         -0.353 (-1.4) -0.400 (-1.4) 
 Child suffers, women         0.140*** (3.6) 0.253*** (4.5) 
 Job preservers independence, women         -0.056 (-1.2) -0.178* (-2.0) 
 Child suffers, men         0.129** (3.2) 0.147** (2.7) 
 Job preservers independence, men         -0.053 (-1.1) -0.123 (-1.4) 
 Constant 129.074*** (10.1) 139.607*** (12.2) 44.297* (2.5) 79.699*** (4.3) 40.947* (2.3) 74.073*** (3.9) 
L1xL1 Constant -18.126*** 
(-
12.1) -18.799*** 
(-
14.2) -7.881*** (-3.9) -11.278*** (-5.3) -7.966*** (-3.9) -11.325*** (-5.3) 
L2x Nb children 0-6 years -0.035 (-0.2) -0.053 (-0.3) 0.193 (0.6) -0.356 (-1.2) 0.163 (0.5) -0.415 (-1.3) 
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 Nb children 7-12 years -0.288 (-1.5) -0.518** (-2.7) -0.405 (-1.3) -0.821* (-2.4) -0.422 (-1.3) -0.861* (-2.5) 
 Nb children 13-18 years -0.464** (-2.6) -0.956*** (-5.3) -0.705* (-2.2) -0.706** (-2.6) -0.714* (-2.2) -0.731** (-2.7) 
 Education: Upper secondary -0.707* (-2.1) -1.050** (-3.3) 0.382 (0.4) 0.197 (0.2) 0.136 (0.1) 0.231 (0.3) 
 Education: Tertiary -1.605*** (-4.2) -1.906*** (-5.6) -0.524 (-0.5) -1.108 (-1.4) -0.951 (-0.9) -1.278 (-1.6) 
 40-50 years, men -0.232 (-0.7) 0.071 (0.2) -0.537 (-1.0) -0.527 (-1.0) -1.281** (-2.9) -0.745 (-1.8) 
 51-64 years, men 1.633*** (5.2) 1.237*** (4.1) 1.426** (2.8) 0.482  0.685** (2.7) 0.234 (0.9) 
 Married couple -0.382 (-1.2) -0.398 (-1.6) -0.392 (-0.7) -0.235 (-0.6) -0.481 (-0.9) -0.270 (-0.6) 
 Urban municipality 0.355 (1.6) 0.369 (1.8) 0.640 (1.8) 0.296 (0.9) 0.569 (1.6) 0.238 (0.7) 
 Swiss nationality, men -0.767** (-2.9) 0.010 (0.0) 0.318 (0.6) -0.160 (-0.3) 0.308 (0.6) -0.154 (-0.3) 
 French speaking 0.118 (0.5) 0.644** (3.2) 0.346 (1.0) 0.503 (1.6) 0.437 (1.2) 0.604 (1.8) 
 Italian speaking -0.103 (-0.2) 0.076 (0.2) 0.159 (0.2) 0.393 (0.6) 0.360 (0.4) 0.594 (0.8) 
 Child suffers, women         -0.095* (-2.0) -0.046 (-0.8) 
 Job preservers independence, women         -0.084 (-1.6) 0.013 (0.1) 
 Child suffers, men         -0.044 (-0.9) -0.099 (-1.8) 
 Job preservers independence, men         0.135* (2.1) 0.024 (0.3) 
 Constant -135.456*** 
(-
17.0) 
-
100.856*** 
(-
14.8) 
-
129.543*** (-11.2) -88.655*** (-7.4) -129.315*** 
(-
11.1) -89.855*** (-7.3) 
L2xL2 Constant 14.516*** (18.7) 10.489*** (16.8) 13.312*** (11.9) 9.741*** (9.2) 12.958*** (11.4) 9.391*** (8.6) 
L1xL2 Constant 3.707*** (6.1) 2.774*** (4.8) 4.074*** (4.5) 2.331* (2.3) 4.700*** (5.1) 3.282** (3.1) 
IND Fixed costs, women 0.523** (3.1) 0.196 (1.4) 0.260 (1.1) -0.037 (-0.2) 0.255 (1.1) -0.042 (-0.2) 
 Part-time, women -2.541*** 
(-
11.9) -2.218*** 
(-
12.3) -1.253*** (-4.3) -1.133*** (-4.0) -1.250*** (-4.3) -1.129*** (-4.0) 
 Welfare -0.754*** (-4.7) -0.436** (-3.3) -1.029*** (-4.0) -0.763** (-3.0) -0.976*** (-3.8) -0.702** (-2.8) 
 Observations 51,372  61,236  24,660  20,844  24,660  20,844  
  Pseudo R-squared 0.282   0.249   0.292   0.237   0.298   0.245   
Source: Swiss Household Panel 2004 and 2014. 
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Table A4: Categorical labour supply model 2014 by attitudes. 
  Models by attitudes 
    (7)   (8)   
  Home-oriented  Work-oriented  
  2014  2014  
EQUATION VARIABLES Coef. tstat Coef. tstat 
Cx Constant 18.122 (1.6) -1.672 (-0.2) 
CxC Constant -1.675** (-3.0) -0.712 (-1.6) 
CxL1 Constant -1.261 (-1.1) 1.260 (1.4) 
CxL2 Constant -0.608 (-0.5) 0.308 (0.3) 
L1x Nb children 0-6 years 2.658*** (6.5) 3.211*** (6.1) 
 Nb children 7-12 years 1.363*** (3.6) 1.768*** (4.4) 
 Nb children 13-18 years 0.898* (2.4) 1.302*** (3.9) 
 Education: Upper secondary, women 0.337 (0.3) -0.091 (-0.1) 
 Education: Tertiary, women -1.566 (-1.4) -0.901 (-1.2) 
 40-50 years, women 0.469 (0.7) 0.837 (1.2) 
 51-64 years, women 2.290** (3.3) 3.047*** (4.1) 
 Married couple 2.148*** (3.3) 3.253*** (5.4) 
 Urban municipality 0.228 (0.5) 0.290 (0.6) 
 Swiss nationality, women 0.380 (0.5) 0.135 (0.2) 
 French speaking -0.949 (-1.8) -0.788 (-1.8) 
 Italian speaking 2.651 (1.7) 3.612*** (3.3) 
 Mother employed at age 15, women -0.202 (-0.5) 0.290 (0.7) 
 Mother employed at age 15, men 0.068 (0.2) -0.872* (-2.1) 
 Child suffers, women 0.051 (0.3) 0.183 (1.5) 
 Job preservers independence, women -0.360* (-2.4) -0.106 (-0.9) 
 Child suffers, men 0.191* (2.3) 0.095 (1.2) 
 Job preservers independence, men -0.038 (-0.3) -0.156 (-1.3) 
 Constant 113.737*** (4.1) 52.635* (2.0) 
L1xL1 Constant -14.928*** (-4.8) -9.440** (-3.1) 
L2x Nb children 0-6 years -0.497 (-1.2) -0.422 (-0.9) 
 Nb children 7-12 years -0.866 (-1.9) -0.959 (-1.7) 
 Nb children 13-18 years -0.444 (-1.1) -1.058** (-2.6) 
 Education: Upper secondary 2.165 (0.8) -0.212 (-0.2) 
 Education: Tertiary 0.205 (0.1) -1.522 (-1.7) 
 40-50 years, men -0.456 (-0.8) -1.144 (-1.8) 
 agegr_p3 0.076 (0.2) 0.318 (0.8) 
 Married couple 0.017 (0.0) -0.422 (-0.7) 
 Urban municipality 0.094 (0.2) 0.278 (0.6) 
 Swiss nationality, men -1.166 (-1.6) 0.720 (1.0) 
 French speaking 0.268 (0.5) 0.991* (2.2) 
 Italian speaking -1.191 (-0.7) 0.962 (1.1) 
 Child suffers, women -0.102 (-0.6) -0.009 (-0.1) 
 Job preservers independence, women 0.043 (0.3) -0.012 (-0.1) 
 Child suffers, men -0.207* (-2.4) 0.005 (0.1) 
 Job preservers independence, men -0.310* (-2.3) 0.285* (2.0) 
 Constant -65.759*** (-3.5) -112.984*** (-6.4) 
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L2xL2 Constant 7.496*** (4.9) 11.225*** (6.9) 
L1xL2 Constant 2.249 (1.4) 4.263** (3.0) 
IND Fixed costs, women -0.186 (-0.6) 0.277 (0.8) 
 Part-time, women -1.167** (-3.0) -1.289** (-3.0) 
 Welfare -1.113* (-2.5) -0.604 (-1.9) 
 Observations 10,062  10,782  
  Pseudo R-squared 0.240   0.270   
Source: Swiss Household Panel 2014. 
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Article 3: The Impact of Female Labour Force Participation on Household 
Income Inequality in Switzerland 
Abstract 
This contribution investigates the link between female labour force participation and 
household income inequality using data from the Swiss Household Panel (2000–2014). 
Through index decomposition analyses, we find that female labour force participation has 
slightly attenuated household income inequality over time. Women’s entry into the labour 
market, higher work percentages within part-time work – but not the shift from part-time to 
full-time work – and the weak correlation in partner’s earnings have contributed to this 
effect.  
Keywords: female labour force participation, income inequality, part-time work, index decomposition, 
household types 
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Introduction 
The growth of female employment is one of the major socio-economic changes in most societies. A 
changed division of labour within couples, evolving social norms, technological changes and the 
expansion of education are drivers of this transition from unpaid housework to paid work. The 
increasing income earned by women has consequences for the household income. Household 
income includes all income sources by all household members and takes account of sharing of 
resources among household members. Because it illustrates the economic well-being of individuals, 
household income inequality is a key inequality measure. Female employment boosts the level of 
household income, but the effect on its distribution is not a priori clear.  
Whether more female employment is good or bad for household income inequality depends on 
which women work more. If mostly women of low-income households work, inequality should 
decrease, whereas if mostly women of high-income households increase their working hours, 
inequality should increase. Although most recent contributions find egalitarian effects at the 
household level, previous empirical analyses have shown mixed results.  
In Switzerland, the link between female labour force participation and household income inequality 
has not been investigated so far. Considering that comparative analyses stress the importance of 
the activity rate for household income inequality (Pasqua 2008; Kollmeyer 2012), Switzerland 
presents an interesting case study. The participation rate is high and part-time work is more 
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common among women than in any other OECD country.42 In parallel to the rise of the activity rate 
from 68% in 1991 to 79% in 2014, the typical household structure has gradually changed from a 1–
0 type (men working full-time, women not working) to a 1–0.5 type (men working full-time, women 
working part-time) (Bühler et al. 2002). Another important characteristic of Switzerland is that, 
unlike many other countries, its household income inequality has remained at the same level since 
2000 (SFSO 2014; Suter et al. 2016) and is now below the European average (Eurostat 2015). 
Therefore, our research question is whether high and rising female employment has contributed to 
keeping household income inequality in Switzerland relatively low. 
Apart from adding evidence for Switzerland, this article contributes to a better understanding of the 
impact of part-time work on household income inequality. Although some studies consider part-
time work as a driver of household income inequality (Esping-Andersen 2009; OECD 2013), this 
aspect has never been empirically addressed in detail. Typically, studies look at how earners and 
non-earners are grouped in households, but do not distinguish between different work percentages. 
In this contribution, we first discuss the different potential channels through which female 
employment affects household income inequality. After a brief literature review we discuss 
methods and data from the Swiss Household Panel (2000 to 2014). To measure inequality in the 
income distribution we use the Theil index and the Coefficient of Variation. Inequality 
decompositions and counterfactual simulations serve as main methodological tools. Our main 
results suggest that women’s stronger labour force participation has contributed to keeping 
household income inequality relatively low in Switzerland. 
 
Theory 
Household income inequality is determined by many different factors (see e.g. Jenkins 1995; OECD 
2015), of which we discuss only those related to labour force participation. The main dependent 
variable of our analysis, household income inequality, includes labour income from employment 
and self-employment of each household member, asset income, private and public transfers, and 
imputed rent. Since we are not interested in the effects of the tax system, we do not include direct 
taxes.  
The household is identified by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office as “a person living alone or several 
persons living in the same dwelling. Family households are divided into single or multiple family 
households or non-family households.” In this sense, household members are not necessarily 
                                                          
42 The intensity of part-time work is similar for women of different age groups.  
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involved in the same activities, but they live together, registered under the same address. This 
means that resources are not necessarily shared among household members. Following this 
definition, very few surveys provide the share of resources produced and held by each member of 
the household (one exception is the German Socio-Economic Panel). The distribution of resources 
within the household is however a key element for inequality. Using two large household surveys, 
Figure 11 shows the inequality in individual earnings and in total household income in Switzerland.  
 
Figure 11: Earnings and household income inequality (Gini indices). 
 
Sources: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2000-2014, Statistics of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) 2007-
2015. Notes: for earnings, the data include individuals of all ages, but exclude self-employed, apprentices and 
inters earnings; earnings constructed with the SHP in 2000 and 2001 include also self-employment; income 
in SILC refer to the previous year. More details about inequality in individual earnings and in household 
income can be found in Suter et al. (2016). 
 
Inequality in individual earnings is on average 0.07 points larger than inequality in household 
income. Pooling earnings of different household members is therefore equalising. Households can 
be seen as a social insurance mechanism, where each member contributes to stability.  
Earnings are however only one element that could contribute to inequality and the altered 
behaviour of women with their increase in labour supply could potentially have multiple 
repercussions on household income inequality.    
Figure 12 illustrates the different channels through which increasing female employment may 
influence household income inequality. We distinguish between effects from changes in the 
household composition (e.g. more single households) and effects from changing working patterns 
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within households (e.g. household labour supply). Earnings inequality at the individual level is 
determined by labour force participation, by the variation in working hours and hourly wages, as 
well as by the relation between working hours and hourly wages. The correlation of earnings 
between members of the same household and the correlation between income sources play an 
additional role. 
 
Figure 12: Determinants of household income inequality.  
 
 
Looking at the different channels of Figure 12, we can formulate some expectations on how the rise 
in female labour force participation in Switzerland affects household income inequality. Table  12 
summarises these hypotheses. First, if more women work, there are fewer women with no working 
hours (and thus zero earnings), which means that inequality of working hours among all working-
age women shrinks (H1a). Second, the effect on the variation of hours depends on whether women 
with a relatively low work percentage or with a relatively high work percentage increase their hours. 
Because working hours are limited at the top (we do not take into account overtime here), we 
expect that rising work percentages bring a lower heterogeneity in hours (H1b). The lower variation 
in working hours (H1a and H1b) would clearly have an equalising effect on earnings and on 
household income.  
The equalising effect from the variation in working hours might be amplified or mitigated by a 
positive or negative correlation between hours and hourly wages. There are two reasons to expect 
a positive correlation in Switzerland (H2), which offsets the equalising effect of H1b partially. Firstly, 
part-time work might be worse paid than full-time work. Such a part-time penalty is the reason why 
the OECD (2013) sees part-time work as a potential driver of income inequality. Secondly, positive 
wage elasticities in labour supply models suggest that the wage potential positively affects working 
hours (Gerfin and Leu 2007). 
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Table 12: Hypotheses on the impact of increasing female labour force participation on household income 
inequality. 
 Type of change Reason Effect on 
household 
income inequality 
H1a All women: Variation in working 
hours decreases over time  
More women work: Fewer inactive 
women with zero earnings 
 
Equalising 
H1b Working women: Variation in 
working hours decreases over 
time 
 
Women increase their working hours, 
fewer women with low work 
percentages  
Equalising  
 
H2 Working women: Positive 
correlation hours- wage level 
Positive own-wage elasticity, part-
time penalty 
Desequalising 
 
H3a Household: Correlation of 
partner’s earnings more positive 
over time 
Partners have more similar working 
hours  
 
Desequalising  
 
H3b Household: 
Correlation of partner’s earnings 
less positive over time  
Women with high earning partners 
increase their working hours less 
Equalising 
H4 
 
Household: inequality of income 
sources: Women’s earnings 
become more relevant for 
household income 
Earnings are more equally distributed 
than income from other sources 
(assets, transfers, pensions)  
Equalising 
H5a Household structure: More 
single households 
Women in single households work 
more than women in couple 
households, no pooling of household 
income 
Desequalising 
H5b Household structure: More 
single mother households 
Single mothers work more than 
mothers living with their partner, no 
pooling of household income, 
generally low income levels 
Desequalising 
 
After having discussed the effects on individual earnings inequality, we now turn to the household 
level. The role of the correlation between the different income sources is a rather complex issue. 
With working patterns of women and men becoming more similar, we expect that earnings of 
women and men should resemble each other more over time. Consequently, the correlation 
between men’s and women’s earnings should become more positive (H3a). However, the 
correlation between income sources does not only reflect the similarity in working hours, but also 
the household structure (e.g. the share of single households), the similarity in wage levels between 
partners (e.g. due to assortative mating) and the relationship between labour supply and partner’s 
earnings. If mostly women with high-earning partners increase their working hours, household 
income inequality will increase, whereas if mostly women with low-earning partners increase their 
working hours, inequality will decrease. In Switzerland, female labour supply depends negatively on 
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the wage level of their partners (Gerfin and Leu 2007). Other studies show that, due to the tax 
system and to income-dependent childcare costs, high work percentages are particularly 
unattractive for women with children and a high earning partner (Bütler and Ruesch 2009; 
Schwegler et al. 2012). We therefore expect that women with high earning partners have increased 
their working hours to a smaller extent than women with low earning partners. Consequently, the 
correlation between couples’ earnings should have become less positive over time (H3b). The two 
hypotheses 3a and 3b point to different directions and might offset each other. Overall, findings 
from various countries suggest that the correlation between female earnings and other income 
components has increased over time and therefore had a disequalising effect on household income 
inequality (Karoly and Burtless 1995; Schwartz 2010). 
A straightforward impact of higher female labour supply is that women’s earnings contribute more 
strongly to total household income. If women’s earnings are more equally distributed than other 
income sources, more female earnings reduce household income inequality. Considering that 
capital income is highly unequal (Piketty 2014; Suter & Ravazzini 2018), and that pensions and social 
transfers are unequally distributed among the working-age population (because only a small share 
of households receives these incomes) we expect this to be the case. Therefore, we expect a further 
equalising impact of female labour force participation on household income inequality (H4). 
Our last hypothesis concerns the household composition. Because women living in single 
households tend to work more than women living in couple households, we can see the rising 
number of single households as a cause of rising female labour force participation. Because single 
households tend to be more unequal than larger households (there is no pooling or redistribution 
of income among household members), more single households amplify household income 
inequality (H5a). This seems likely to be true in the Swiss context. Although not being focused on 
female labour force participation, the research conducted by Ernst et al. (2000) on Switzerland 
shows that inequality among dual-earner households was clearly lower than among single-
households. The same reasoning applies to single mothers, who also tend to work more than 
mothers living with a partner. Moreover, single mothers tend to have particularly low household 
income and a high variation in earnings, which reinforces this desequalising effect (H5b). This is 
confirmed by studies in many developed countries, where single parenthood contributed to income 
inequality (Western et al. 2008; Kollmeyer 2012).  
Notwithstanding the multitude of our hypotheses, there might be other potential impacts of female 
labour force participation on household income inequality, for example on the inequality in hourly 
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wage. Our discussion has not taken account of other changes occurring over time, such as the tax 
system, business cycle, changes in the industrial structure or in the unemployment rate. We also 
neglect the possible effects of more male part-time work as a result of a changed division of labour 
within couples.43  
Literature review 
Although the issue of female earnings has received considerable attention in the literature on 
income inequality, contributions have so far focused on few countries. While there is extensive 
evidence for the USA (Cancian and Reed 1999; Daly and Valletta 2006; Pencavel 2006; Larrimore 
2014), there is scarce empirical research for continental European countries (exceptions are Breen 
and Salazar (2010) on the UK and Del Boca and Pasqua (2003) on Italy). This is surprising, considering 
that comparative studies show large differences between countries (Cancian and Schoeni 1998; 
Esping-Andersen 2007; Pasqua 2008; Harkness 2013). Previous findings in the literature show that 
women’s entry into the labour market contributes to a lower household income inequality. The few 
studies that report the opposite effect have been mostly published more than 20 years ago 
(Ryscavage et al. 1992; Karoly and Burtless 1995).  
An important drawback of comparative studies is that they do not involve an analysis over time. 
Rather, they test whether observed income inequality is higher or lower compared to a situation 
where no women work. Such approaches cannot show the direction of the effect of other changes 
in female employment, most importantly when part-time working women increase their working 
hours. The same limitation applies to aggregate level analyses that link female employment rates to 
income inequality (e.g. Kollmeyer 2012). To find the effect of an increase in female labour force 
participation over time, data on different time points is required. 
The study by Breen and Salazar (2010) on the UK was one of the first to include also single 
households. This is not only important for inference on the (working-age) population, but also to 
take the relationship between having a partner and labour supply into account. Their study looks 
not only at female labour force participation, but also at assortative mating and, most importantly, 
at educational expansion. Their results show that these aspects have hardly contributed to the 
increasing income inequality between households that, in the case of the UK, was driven by the rise 
in unemployment among the male population.  
                                                          
43 We have tested these effects, but we found that the increase in male part-time work is marginal and not relevant for 
household income inequality. 
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More recently, Larrimore (2014) has disentangled the different drivers of income inequality in the 
United States using shift-share decomposition of inequality indices for the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s 
by employment status, marriage rate and the correlation of spouses’ earnings. This last aspect was 
a main driver of the steep rise in inequality in the 1990s, whereas a rise in female earnings inequality 
and the unemployment rate made inequality slowly increase in the 2000s. Female employment 
moderated income inequality growth in the first years of the 2000s but was unable to reduce the 
growth in inequality in the latest years.  
Following Breen and Salazar (2010) and Larrimore (2014), this paper includes different household 
types according to the cohabitation and the employment status of all their members and, in 
addition, distinguishes between different work-percentages. Even if we acknowledge the 
interrelatedness of education, assortative mating, and employment, as illustrated by Blossfeld and 
Buchholz (2009), we do not go into the different causes of female labour force participation but 
concentrate on the consequences in terms of household income inequality.  
 
Data and operationalisation 
We use data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) covering the years 2000 to 2014. Because the 
SHP includes income and work-percentages of all individuals in the household, it is well-suited for 
our purpose. Although we analysed the data of all years, we present here results only for 2000, 
2004, 2009 and 2014, as female labour participation did not change abruptly from one year to 
another.44  
We focus on individuals of working-age and do not limit the analysis to households composed of 
couples. We include all households where the head is between 25 and 64 years old (n in 2000= 
3,589, in 2004=4,307, in 2009=3,261, in 2014= 5,186). The reason for this age range is that by the 
age of 25 most individuals have finished their education and by the age of 65 most are retired. The 
main income earner within the household has been designated as the household head. The units of 
analysis are individuals and weights are used to correct for sample selection and non-response. 
Household income has been deflated using the 2005 consumer price index and adjusted for 
household size using the modified OECD scale, which assigns a weight of 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to 
each additional adult (14 years and older) and 0.3 to each child. We top-coded extremely high values 
                                                          
44 We selected the years in order to include the first and last available year in the SHP (2000, 2014) and similar time 
intervals in-between. Even if not reported in the tables, we computed the inequality for all years to assure that findings 
are not driven by the selection of years. In the few cases, where our results varied between the years, we state this 
explicitly in the text. 
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(income above the 99.75 percentile) as these outliers strongly influence inequality measures, in 
particular the coefficient of variation which is sensitive to high income (Salverda et al. 2009). 
For yearly income in the SHP, we use variables provided from the SHP-CNEF file.45 Hourly wages 
have been computed at the basis of monthly wages and weekly working hours46 and are top-coded 
at 10 times the median wage. The measurement of part-time work is crucial for our analysis. In line 
with a national definition used by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, we consider individuals 
working at least six hours per week as active, and individuals working at least 36 hours a week as 
full-time workers.47 For some analyses, we further distinguish between small part-time work (6–19 
hours) and higher part-time work (20–35 hours).48 We are aware that the categorisation of working 
hours into three (or four) groups has consequences on the results (although not on the main 
findings). However, considering that previous studies only identified two categories (working vs not-
working) and did not consider heterogeneity in working hours among active individuals, we think 
that our approach is already revealing. 
Decomposition methods 
The empirical aim of this article is to test how the recent rise in female employment affected 
household income inequality. We use different decomposition methods and counterfactual 
distributions. Some of the hypotheses presented in Section 2 will be addressed by descriptive 
statistics.  
Factor decompositions separate household income into different additive income components. In 
our analysis, we consider three factors: female labour income (f), male labour income (m) and other 
income sources (ot).  
𝑌 = 𝑌𝑓 + 𝑌𝑚 + 𝑌𝑜𝑡   (4) 
In line with previous studies, we chose the coefficient of variation (CV) as inequality index due to its 
easy decomposability. The values of the CV are positive but not limited at the top and are 
comparable across groups and time points. The coefficient of variation can be decomposed into 
three elements (Shorrocks 1982): the inequality of each factor (𝐶𝑉𝑘 for factor k), the correlation 
                                                          
45 Details of income imputation are available from the SHP documentation.  
46 These estimates are produced including both employed and self-employed. The inequality of individual earnings is 
therefore higher than the estimates reported in Figure 11. 
47 After 1991, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office adapted the definition of economically active individuals to the ILO 
definition of one hour of work. In this article, we use the old definition proposed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
48 To distinguish work intensities, we have considered weekly working hours (usual hours and contractual hours), work-
percentages and occupational status from the grid questionnaire. Individuals with yearly earnings below CHF 12,000 are 
considered as inactive, full-time working individuals have yearly earnings of at least CHF 36,000. 
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between a pair of income components (𝜌), and the share of each component in the total income of 
the household (𝑆𝑘 for factor k). Decomposing the coefficient of variation for our three income 
components gives: 
𝐶𝑉𝑦
2 = 𝑆𝑚
2 𝐶𝑉𝑚 
2 + 𝑆𝑓
2𝐶𝑉𝑓 
2 + 𝑆𝑜𝑡
2 𝐶𝑉𝑜𝑡 
2 + 2𝜌𝑚,𝑓𝑆𝑚𝑆𝑓𝐶𝑉𝑚𝐶𝑉𝑓 + 2𝜌𝑚,𝑜𝑡𝑆𝑚𝑆𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑉𝑚𝐶𝑉𝑜𝑡 +
2𝜌𝑓,𝑜𝑡𝑆𝑓𝑆𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑉𝑓𝐶𝑉𝑜𝑡                                                              (5) 
Increased female labour force participation influences income inequality in three different ways: 
inequality of female earnings (CVf), women’s share of total household income (Sf), and the 
correlation of women’s earnings with men’s earnings (𝜌𝑚,𝑓) and with other income components 
(𝜌𝑜𝑡,𝑓). A common misconception regarding the impact of female labour force participation on 
household income is to draw conclusions about the general effect from just one of these 
components. Several contributions that found a desequalising effect of women’s labour force 
participation indeed suffered from these methodological problems. For example, higher inequality 
of women’s earnings compared to men’s earnings or the increased correlation between spouses’ 
earnings over time are not sufficient to explain the disequalising effect of female employment.  
Shift-share analysis can isolate the effect of female labour force participation on inequality by 
varying one or several of the components of the decomposition. To assess the impact over time 
using two time points (t, t+1), we compute inequality under the assumption that only some 
elements of the CV have changed to t+1 values, but the other elements have remained at their 
previous levels (t).  
An alternative approach is to compare inequality in different household types, typically 
distinguishing between dual-earner couples, male- and female-breadwinner couples, and non-
working couples (Pasqua 2008; Harkness 2013). This approach is complementary to factor 
decompositions, which cannot separate the effects due to changes in the household composition 
(e.g. more single women or more single mothers) from effects due to changes within groups. For 
example, single men households and households with a non-working wife were treated in the same 
way in factor decompositions because both are households with zero female labour income.49 
Similarly, factor decompositions cannot explicitly distinguish between full-time and part-time work. 
The main disadvantage of decompositions by groups is that discrete groups are necessary.  
                                                          
49 This has to be taken into account when results from factor decompositions are interpreted. To test hypotheses 3a 
and 3b, which focus on couples, we will report correlations for couple households in addition. Moreover, our results 
show relatively stable percentages of single households over time. It is therefore unlikely that changes the household 
composition explain changes over time.  
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The decomposition of inequality by groups can tell us to what extent inequality varies due to 
changes in the proportion of individuals in each group, changes in within-group inequality and 
changes in inequality between the different groups. Moreover, we are able to compare part-time 
and full-time work using a counterfactual analysis. We use the Theil index which can be expressed 
as the weighted sum of inequality between groups plus inequality within each level: 
𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑
𝑥𝑖
?̅?
𝑁
𝑖 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥𝑖
?̅?
) = ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅
?̅?
𝐽
𝑗 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅
?̅?
) + ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅
?̅?
𝐽
𝑗 𝑇𝑗                                       (6) 
where N is the total number of individuals i, 𝑥𝑖  the individual earnings and ?̅? mean earnings, j 
represents a group, 𝑝𝑗 is the proportion of people in group j and 𝑥?̅? the mean income of the group. 
𝑇𝑗 is the Theil within the group j and it takes the form of: 
𝑇𝑗 =
1
𝑛
∑
𝑥𝑖|𝑗
𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥𝑖|𝑗
𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅
)𝑛𝑖=1                                                               (7) 
where n is the number of people in the jth group and 𝑥𝑖|𝑗 is the individual wage of individual i in 
group j. One drawback of the Theil index and of all other inequality measures based on the logarithm 
is that zeroes lead to the index being undefined. Households with no income are, therefore, 
excluded. This is unproblematic in our case because there are virtually no households with zero total 
household income.  
Results 
Individual earnings 
We first focus on individual earnings to distinguish the evolution of women’s working hours from 
changes in hourly wages.  
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics to assess individual-level hypotheses H1 and H2.50 First, we 
look at the evolution of working types. The share of non-working women has declined from 38 % in 
2000 to 20% in 2014. In addition, active women have increased their work-percentage and full-time 
work has risen from 26% of all women in 2000 to 35% in 2014. Similarly, the share of higher part-
time (21–35 hours per week) has increased from 22% to 32%, while fewer women have a low 
percentage (from 14.2 to 12.9). Another indication that part-time working women have intensified 
their labour supply is the shrinking variation in hours worked (standard deviation declined from 12.6 
                                                          
50 We opted for simple descriptive accounts rather than for a more formal decomposition into hourly wage, working 
hours and correlations for two reasons. The first is that the decomposition requires a logarithmic transformation, which 
we find not appropriate for working hours. The second is that the decomposition relies on the coefficient of variation, 
which is highly sensitive to outliers. 
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in 2000 to 11.4 in 2014). We find thus that both entry into the labour market and shifts within active 
women (as expected in H1a and H1b) are responsible for decreasing variation of working hours and 
have contributed to lower earnings inequality at the individual level.  
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics on women’s working hours, hourly wages and yearly earnings, 2000, 2004, 
2009 and 2014 
Women 2000 (sd) 2004 (sd) 2009 (sd) 2014 (sd) 
Working type (in %)         
  0–5 hours 38.4  28.6  21.4  19.9  
  6–19 hours 14.2  15.5  15.6  12.9  
  20–35 hours 21.7  26.5  32.7  32.0  
  36+ hours 25.8   29.4   30.3   35.2   
  Total 100    100  100    100  
  N 2635  2779  2362  3819  
Working hours (weekly)         
  Working women: mean 29.4 (12.6) 29.8 (12.2) 29.9 (11.9) 31.3 (11.4) 
  All women (inc. inactive): 
mean 18.3 (17.3) 21.5 (16.8) 23.6 (16.1) 25.2 (16.1) 
  N 2744  2848  2362  3616  
Hourly wage         
  6–19 hours: mean 39.1 (30.2) 32.6 (21.4) 34.5 (22.1) 35.5 (24.9) 
  20–35 hours: mean 36.0 (17.4) 33.0 (12.9) 35.5 (15.6) 35.4 (14.3) 
  36+ hours: mean 33.1 (12.3) 33.1 (12.4) 34.6 (14.9) 34.2 (13.6) 
  Theil index 0.121 (0.009) 0.104 (0.008) 0.104 (0.009) 0.107 (0.009) 
  Correlation hours-wage −0.12  −0.05  −0.02  −0.09  
  N 1599  1913  1760  2664  
Yearly earnings         
  All (incl. inactive): Theil 
index 0.252 (0.016) 0.280 (0.009) 0.258 (0.011) 0.236 (0.009) 
 Working: Theil index 0.190 (0.015) 0.194 (0.007) 0.180 (0.009) 0.187 (0.008) 
  N 3416  4062  3119  4929  
Source: SHP 2000-2014, own calculations. Notes: Women between 25 and 64 years of age. Standard 
deviation (sd) in parenthesis. Working hours have been top-coded at 45 hours. Hourly wages have been 
deflated using 2005 as the base year. Yearly earnings include imputed values provided in the CNEF-File of the 
SHP. 
 
The next step is the link between working hours and the wage level. Table 13 shows similar hourly 
wage levels for smaller part-time, higher part-time and full-time work.  Although we cannot formally 
test whether there is a part-time penalty with these descriptive statistics, results illustrate that part-
time work is not restricted to low-qualified jobs in Switzerland.51 Accordingly, there is no correlation 
between hourly wage and working hours, which means that the channel proposed in H2 seems not 
                                                          
51 Further confirmation is provided by decomposition of the Theil index by work-type, where the distinction between 
small part-time, high part-time and full-time explains less than 0.3% of wage inequality. 
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relevant for Switzerland.52 Summing up our findings on women’s earnings inequality, we see that 
rising female labour force participation has clearly reduced women’s earnings inequality.  
 
Household income: Income sources 
We now switch to the household level to test our remaining hypotheses (H3–H5). Before addressing 
the hypotheses, we first discuss the inequality decomposition by income source (men’s earnings, 
women’s earnings and other income components) as presented in Table 14. 
Total household inequality seems to have slightly decreased since 2000 (both significant for Theil 
and CV), which is in line with official statistics on income inequality (SFSO 2014). Looking separately 
at the trends of the three income sources, we notice that inequality of men’s earnings has remained 
constant over time, whereas women’s earnings and other household income have become more 
equally distributed.53 From the analysis at the individual level, we know that the decline in women’s 
earnings can be uniquely attributed to the variation in working hours rather than to the distribution 
of the wage level, as the latter has remained stable.54 The analysis at the individual level has also 
shown that both entry into the labour market and increasing work-percentages contributed to this 
equalising effect. In addition to this, the higher earnings inequality of women compared to men 
(1.12 vs 0.78 in 2014) can be explained by their higher variation in working hours rather than by a 
higher variation in wage levels. Comparing all income sources, we notice that the inequality of each 
separate income source is higher than inequality of household income, reflecting the strong 
equalising effect of aggregation and income pooling at the household level.55 
Turning to the correlation between income factors in Table 14, we see that men’s earnings are 
negatively related to women’s earnings (−0.16 in 2000 and −0.18 in 2014). Furthermore, the 
correlation shows no time trend. The negativity can be explained by the fact that the sample 
                                                          
52 Although the years shown in Table 2 suggest a negative correlation, the coefficient is positive in other years. 
Distinguishing wage quintiles, we find that women in the middle part of the wage distribution (3rd and 4th quintile) work 
slightly more than women with lower or higher wages. 
53 A more detailed analysis on other income shows that income inequality has decreased for private transfers, public 
transfers and to a lesser extent for imputed rent. Inequality of asset income and social security pension show no clear 
trend. 
54 Although a more detailed analysis on wage inequality is beyond the scope of this article, we want to point to the role 
of the data sources. While population surveys as the SHP and the Swiss Labour Force Survey suggest a rather stable 
wage inequality, the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey shows increasing inequality of hourly wage because it covers very 
high wages (Suter et al. 2016).  
55 As a robustness check, we have performed as far as possible the same analysis with data from the Swiss Labour Force 
Survey, which has the advantages of dating back to 1991, providing larger sample sizes and fresh samples every year. 
Because of serious shortcomings of the data (e.g. only one person per household was interviewed and large 
measurement errors in household income), we just mention that the equalising effect of increasing female labour force 
participation was also observed during the 1990s and that the evolution since 2000 is comparable to results of the SHP. 
100 
 
includes not only couples, but also single households and other household members (e.g. children 
and parents, brothers and sisters, flatmates). 
To be able to test H3a and H3b (referring to the correlation between partners), Table 14 provides 
also the correlation for couples in which both partners are between 25 and 64 years old. These 
coefficients are very close to zero and do not show any time trend. Overall, we can say that neither 
H3a (which predicted a more positive correlation over time) nor H3b (which predicted a less positive 
correlation over time) is supported. This is truly a different finding from those reported in other 
studies (Cancian and Reed 1999; Schwartz 2010; Harkness 2013),56 which show positive and 
strengthening correlations between spouses’ earnings over time. To understand which women 
increased their working hours, Figure 13 shows women’s working hours by the earnings quintile of 
their partner. We see that women’s working hours clearly decline with the wage level of their 
partner. In 2014, women with partners in the highest quintile worked six hours less per week than 
women with partners in the lowest quintile.57 This difference has remained constant since 2000 
because women in all quintiles have increased their working hours in a similar way. Interestingly, 
such a clear pattern is no longer observed in other countries (OECD 2015). The explanation of the 
negative relation between women’s working hours and partner’s wages deserves further analysis 
for future studies (see Kuhn & Ravazzini 2017b and Ravazzini et al. 2017).  
Coming back to the decomposition of household income inequality by income component, we now 
address H4. Table 14 reveals that men’s earnings are still the most important income component 
accounting for 66.3% of total household income in 2000 and for 59.6% in 2014. In parallel, although 
this share stagnates since 2009, the contribution of women’s earnings to household income has 
grown from 24.9% in 2000 to 28.6% in 2014.
                                                          
56 For example, replicating the sample selection as in Harkness’ study, we find more strongly negative coefficients than 
in any other country. For all households (including non-couple households) the correlation coefficient in Switzerland 
amounts to −0.15 (for 2005), which is clearly below estimates of any other country (the lowest in Harkness’ study is 
Luxemburg with −0.03). Selecting couples only, the correlation in Switzerland is 0.04 (in 2005), while the others country 
show correlations from 0.11 in Germany to 0.36 in Finland. 
57Women with partners in the highest quintile are older (46 years on average,) than women with partners in the lowest 
earnings quintile (39 years on average). In contrast, having small children is not related to the partner’s wage level. The 
negative relation between working hours and wage of the partner holds both for participation and for the working hours 
of active women.  
101 
 
Table 14: Decomposition of household income inequality by income source. 
 Coefficient of Variation  Income shares Correlation 
  total men women other 
working 
women men women other 
women/ 
men 
women/ 
other 
men/ 
other 
women/ 
men 
couple 
2000 0.572 0.734 1.313 2.581 0.983 66.3 24.9 8.8 -0.16 0.00 -0.09 0.00 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.021)        
2004 0.582 0.789 1.279 2.162 0.980 62.8 26.4 10.9 -0.17 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.032) (0.016) (0.028)        
2009 0.507 0.740 1.141 1.818 0.909 59.9 29.7 10.4 -0.19 -0.02 -0.18 0.00 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.027) (0.071) (0.024)        
2014 0.528 0.775 1.123 1.655 0.864 59.6 28.6 11.8 -0.18 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.046) (0.018)       
Source: SHP 2000-2014. Notes: For correlation of couples, couples where both partners are between 25 and 64 have been selected. n of households: 3589 (2000), 
4307 (2004), 3261 (2009) and 5186 (2014). 
 
 
Figure 13: Weekly working hours of women by wage-quintile of their partner for 2000 and 2014. 
 
Source: SHP 2000 and 2014. Notes: All women 25–64 years of age living with their partner (including inactive); working hours top-coded at 45 hours/week; n: 
1410 in 2000, 2178 in 2014. 
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Whether this change is equalising remains an open question because women’s earnings inequality 
is lower than inequality of other income sources, but higher than inequality of men’s earnings. In 
order to properly test H4 (effect of higher contribution of female earnings to household income), 
we conduct a shift-share analysis (Table 15), which also tests the overall effect of the increased 
female labour force participation on household income inequality. 
Because the selection of the years influences the results, we show the effect for three different time 
intervals. The first row shows the CV in t0, the second row shows the CV assuming that only 
inequality of women’s earnings (CVf) increases to t1 level keeping factor shares, inequality of other 
factors and correlations among factors constant as in t0. In this scenario, inequality declines by 3.4% 
from 2000 to 2014. If we adjust the correlation between female earnings and other income sources 
(men’s earnings and other income) to their 2014 values (counterfactual 4), we find that the CV is 
2.3% lower than in 2000. In counterfactual 5, we change all the income shares to their 2014 values. 
This change increases inequality by 3.7%, which is due to a higher importance of (highly unequal) 
income of other sources for household income. If we change only the share of female earnings while 
keeping the other factors constant (counterfactual 6),58 the CV changes by less than 1%, which is 
against our expectations for H4.  
 
Table 15: Counterfactual distribution of household income for changes between 2000 and 2014 (coefficient 
of variation). 
 2000–2014 2000–2009 2004–2014 
  CV 
change 
since t0 CV 
change 
since t0 CV 
change 
since t0 
Coefficient of variation (CV) t0 0.572   0.572   0.582   
(1) women’s inequality to t1 0.552 −3.4% 0.554 −11.2% 0.564 −2.9% 
(2) men’s inequality to t1  0.592 3.5% 0.574 −3.1% 0.575 −1.1% 
(3) inequality of other income to t1 0.551 −3.6% 0.554 0.5% 0.567 −2.5% 
(4) correlation of female income to t1 0.559 −2.3% 0.559 −3.1% 0.569 −2.1% 
(5) all income shares to t1 0.593 3.7% 0.587 −2.3% 0.584 0.4% 
(6) share of female earnings to t1 0.575 0.6% 0.577 2.6% 0.582 0.1% 
(7) all women’s values to t1 0.535 −6.3% 0.537 −6.0% 0.550 −5.5% 
Coefficient of variation t1 0.529 −7.5% 0.507 −11.2% 0.529 −9.1% 
Change t1–t0 explained by women’s 
labour force participation 84.0%  53.7%  60.1% 
Source: SHP 2000 and 2014. 
                                                          
58 We divided income shares from men’s earnings and other earnings in 2000 by 0.95 (100-women’s share in 2014)/(100-
wome’s share in 2000), so that the income shares of the counterfactual distribution add to 100%. 
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Most importantly, Table 15 shows the inequality level assuming that only elements associated with 
women’s labour force participation changed (correlation, women’s share, inequality of women’s 
earnings), while men’s earnings and other household income remained constant. For the period 
2000–2014, we find that household income inequality declines from 0.57 to 0.53 (−7.5%). This 
amounts to 84% of the real decrease in income inequality between 2000 and 2014 which can be 
attributed to female labour force participation. If other years are chosen, female labour force 
participation however explains only 54% of the change between 2000 and 2009 and 60% of the 
change between 2004 and 2014. This shows that the rising female earnings have contributed to the 
small decline in household income inequality in Switzerland.  
 
Household income: Household types 
The decomposition by factor shares comes with some limitations, as it can neither show the effect 
of part-time work nor address the effects of changing household structure. Therefore, we conduct 
decompositions by household types as described in the methodological part. We distinguish ten 
groups: male breadwinner couples (1), female breadwinner couples (2), couples where the man 
works full-time and the woman part-time (3), couples where the woman works full-time and the 
man part-time (4), full-time working couples (5), and couples where both either work part-time or 
do not work (6), single women (7), single men (8), single mothers (9) and other households (10), 
which consist mostly of couples living with children, who contribute to household income.59  
Results are presented in Table 16. If not stated otherwise, the discussed changes are significant at 
the 95% confidence level. The ten household types explain 15.7% of total inequality in 2000 and 
almost the same share (15.1%) in 2014. Most of the inequality is thus within groups.  
We first address the role of single and single mother households to test H5. The share of single 
women has remained relatively stable, which means that H5a can be rejected.60 Interestingly, more 
households composed by single women would not even have increased household income 
inequality because the income level and the inequality of this group are close to the population 
averages. The situation is slightly different for single men, who show a high average income (ca 23% 
above the population average) and high (within) inequality level in 2014.  
                                                          
59 Couples whose children are younger than 18 years old or earn less than CHF. 24,000 per year are considered as couple 
households.  
60 Although Table 16 suggests an increasing share of single men, a closer examination reveals that this evolution is due 
to weights provided by the SHP. We choose nevertheless to use weighted data because unweighted data bring other 
bias. 
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In contrast, single mother households have the lowest average income of all household types and a 
high level of within inequality. Given that the share of single mothers has decreased over time, this 
socio-demographic aspect did not affect inequality (H5b).  
 
Table 16: Decomposition of household income inequality by household types in 2000 and 2014. 
  
Share 
2000 
Share 
2014 
Income 
2000 
Income 
2014 
Theil 
2000 
Theil  
2014 
Couple: male breadwinner 31.8% 19.1% 0.831 0.791 0.144 0.134 
Couple: female breadwinner 2.6% 3.5% 0.692 0.846 0.268 0.129 
Couple: man full-, woman part-time 26.8% 30.1% 1.113 1.051 0.118 0.084 
Couple: woman full-, man part-time 1.1% 1.9% 1.036 1.192 0.055 0.086 
Couple: both full-time 6.9% 9.2% 1.553 1.421 0.080 0.069 
Couple: both part-time or inactive 6.2% 7.8% 0.668 0.768 0.227 0.157 
Single women 4.2% 4.3% 0.994 0.928 0.136 0.114 
Single man 3.6% 4.7% 1.230 1.224 0.105 0.162 
Single mother 4.4% 3.6% 0.673 0.709 0.128 0.145 
Other households (other earners than couple) 12.5% 15.8% 1.170 1.055 0.091 0.088 
Overall 100% 100%    1.000    1.000 0.149 0.122 
% between household types     15.7% 15.1% 
Source: SHP 2000 and 2014. Notes: Income refers to the ration of mean income of each household type 
over the population mean income. n of households: 3589 (2000) and 5186 (2014). 
 
After testing the effect of the household composition, we look more closely at couple households. 
Most importantly, the share of male-breadwinner couples has declined from 31.8% of all working-
age households in 2000 to only 19.1% in 2014, whereas the share of full-time working men and part-
time working women increased from 26.8% to 30.1%. Full-time working couples have also become 
more common (6.9% in 2000, 9.2% in 2014), whereas couples with a main female earner remained 
marginal. It is interesting to compare the inequality and income levels within these household types. 
Single breadwinner models are more unequal than dual-earner households (the difference is 
significant in 2014, but it just misses the significance level in 2000) and have a low average 
household income (83% and 79% of average income). The abandonment of the male breadwinner 
model contributes thus to a more equal distribution of household income. Turning to the 
comparison of part-time and full-time working women, we see that the inequality within groups is 
lower when both partners work full-time, probably reflecting the heterogeneity of working hours 
among part-time working women. Because full-time working couples have high incomes (1.55 times 
the average income in 2000 and 1.42 times the average income in 2014), the effect of a switch from 
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part-time to full-time work on income inequality remains ambiguous and requires additional 
analyses that we present below. Turning to low work-intense couple households, we notice that 
their inequality appears quite high. This is probably because the reasons for a low participation in 
the labour market vary considerably (e.g. from income-rich households whose members do not 
need to work to unskilled household members excluded from the labour market).61  
In order to properly estimate the equalising potential of more working women and to compare part-
time and full-time work, we have computed a counterfactual analysis with the Theil index in 2000 
and 2014 (Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Counterfactual analysis by household type.  
 2000 in % 2014 In % 
Theil index 0.149  0.122  
1–0 hh. switch to 1–0.5 hh. 0.133 −10.7% 0.107 −11.7% 
1–0.5 hh. switch to 1–1 hh. 0.154 3.6% 0.128 5.0% 
Source: SHP 2000 and 2014. Notes: 1–0 hh. indicates male breadwinner households; 1–0.5 hh. indicate 
households where men work full-time and women work part-time and 1–1 hh. indicates household where 
both partners work full-time. 
 
A limitation of this approach is that selection effects are not taken into account. For example, the 
counterfactual assumes that inactive women would have similar earnings as women already 
working. In the first counterfactual, we simulate that all inactive partnered women enter the labour 
market as part-time workers, which means that all 1–0 type households (group 1) switch to the 1–
0.5 type (group 3) keeping other proportions, within-inequality and mean earnings constant. The 
Theil index in this scenario declines by 10.7 % in 2000 and by 11.7 % in 2014. In the second 
counterfactual, we simulate that all part-time working women living with a partner switch to full-
time, which means that all 1–0.5 type households (group 3) switch to the 1–1 type (group 5) 
assuming that other elements remain constant. This shows that more full-time work opposed to 
part-time work has little impact on household income inequality (3.6% in 2000, 5.0% in 2014). 
Nevertheless, the effect points to more income inequality.62  
 
                                                          
61 We have also carried out a decomposition of the inequality change proposed by Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) 
for the MLD (mean log deviation). The MLD of household income declined from 0.156 in 2000 to 0.125 in 2014. 75% of 
this decline can be attributed to inequality within groups, 21% to changes in relative incomes and only 4% to changes 
in the proportions.  
62 Taking account of the fact that part-time working women tend to have higher earning partners than full-time working 
women (Figure 12), the adverse effect of more full-time work on inequality is likely to be underestimated in the 
counterfactuals in Table 6. 
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Conclusion  
This study is a contribution to the growing literature addressing the consequences of demographic 
changes on household income inequality. While many studies have focused on the rising share of 
single households, we find that the most striking changes in household types in Switzerland have 
occurred within couples, as dual-earning couples have replaced the dominant male-breadwinner 
family. Our analysis has shown that this evolution has kept household income inequality low in 
Switzerland. Moreover, the small decline in inequality level observed since 2000 can mainly be 
attributed to increasing female labour force participation. A summary of the hypotheses and the 
results obtained in this analysis can be seen in Table 18. The first two rows of Table 18 highlight that 
among the different channels linking female earnings and household income inequality, the 
homogenisation of women’s working hours was the most important. Both women who enter the 
labour market and part-time working women who augment their work percentage have contributed 
to the lower variation of working hours, which translates into lower household income inequality. 
In contrast, potentially offsetting factors, such as a part-time wage penalty or an increasing 
correlation of partners’ earnings, are not relevant for this country. Women over the entire income 
distribution have increased their participation and their working hours to a similar extent.  
The very weak correlation of partner’s earnings in Switzerland is striking in comparison to studies 
on other countries that report positive and strengthening correlations between partner’s earnings. 
One of the reasons for this Swiss particularity is that women with high-earning partners work less 
than women with low-earning partners. The tax system, progressive childcare costs, attitudes, the 
gender pay-gap and weak assortative mating could be potential explanations, which need to be 
addressed in future studies.  
While there is extensive evidence that women’s entry into the labour market reduces household 
income inequality, the differences of part-time work compared to full-time work with respect to 
household inequality has been neglected by previous studies. 
Even though our analysis shows clear equalising effects of female labour force participation in 
general, we find that switching from part-time to full-time work has little impact on income 
inequality, and that this impact points even towards more household income inequality. 
Comparative studies are needed to test whether this result is particular to Switzerland. About half 
of the women in working-age work part-time (between 6 and 35 hours per week) and most of them 
work more than 50%. Average hourly wages of full-time working women and of women with small 
and high part-time percentages are very close. This means that part-time work contributes to 
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income inequality only through the variation in working hours and not through the variation in 
hourly wages in Switzerland.  
 
Table 18: Hypotheses and results on the impact of increasing female labour force participation on household 
income inequality. 
  Type of change 
Effect on 
household 
income 
inequality 
Observed result 
H1a 
All women: Variation in 
working hours decreases 
over time 
Equalising Supported 
H1b 
Working women: 
Variation in working 
hours decreases over 
time 
Equalising Supported 
H2 
Working women: 
Positive correlation 
hours- wage level 
Desequalising 
Not supported: 
part-time work is not restricted to 
low-qualified jobs 
H3a 
Household: Correlation 
of partner’s earnings 
more positive over time 
Desequalising 
Not supported: 
all women have increased their 
working hours 
H3b 
Household: 
Correlation of partner’s 
earnings less positive 
over time 
Equalising 
Not supported: 
all women have increased their 
working hours 
H4 
Household: inequality of 
income sources: 
Women’s earnings 
become more relevant 
for household income 
Equalising 
Not supported: 
Women’s earnings are slightly more 
important for household income, 
but they are more unequal than 
men’s income 
H5a 
Household structure: 
More single households 
Desequalising 
Not supported: single households 
have not increased, and single 
women do not display higher 
income inequality 
H5b 
Household structure: 
More single mother 
households 
Desequalising 
Not supported: the number of single 
mothers has declined 
 
While our analysis shows clear equalising effects of female labour force participation up to 2014, 
the scope for future effects is limited. Considering the high activity rate, the potential of labour 
market entry is limited. Furthermore, more full-time work opposed to part-time work is not a means 
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to lower household income inequality further in Switzerland. However, women who increase their 
working hours from small work-percentages could be beneficial for household income inequality.  
Our findings are more than a confirmation of previous studies. The Swiss case shows that increased 
female labour force participation is equalising even in a context of high female labour force 
participation. Another important result is that from the perspective of household income inequality, 
part-time work is not detrimental, but rather beneficial to low household income inequality. We can 
conclude by saying that high female labour force participation did not come at the price of higher 
income inequality.  
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Concluding remarks  
Main results  
This section highlights the main results of the three articles of this thesis and gives evidence-based 
suggestions for policy-related issues on female labour force participation and income inequality. 
In a country with already high female labour force participation, the first two articles of this study 
have investigated whether family policies and the economic and attitudinal endowments of 
households can contribute to expand women’s labour supply further. Attention has been paid 
mainly to the intensity of labour supply and namely to different rates of part-time work.  
The first article of this study concluded that the institutionalisation of maternity leave and the 
expansion of childcare caused a small but significant increase in female high part-time employment 
(i.e. part-time employment of between 20 and 36 hours per week increased by 2 percentage points). 
These reforms in family policy were unable to increase maternal labour force participation, but they 
succeeded in expanding the intensity of participation among already working mothers. However, 
not all mothers benefitted from this expansion in the same way.63 Vulnerable groups, such as low-
educated mothers, single mothers or large families, were not affected by these reforms,64 whereas 
upper-secondary educated mothers of two children, who were married or cohabited with their 
partner, could benefit from these reforms and increased their labour supply. Vulnerable groups, 
except for single mothers who have priority access to childcare, were probably not affected by the 
reform due to the high costs of institutional childcare in Switzerland. Even if childcare availability 
improved, accessibility might still be difficult for some groups due to high prices (Abrassart & Bonoli 
2015). Further studies indicate that childcare costs are likely to be responsible for the reduced saving 
probability of families in Switzerland (Ravazzini & Kuhn 2018). In West Germany, recent results have 
also shown that an augmented availability of low-cost, state-subsidized childcare increases mothers’ 
likelihood of returning to employment in the second year after childbirth, when paid leave 
entitlements expire (Zoch & Hondralis 2017). 
Therefore, costs and childcare availability might be the most important obstacles for an increase in 
the labour supply of all women.65 Even if the reforms eased labour supply for some population 
                                                          
63 Recent research has found that more spending leads to higher levels of childcare use, but not directly to lower levels 
of inequality. For achieving equity in childcare use, government investment should lead to an expansion of childcare 
places across the income distribution (van Lancker 2018). 
64 Single mothers and large families were particularly touched by the Dot-com crisis (2002-2005) but registered an 
improvement in their objective and subjective conditions in the years that followed (Simona & Ravazzini 2018). In some 
cases, this improvement might be linked to more generous family policy after 2005.   
65 For a discussion on the availability vs. affordability of childcare in Germany, see also Kreyenfeld & Hank (2000). 
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groups, they did not have different effects on natives and migrants.66  In this sense, the reforms 
were not discriminatory, but they also did not succeed in satisfying the expectations of some 
municipalities by attracting high-qualified migrants in cantons that expanded childcare more than 
the national average.  A more refined analysis at the municipal level might however produce 
different results in terms of mobility. The results indicated also that the reforms did not produce 
any change in paternal employment. This result would hardly change with a more sophisticated level 
of analysis. Paternal employment was therefore not touched by the reform and this means that 
women could work more without needing men to adjust their labour supply. Even if for men it would 
be difficult to increase their labour supply even further, this different sensitivity of family policies 
among women and men points to the fact that family remains a women’s business. 
The second article of this dissertation showed that apart from childcare availability, culture and 
social norms are important dimensions for women’s labour supply in Switzerland.  This evidence has 
been supported by several elements. First, this study found that women’s utility of staying home is 
higher for mothers in the Italian-speaking part of the country and that, controlling for other 
characteristics, married women prefer to stay home than cohabiting women. Although the lack of 
childcare in the Italian-speaking part of the country could be an explanation for these results, the 
combined effect of culture (i.e. the linguistic region) and marital preferences suggests that women 
with traditional values have stronger preferences for housework than for paid work. Second, the 
analysis confirmed that gender role attitudes influence women’s labour supply in a considerable 
way. In couples, not only women’s gender role attitudes, but also their partners’ attitudes play an 
important role in the choice of working hours. Attitudes affect both the utility of staying home and 
the reaction to a pay rise. Furthermore, the reaction depends on women’s attitudes. Women with 
home-oriented attitudes reduce their working hours more strongly following a pay rise than women 
with work-oriented attitudes. The same holds for partners’ pay rise: women with home-oriented 
attitudes reduce their labour supply more than women with work-oriented attitudes if their partner 
earns more. Therefore, even though the economic impact of partners’ income and wages on 
women’s labour supply has reduced over time, partners are still able to affect women’s decisions 
both with their economic and with their attitudinal endowments. For home-oriented women, the 
                                                          
66 Abrassart & Bonoli (2015) found that childcare use depends also on parents’ nationality (e.g. children from South and 
East European countries are less likely to be found in childcare centres than Swiss children and children from Northern 
countries. How this is related to the lack of informal childcare (e.g. the proximity of family and grandparents) and 
therefore to potentially high childcare costs or to home-oriented attitudes and culture is something that remains to be 
studied in the future. 
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joint effect of income and of moral pressures to stay home and to take care of children are 
particularly important.  
Within this cultural setting, policies that aim at stimulating labour supply through financial 
incentives targeted directly on women might thus not produce the expected results. In order to 
stimulate women’s labour supply, it would be better if financial incentives targeted the entire 
household. Childcare costs are placed on families and might be a good strategy. When costs are low, 
external childcare is indeed used more also by low-educated households (Abrassart & Bonoli 2015) 
with more traditional home-oriented values. Financial incentives could also be placed directly on 
fathers as women’s labour supply is responsive to the economic endowment of their partners. 
Financial incentives for fathers to work part-time might stimulate maternal employment and lead 
to a more equalitarian division of work within couples. Another strategy to stimulate maternal 
labour supply could be to shift the focus to non-monetary elements.  Among these elements, high 
quality formal childcare, work-friendly school schedules and flexibility in the workplace and in 
teleworking might be viable ways to create a more attractive work environment for women with 
children. From a legal point of view, the constitution of paid paternity leave and incentives to share 
parental leaves between mothers and fathers could be additional desirable solutions to increase the 
maternal labour supply and at the same time reach more equality within the household.   
The household perspective is not only relevant for the study of female labour force participation, 
but also for the analysis of the effects of women’s labour supply on household income inequality. 
The last article of this thesis attested the presence of an increasing trend of dual-earning couples 
compared to the previously dominant male-breadwinner model. Female labour force participation 
increased between 2000 and 2014 and changes happened mainly within couples, while the 
proportion single households remained largely unchanged over time. External work duties are 
therefore more shared among women and men in recent years than before and this had 
consequences on household income inequality. 
Several mechanisms intervened in the relationship between women’s labour supply and household 
income inequality. First, with more female labour force participation, women’s earnings inequality 
declined. Both women who entered the labour market and part-time working women who 
augmented their hours of work contributed to more homogenous wages among women and to the 
reduction of inequality. All women increased their working hours, but the scenario could have been 
different if some groups increased their labour supply more than others. Inequality could have 
reduced even further if work among potentially low-earning women increased more than among 
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potentially high-earning women. The first article of this thesis showed that the expansion of 
childcare was more favourable for the labour supply of women with upper-secondary education 
who were already working. As the effect on inequality was mainly produced by women who entered 
the labour market, the expansion of childcare is unlikely to have produced important effects on 
household income inequality. However, if childcare costs were reduced and more women with low-
education entered the labour market, then childcare policies could potentially have an equalising 
effect on household incomes. 
The second mechanism that intervened in the relationship between women’s labour supply and 
household income inequality is the correlation of partners’ earnings. In Switzerland, this mechanism 
has not altered inequality as women over the entire income distribution have increased their 
participation and their working hours. Despite increasing assortative mating in hourly wages in this 
country (Ravazzini et al. 2017), the income correlation between partners has remained very close 
to zero. This could be because after selectivity in the mating process based on wages or wage 
potentials, wage inequality between partners increases following labour supply adjustments over 
the duration of the partnership (Ravazzini et al. 2017). If women did not reduce their labour supply 
over the life course, the correlation between partners’ wages could be higher. This would lead to 
higher income inequality between households. This means that if childcare costs did not only 
succeed in stimulating potentially low-earning women to work but succeeded also in reducing 
women’s interruptions on the labour market, income inequality could increase. Inequality could 
increase even further if already working women switched from part-time to full-time work. Even if 
wages linked to part-time and full-time positions are similar in this country and more women 
working full-time would not increase the variability in women’s wages, inequality between 
households would increase because of the correlation between partners’ incomes. Women living 
with high-earning partners are currently working less than women living with low-earning partners.  
If all women became more attached to the labour market and decided to contribute as much as 
men do, households would probably become more polarised into income-rich and income-poor 
household. This increase in inequality would not necessarily be driven by a negative phenomenon 
because women could profit in terms of their realisation on the labour market and in their careers, 
but it might nevertheless lead to negative externalities, such as high crime rates and low social trust, 
that must be considered as a social cost. In this case, there would be a trade-off between gendered 
inequality and total household inequality. Childcare subsidies on one side and taxes on (father’s) 
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incomes on the other side might then be implemented as competing policies to counterbalance 
these two forms of inequality.  
Even if possible, this scenario is however unlikely because housework and childcare responsibilities 
are difficult to externalise completely. Believing that all women and men could work full-time is also 
unlikely in the future due to increasing robotization and digitalisation that will substitute part of 
manual and repetitive jobs.  With less traditional gender role attitudes, what could more likely 
happen in the future is that men will share housework responsibilities and childcare so that both 
partners would have short career interruptions. If this was the case, income inequality within 
households would be smaller and therefore gender inequality would be smaller. Yet, the total effect 
on income inequality is difficult to predict as inequality between households might still increase due 
to assortative mating. In this scenario, however, inequality would reflect returns to education and 
be more linked to educational investments than to gender roles. Another question that will remain 
at that point will be whether different educational fields should have different returns. Currently, it 
is arguable whether people’s effort is represented by educational choices and then fairly rewarded 
on the labour market. Will we need more programmers or more carers in the future? With more 
women choosing social disciplines and more men choosing technical disciplines, inequality within 
and between gender and households will probably depend on which jobs will have the highest 
demand compared to their supply. In addition, the introduction of new policies, such as a basic 
income scheme, might shake the rules and alter these socially constructed roles that both women 
and men are enduring. It is difficult to predict how gender roles, gender stereotypes, returns to 
education and social policies will change in the next years, but their interactions are clearly 
something interesting that future research could address.  
 
Future research 
The contribution of this study to the overall literature could be extended in several ways.  
As previously mentioned, childcare costs are an important element that should be included in the 
analysis to evaluate why some mothers (e.g. low-educated mothers and mothers with a migration 
background) do not use external childcare. Like the study of Abrassart & Bonoli (2015) for the canton 
Vaud, the analysis should go beyond childcare availability and study prices, quality and proximity of 
childcare places at the municipal level all over Switzerland. This could be done when detailed data 
about childcare supply and demand become available. In addition to childcare, mothers are affected 
also by after-school care policies (Felfe et al. 2016). This is particularly important for women with 
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more than one child and studies that combine childcare and after-school care could provide 
additional insights on how family policies affect women’s labour supply and fertility decisions.   
More generally, the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 4 can establish some new links 
between separate micro and macro elements, but it represents only a relatively small part of the 
overall picture. Among the elements that this study has not investigated, it could be examined how 
gender role attitudes expressed through voting preferences shape the degree of childcare services 
available to working parents. Although this could be methodologically feasible to study, the path 
between attitudes and implemented policies is not direct and budget constraints often limit the 
interpretation. The first article of this study has addressed this concern with a robustness check 
limiting the analysis to municipalities with similar voting preferences, but a more detailed analysis 
could be performed in this respect. 
Another possible relationship that could be better identified in Figure 4 regarding the socio-political 
context and gender role attitudes involves female labour force participation. Some studies have 
found that the level of female labour force participation in the country of origin or in the country of 
residence shapes the degree of tolerance towards working mothers (Zuo & Tang 2000; Fernandez 
& Fogli 2009) and is able to predict future levels of female labour force participation (Fernandez 
2013). In Figure 4, an arrow could therefore be drawn between female labour force participation at 
the macro level and gender role attitudes at the micro level. Given the cross-national design that 
would be required to study this relationship, this dissertation has studied only the direct relationship 
between individual and partner’s attitudes and the number of hours worked by women. A 
comparative study with many countries would allow for this additional test.  
This study has mainly focused on female labour force participation and women’s labour supply. Even 
if the number of hours worked by women could increase, this increase does not necessarily translate 
into better jobs and better careers. Focusing specifically on women’s labour supply and part-time 
work, this thesis has omitted important indicators about female employment and women’s life, such 
as career progression, job satisfaction and life satisfaction. Future research could address these 
points and investigate whether external childcare is related to improvements in women’s quality of 
life, careers and self-realisation.  
In addition, the impact of partners’ economic and attitudinal endowments on other job-related 
indicators than the number of hours of work worked by women could be something to explore in 
future research. Although men have a relatively stable labour supply that justifies why many studies 
consider men as an exogenous element for women’s labour supply decision, the repartition of work 
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and family duties within the household might change in the future and models that are able to 
capture joint decisions might become the norm. The evolution of work arrangements within couples 
and the share of single households are likely to determine the most appropriate methodology to 
use in future research.   
More research is needed also in the field of income inequality. Even though income inequality is a 
source of instability, it is not yet established until which threshold income inequality should be 
considered normal or even beneficial to stimulate people’s efforts. Moreover, an increase in income 
inequality could be associated with societal changes that could be considered positive from other 
points of view. Research could go in this direction verifying these trade-offs and finding a threshold 
of “unfair” inequality that is harmful for the economy and society.  
Stable income inequality is a condition that depends also on the stability of the active population. 
With population ageing and with the baby boomers approaching retirement, other forms of 
inequality and namely wealth inequality could become more relevant to study the fair distribution 
of resources within society.  Research that focuses on wealth inequality is relevant also from a 
gender perspective as women accumulate less wealth than men over their life-course. Partners’ 
effects on wealth accumulation are also something that could be investigated more in the future. 
How pensions could be tailored to decrease this inequality and which political measures could be 
taken to contain wealth inequality is an open field for future research.
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